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ABSTRACT
That the fundamental tension between liberalism and democracy, the two
founding imperatives of the American political tradition, has been an important
theme of the American novel is obvious when one considers the contribution that
writers of the stature ofMelville, Hawthorne, Twain, James, Dos Passos, and
Steinbeck have made to the discussion of liberal democracy in America. Richard
Rorty has recently offered the view that there is little value in exploring the work
of contemporary novelists for their assessments of the state of American civil and
political life since, "in America, at the end of the twentieth century, few inspiring
images and stories are being proffered," with those examples of literary "elite
culture" that are produced (he does single out the novel) being "written in tones of
either self-mockery or of self-disgust" (.Achieving our Country: 1998, 4-6). It is
my contention that rather than being consummate connoisseurs of political
despondency, many prominent postwar American novelists continue to participate
in the ongoing theoretical and political discussion amongst historiographers,
political theorists, literary critics, essayists, and journalists, that perennially
surrounds the subject of the state of American liberal democracy. By looking at
specific novels by Norman Mailer, Thomas Pynchon, Philip Roth, and Don
DeLillo, I explore, not just the contribution of these postwar novelists to the
vitality of contemporary American political debate, but also how the ideas, issues,
themes, ideologies, quarrels, and histories that have defined the development of
liberal democracy and liberal democratic theory in postwar America, provide a
useful and illuminating context in which to read the work of some of America's
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What a curiosity is our Democracy, what a mystery. No
novelist unwinds a narrative so well.
--Norman Mailer, from "Nixon's Fall"
One of the ways to approach the American novel, as Ralph Ellison has
suggested, is to see it as a "function of American democracy" (Ellison 308). Part
of what he means by this is that the form of the novel seems to suit the kind of
societal, political, and aesthetic shifts that are a constant in a nation which asserts
its dedication to the often-conflicting principles of liberty and equality, to the
political idea of liberal democracy. The novel, as Ellison would have it, is the
literary form best able to engage in conversation with the complexity and diversity
of the American experience, and particularly to represent the often wide gap
between the liberal democratic ideals that America professes and their social,
political, and cultural realization. In the hands of Henry James, Stephen Crane,
and Mark Twain, argues Ellison, the novel "suggested possibilities, courses of
action, stances against chaos," it helped to "create the American conception of
America" (316). In general terms, this dissertation is a study of four of postwar
America's most important novelists—Norman Mailer, Don DeLillo, Thomas
Pynchon, and Philip Roth— and the critique of the state of American liberal
democracy which each offers as an element of his fiction. It attempts to
demonstrate the manner in which these novelists engage with and participate in
current and ongoing theoretical and political discussions amongst political
philosophers, historiographers, literary critics, journalists, essayists, and other
writers, concerning the many issues surrounding the nature and vitality of postwar
American liberal democracy.
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In relation to its capacity and willingness to live up to the demands placed
on the American novel as a "function of American democracy," as a literary forum
where the social and political predicament of the nation is made to wrestle with the
liberal democratic faith in its possibilities, the postwar novel has often come in for
criticism. Ellison himself finds, in the postwar novel, a lack of "a certain
necessary faith in human possibility before the next unknown," and more recently,
Richard Rorty, in his book Achieving Our Country, has offered the view that there
is little use in searching the work of contemporary American novelists for their
assessments of the state of American liberal democracy since, "in America, at the
end of the twentieth century, few inspiring images and stories are being proffered,"
with those examples of literary "elite culture" that are produced being "written in
tones of either self-mockery or of self-disgust" (Rorty 4-6). By looking in depth at
specific novels by four prominent postwar novelists—Mailer's The Naked and the
Dead, The Armies of the Night, and Harlot's Ghost; Pynchon's Vineland;
DeLillo's Libra and Underworld; and Philip Roth's American Pastoral, IMarried
a Communist, and The Human Stain ("The American Trilogy")—I attempt to
demonstrate that in fact liberal democratic faith remains a vital theme and issue for
these authors, or at least one that has not yet been fully displaced by
disillusionment, despair, or disgust concerning the possibilities suggested by the
ideals of liberalism and democracy. Choosing to focus on specific postwar
novelists and novels, rather than surveying the whole period, allows for a more
rigorous and differentiated picture of the American novel's continuing investment
in the debates and arguments surrounding the state of American liberal democracy
to emerge.
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To frame this study I broadly focus on four central liberal democratic
themes—citizenship, legitimacy, justice, and individualism—dedicating one
chapter to each. I say "broadly focus" because each fundamental theme will
provide a point of departure for a discussion that will seek out those areas, related
to the main theme, where the concerns of the novels in question intersect with
matters pertinent to relevant political issues, or central to specific interpretations of
historical or political developments. The constellation of political, social, and
cultural concerns related to liberal democracy raised in the work of these four
novelists is in itself evidence that liberalism and democracy remain not only
relevant, but crucial terms in the vocabulary which the postwar American novel, or
at least these specific exponents of it, use to navigate the ever-shifting waves of
the American experience. Rather than consummate connoisseurs of political
despondency, the American novelists featured demonstrate a kind of obstinate
faith in America's first principles of liberalism and democracy in the midst of the
often-strident critique of contemporary American political culture and institutions
that one confronts in their work. In this regard they are correlate in tone with
some of the most idiosyncratic voices in American postwar political philosophy
and theory, thinkers like Sheldon Wolin, Christopher Lasch, and George Kateb,
whose perspectives and conceptual approaches will function as something of a
compass to provide some guidance through the political depths that the novels in
question traverse.
Just as important, however, are the imaginative, formal, and distinctly
literary resources that these novelists have at hand when they venture into these
political waters. The idioms, conventions, and literary traditions on which Mailer,
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Pynchon, DeLillo, and Roth draw to help structure their narratives and elucidate
their themes both inform and emerge from the nature of the political critique
which they offer. Thus Mailer's allegorical approach to the "war novel" in The
Naked and the Dead, DeLillo's ironic use of conspiracy narrative and Gothic
imagery in Underworld, the tempered pragmatism of Pynchon's appeal to
elements of pastoralism and the jeremiad in Vineland, and Roth's reimagining of
the mythic and literary conventions of the Adamic tradition in American literature
in American Pastoral, all exhibit an insistent interest in the potential of
characteristically literary concerns and preoccupations to engage with moral and
topical matters more immediately relevant to the state of liberal democratic
politics in America. By employing symbolic resources associated with the
literary, and often with the American novel in particular, these writers
acknowledge the strength and potential of American liberal democratic ideals,
principles, and traditions to continue to appeal to the imagination, while also
emphasizing the distance between those principles and their implementation and
practice in postwar America.
The general condition of the American liberal democratic imagination is
one of the overriding themes shared by the novelists discussed here, a concern that
is inseparable from the particular issues surrounding developments in postwar
American politics and political institutions that capture their attention in specific
novels. The decline of a progressive and populist inspired liberalism and the rise
of a more apolitical mode of politics that has done much to impoverish the public
sphere in postwar America is registered in the effort undertaken by these novelists
to dramatize the damage done to the morale of the American liberal democratic
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imagination by developments in American political and social life such as: the
nature of the expansion of state and corporate power following WW II, the broad
diminishment of American civil society and popular political engagement, the
distrust and paranoia engendered by the cold war "culture of secrecy," the growing
disillusionment with the idea of a common America in the wake of the Vietnam
war, and the near-abandonment of the notion of individualism to a reductive
economic conception that has solidified at the heart of an ascendant neo-
conservatism in America. Against this background, I will argue, Mailer, DeLillo,
Pynchon, and Roth offer fictions that pursue avenues of insightful critique,
comment, and often condemnation of these developments, but also suggest
responses to them, evoking elements of liberal democratic faith and possibility,
however tempered, which emanate in their representations of modes of resistance,
hopeful artistic visions, and often nostalgic recollections of the recent past, as well
as suggestive appeals to a Lincolnian conception of individual self-invention, a
Jeffersonian notion of democratic revolution, and an Emersonian affirmation of
justice.
The first chapter begins by looking at the themes and issues related to the
crisis of liberal democratic citizenship raised in Norman Mailer's The Naked and
the Dead, and particularly to Mailer's concerns regarding the emergence of an
apolitical and anti-democratic style of politics in postwar America, articulated in
the novel's allegorical presentation of the decline of liberalism and the
increasingly technocratic and corporatist tendencies of the American state and of
American politics. Mailer offers a diagnosis of these tendencies as totalitarian and
depicts the diminishment of the vitalizing tension between the right and the left in
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America, often referred to as "the end of ideology," as a kind of paralysis of
politics, the colonization of the American liberal democratic imagination by the
stifling logic of the technocrat. In The Armies of the Night, and against this
general drift towards the apolitical, Mailer affirms a mode of political action that
asserts both the idea of the revolutionary central to the principle of democratic
participation and the experience of existential subjectivity which Mailer posits as a
vital element of the notion of individual freedom rooted in the American liberal
tradition. For Mailer, the fundamental tension which marks liberal democracy,
between the demands of democratic politics and the principle of liberal freedom,
lends citizenship the kind of dynamic and existential quality which Mailer pits
against the stagnant and instrumental character of the mode of anti-politics he
identifies with the technocratic and corporatist challenge to the American liberal
democratic imagination. While recognizing the concessions and compromises
which participation in a democratic public life demand from the individual, the
"theory of citizenship," if it can be called that, which sustains Mailer's narrative in
The Armies of the Night, argues toward a renewal of the foundational idea of the
revolutionary in American politics as both a means of resisting the "totalitarian"
psychology which Mailer detects at the heart of the postwar ascendance of techno-
corporatist ideology, and an expression of democratic individuality, a performance
of individual subjectivity made possible by the experience of the contingency and
plurality of values in the political realm.
Mailer's diagnosis of the blight of technocratic and anti-democratic
tendencies in postwar American politics and political institutions also sets the
stage for Chapter Two, as Mailer turns his attentions, in Harlot's Ghost, to the
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ambiguous presence of the CIA in postwar American political life. Focusing on
Mailer's narrative foray into the peculiar bureaucratic world of "the agency" at the
heart of the cold war "culture of secrecy" as a continuation of his abiding interest
in the apolitical and democratically illegitimate forces at work within postwar
America, Harlot's Ghost provides a handy thematic bridge to the more extensive
discussion of two novels by Don DeLillo, Libra and Underworld, which are the
primary focus of the chapter. The rampant suspiciousness and pessimism that are
central elements of DeLillo's fiction reflect the dominant political mood that
DeLillo detects in the nation and age in which he writes. In Libra, DeLillo's
fictional account of the events surrounding the assassination of President John F.
Kennedy, the cogency and relevance of conspiracy narrative is both affirmed and
undermined, as DeLillo fashions a narrative perspective that works between the
explanatory pillars offered by conspiracy and coincidence as a response to what
DeLillo refers to as the "gloom [...] of unknowing" which the uncertainty and
skepticism regarding the official explanation of the assassination still evokes in the
American popular consciousness. Counterpoised between paranoia and
contingency DeLillo's narrative mode, in Libra, calls attention to the crisis of
confidence in the liberal democratic legitimacy of American political institutions
that has accompanied the intensification of systemic power and state secrecy in
postwar America, while also affirming a persistent populist desire within the
American political imagination for a more democratic engagement with those
forces—economic, political, and social—which shape and influence events and
individual circumstances in American life. In this way the conspiratorial narrative,
a mode in which Libra both operates and intervenes, is utilized as a style of
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critique, a way of dramatizing the important social and political shifts which the
popularity of conspiracy theory underlines, while also functioning as recognizable
evidence of an active liberal democratic impulse, one which reacts against the
erosion of democratic legitimacy and the degradation of liberal individuality, but
whose appeals to a logic in which neither exist or are possible are often made at
the expense of a conception of individual political resistance or democratic action
capable of affirming a sense of effective political agency or the possibilities
offered by popular political engagement.
In Underworld, DeLillo broadens his narrative scope beyond the events
and uncertainties surrounding the Kennedy assassination to encompass nearly the
entire postwar era, tracing developments in the form and nature of paranoia and
skepticism in the American consciousness from the nuclear-age anxieties shaped
by the bi-polar tension and the expansion of the security state characteristic of the
cold war era, through to the post-cold war period of expanding globalization and
the growing trepidation and unease regarding social fragmentation and
environmental disaster. Utilizing Gothic conventions and imagery, DeLillo's
novel portrays a world haunted by forces and systems of power whose expansion
and increasing complexity give rise to an atmosphere of pervasive anxiety and
suspiciousness that DeLillo explores in his dramatization, not only of some of the
central historical events and figures of the postwar period in America, but also in
the fragments of life on the streets, discussions in the workplace, and the
experiences of the classroom which Underworld develops as a kind of
counterhistory, or what DeLillo has called "the lost history that becomes the
detailed weave of novels" ("Power" 5). While there is little doubt that DeLillo's
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work reflects the widespread cynicism and pessimism which he recognizes as a
central element of the period's popular political and cultural disposition, the
sympathetic manner in which he incorporates into his narrative perspective
hopeful artistic visions, nostalgic recollections of community, inchoate yearnings
in his characters to escape from the demoralizing forces which circumscribe
contemporary life, and a thematic interest in the possibility of redemption and
renewal is a clear indication that his work is not wholly given over to the primary
mood it represents, but in fact seeks to both critique and respond to that pessimism
and suspicion by preserving an adversarial sense of political agency and individual
selfhood as part of its vision. It should be pointed out that the discussion of
paranoia and conspiracism undertaken here does not address the effects of the
September 11th, 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York, an
event which, while undoubtedly a central development in the nature of post-cold
war fears and anxieties in America, falls outside of the narrative and historical
scope of Underworld (1997).1
The narrative of Thomas Pynchon's Vineland also ranges broadly across
postwar American social and political history, a period which has witnessed a
significant decline in the fortunes of progressive and reform politics in America,
developments which are central to the thematic concerns of what is often
considered Pynchon's most political novel to date. At issue in Chapter Three is
the determinate nature of the political ideas underlying the critique of the state of
American democratic politics which Pynchon undertakes in his work, and
specifically the extent to which Pynchon can be said to be an exponent of a form
' For a sense of DeLillo's perspective on post- 9/11 America see his recently published novel
Cosmopolis (2003).
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of pragmatism that is consistent with liberal democratic principles. The themes of
justice and the expansion and abuse of state power dominate Vineland's staging of
the waning influence of liberal and progressive ideals in contemporary America, as
Pynchon dramatizes the impact of the New Deal, the decline of the New Left, and
the ascension of neo-conservatism on the shape and practice of contemporary
American democracy. While there is an unmistakable element of lament in
Vineland's approach, there is also a recognizable attempt to affirm, against the
skepticism and disillusionment for which Pynchon is well-known, a hopeful vision
of the future implicit in the promise of American liberal democratic ideals.
Pynchon represents both the infirmity and the resiliency of the democratic
aspirations of reform politics in America, traversing the thematic territory between
justice as a foundational liberal principle and the experience of injustice in postwar
American life. Making a case for the presence of a pragmatic Emersonianism in
Vineland, I argue that Pynchon's novel takes seriously the possibility of a renewed
progressive and populist spirit in American political thought and practice as a
response to the dispirited and enervated state of the political left in contemporary
America.
Philip Roth's fictional exploration of the tensions between the political and
social realities of postwar America and the mythic elements of American identity
in his "American trilogy" is the subject of Chapter Four. In American Pastoral, I
Married a Communist, and The Human Stain, Roth reflects on the ambivalent
nature of the American ideal of self-invention, offering three narratives in which
the ever present antagonism between the liberal promise of individualism and the
demands visited on the individual by social and political forces and the
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contingencies of history surface to leave its mark both on the lives of his
protagonists and on the larger story of postwar America. By working self¬
consciously within the framework of American Adamic mythology in American
Pastoral, Roth draws on archetypal and literary conventions to help dramatize
both the tragic elements of recent American history, particularly in regard to the
Vietnam war, and the potent sense of possibility which the myth of the Adamic
individual continues to offer the American democratic imagination. Roth pursues
this thematic thread back through the McCarthy era in IMarried a Communist and
into the period of the impeachment crisis which plagued the presidency of Bill
Clinton in The Human Stain, offering a perspective on those moments in postwar
America when the often-strained seams binding the liberal narrative of individual
possibility to the unfolding tale of the American experience seem to be most
tested. Throughout, Roth maintains an awareness of both the vitalizing role that
individualism plays in the idea and the ideology of America and the illusory nature
of such idealism, of the collision between his characters' visions of American
freedom, innocence, and self-reliance and the contingencies and limitations
imposed on their individual fates by the historical failures and unresolved issues
regarding race and inequality that continue to impede the realization of the
promise of American liberal democracy.
Martha Nussbaum, in her book Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination
and Public Life, makes a case for what she sees as the importance of the literary
imagination in the overall dynamic of political discussion in America, a position
which grows out of the conviction, most eloquently articulated, Nussbaum argues,
in the work of Walt Whitman, that "storytelling and literary imagining are not
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opposed to rational argument, but can provide essential ingredients to rational
argument" (Nussbaum xiii). The approach adopted in what follows takes
Nussbaum's assertion quite straightforwardly, regarding the polemical tendencies,
ideological sympathies, and moralistic elements of the works under consideration
as an invigorating ingredient of both the American novel and of many fundamental
debates in American political life. Aside from the prominent place which each
holds in contemporary American fiction, what specifically recommends Mailer,
Roth, Pynchon, and DeLillo for this study is the trenchant manner in which the
force of their literary imagination engages with the kinds of fundamental moral
and political matters which are directly relevant to the discussions and debates
which surround the notion of liberal democracy in contemporary America.
The novelists discussed here have all produced fiction that productively
participates in political argument in a broad sense, engaging themes and fashioning
narratives that actively employ political ideas and perspectives as essential
elements of their fictional projects. This is not, of course, a characteristic that is
exclusive to these four writers in postwar America. The same can be said of the
work of novelists ranging from Gore Vidal, Joan Didion, and John Edgar
Wideman to Ralph Ellison, Toni Morrison, and Kathy Acker, amongst others. It is
the combination of this political sensibility and the range of postwar historical,
intellectual, and political developments with which these novelists have concerned
themselves in their work that has prompted their inclusion here. All four of these
novelists have produced narratives that attempt to address the historical breadth of
the postwar period in America, raising issues, substantive and theoretical, which
often draw on and contribute to ongoing political and cultural "arguments"
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regarding the significant events and developments which have left their mark on
both the idea and the practice of American liberal democracy. In this regard, these
writers offer exemplary opportunities to gauge the complexity, insightfulness and
persuasiveness with which the postwar American novel continues to contribute to
that discussion, both by considering the reflections on the state of American liberal
democracy offered in their work, and by demonstrating the extent of the literary,
political, and moral investment of their fiction in keeping faith with the both idea
and the practice of liberalism and democracy in America.
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CHAPTER ONE
The Ascension of Technocorporatism and the Crisis of Liberal
Democratic Citizenship in Norman Mailer's The Naked and the Dead
and The Armies of the Night
Not since the debates between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists which
preceded the ratification of the American constitution, and which produced such
foundational liberal democratic documents as The Federalist Papers and John
Adams's A Defense of the Constitution of the Government of the United States of
America, has the citizen as a site of tension between the demands of liberal
individualism and democratic principles so dominated the discourse of political
theory in America. The liberal-communitarian debate that has influenced so much
of Anglo-American political theory for the better part of two decades now has
succeeded in foregrounding many issues, ranging from the political to the
epistemological, that are sources of conflict within any conception of citizenship
which hopes to bridge the philosophic divide between liberalism and democracy.
Postmodernism too, with its complex and varied attacks on "liberal subjectivity,"
has sought to rupture the liberal democratic construction of citizenship into its
constituent parts in order to make apparent the "technologies of the subject" that
contemporary late-capitalist society has inherited from the Enlightenment. And, of
course, there is the crisis of political identity and community that face citizens of
America as a consequence of the collapse of Communism and the end of the cold
war. All of these challenges serve to highlight the most elemental of tensions
within liberal democracy, the difficulties that always surround "the nature of the
2 It is generally agreed that the liberal-communitarian debate began in earnest with the publication
ofMichael Sandel's Liberalism and the Limits ofJustice in response to John Rawls' influential A
Theory ofJustice.
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individual and his [/her] role in the polity" (Pennock, 2). Such discourse
constitutes what Ronald Beiner has usefully called the liberal democratic "problem
of citizenship" (Beiner 3).
Of course, as relevant and philosophically significant as Beiner's "problem
of citizenship" is, in contemporary America one cannot hope to adequately
approach questions surrounding the relationship between the individual and the
polity without recognizing the influence of a crucial third player in the dynamic of
citizenship —the state. For all of the epistemological and theoretical questions
concerning the metaphysical girding of the liberal democratic notion of
citizenship, confronting the meaning and praxis of the state—the organization and
institutionalization of political power—means facing up to what Robert J. Pranger
and Danilo Zolo have identified as "the eclipse of citizenship" in contemporary
America (Pranger, Zolo 152). As Alan Wolfe has pointed out, the state, as both a
concept and as a theoretical reference point, has suffered some neglect in
contemporary American political discourse, despite the "continued centrality of
organized political power in modern societies" (Wolfe ix). In fact for political
theorists such as Sheldon Wolin and George Armstrong Kelly3 it is the growth and
mobilization of state power beyond the legitimating boundaries of democratic
political practice that have made "conceptions of democracy, and especially of the
democratic citizen, anachronistic" (Wolin, Essay 184). Such political thinkers
argue that the central culprit of the "crisis of citizenship" in contemporary America
is not an inadequate theory of citizenship, nor an inability for political institutions
3"
Today's problematic nature of citizenship (in the democracies, and especially the United States)
is in part linked to the demise of the concept of the state in the twentieth century, the very time
when the powers of the empirical state were growing inordinately" (Kelly 79).
17
to liberate themselves from the Enlightenment conception of the autonomous
subject, but rather the undemocratic nature of the state and its growing
imperviousness to legitimate democratic praxis and politics.
It is then this complex triangular relationship between the individual, the
polity, and the state, that marks the theoretical and political ground on which the
nature, and in fact validity, of contemporary liberal democratic citizenship in
America is contested. The "explosion of interest in the concept of citizenship
among political theorists [...] [and] among thinkers on all points of the political
spectrum" has not necessarily been mirrored across the whole range of the
American novel, but it is certainly the case that many of the issues and themes
prominent in the work of Norman Mailer can be said to traverse this disputed
territory (Kymlicka and Norman 283).
Since 1948, the work of Norman Mailer has offered such unique and
compelling commentary on the defining developments of contemporary American
social and political life that, as Christopher Hitchens writes, "the politics of
Norman Mailer have conventionally been evaluated more as a personal register of
the American Zeitgeist, and less as owing any debt or duty to ideology" (115).
And yet Mailer has, at least since his infamous speech at the Waldorf peace
conference in 19494, made his own political development a significant, and often
very public, focal point of his career as a writer. Despite an ideological odyssey
that has seen Mailer don political figurations ranging from Marxist5 to Trotskyite
4 See Manso 134-35
5
Referring to Mailer's Waldorf peace conference speech Irving Howe is reported by Peter Manso
as saying: "The speech was pure left-wing sectarianism, the line that both sides are no good and
moving towards an increasing concentration of state power. God knows what being a committed
Marxist means, but I don't think Norman ever qualified in any doctrinal sense" (Manso 135).
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to his most considered and mature position, in which he describes himself as a
"left conservative," Mailer has consistently, again borrowing Hitchens' terms,
"retained a certain idea of the Left." Despite his flirtations with more radical
political ideas, Mailer has, since the time of his first novel, shown a strong and
passionate sympathy for the principal concerns of American liberal democratic
citizenship6, a sympathy that has shaped his political dissidence and helped to
define the thematic concerns of his fiction. As Mailer himself has recently
commented, upon re-reading the bulk of his body of work while preparing a
collection to commemorate the fifty-year anniversary of the publication of The
Naked and the Dead,
One theme came to predominate—it was apparent that most of my
writing was about America. How much I loved my country—that
was evident—and how much I didn't love it at all! Our noble idea
of democracy was forever being traduced, sullied, exploited, and
downgraded [...] So, yes, the question was alive—would greed and
the hegemony of the mediocre [...] triumph over democracy?
(Mailer Time, I)
Mailer's commitment to what is really a rather traditional liberal democratic idea
of America—an America that pursues democratic ideals and resists the forces of
mediocrity—cohabitates in Mailer's writing with his struggle to understand his
country existentially, which for him usually means in terms of power and self-
creation.
"Existential" is a term that Mailer employs often and widely in his essays
and in interviews. Impossible to define exactly, the term implies, for Mailer, more
of an attitude than a philosophy. This attitude is best described as the aura which
6 Mailer's great friend, the Marxist philosopher and novelist Jean Malaquais, has described
Mailer's political philosophy as thinking "in terms of God, Liberty, and the Constitution" (Mills,
97).
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surrounds a personality with the courage and vitality to confront the power of the
will, which means for Mailer, to recognize the freedom inherent in existence and
exercise it through action, risk, and constant self-creation. That a nation can
possess such an attitude, and express a personality capable of exercising existential
freedom in this manner, is a belief that radiates in all ofMailer's musings on
American politics. For Mailer, the ideal of America is not based on anything
absolute or unchangeable, but rather is in a constant state of becoming; liberty and
democracy combine to form a kind of existential politics that, as far as Mailer is
concerned, constitutes the closest thing to an essence that America possesses.
This existential view of America compels Mailer to seek out the alienating
elements in its social and political life. What, in America, destroys both the
individual imagination and the sense of collective free will that are so central to its
continued self-creation? It is a question that, for Mailer, gets to the heart of what
is threatening both the possibility and the praxis of liberal democratic citizenship
in contemporary America. Mailer's answer in work after work is the
totalitarianism of technology and the values of the corporation. As he
demonstrates early on in his career in The Naked and the Dead, the old battle
between conservatism and liberalism, between the right and the left, which has
traditionally animated American politics, is dying. In the wake of this, for Mailer,
America has become "corporation-land," and much of what could be called
political in his work, most substantially demonstrated in his novel about the 1968
protest march on the Pentagon The Armies of the Night, is devoted to resisting the
apolitical and anti-democratic challenges which this poses to the health of
America's political life.
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"The shits are killing us": The Ascension of the Technocrat and the
Corporatist Challenge to Liberal Democracy in Norman Mailer's The Naked
and the Dead
"As the years go by and I become a little more possible for
Ph.D. mills, graduate students will begin to write about the slapping
of my creative rage, ofMailer's vision of his rage as his shield,
when what I was trying to say was simply. 'The shits are killing
us.'"
—Norman Mailer, Advertisements for Myself
In his essay on totalitarianism found in The Presidential Papers, Norman
Mailer asserts that, "totalitarianism is better understood if it is regarded as a plague
rather than examined as a style of ideology" (175). The persuasion of
totalitarianism that most concerns Mailer is specifically American; it is not the
totalitarianism which comes attached to Fascism or Bolshevism with their
penchant for absolute dictatorship and authoritarian oppression—-modern
American totalitarianism is not an employer of the hob-nailed boot or the
internment camp. For Mailer, the term totalitarian is most usefully affixed to a
psychology rather than an ideology, or rather to a particular disease of the
American mind, a contamination of the American collective consciousness by the
growing ubiquity of technocratic modes of thought and politics.
Of course, the dangers surrounding the development of "mass politics" was
a central issue for many American intellectuals and critics writing in the postwar
era. Mailer shared the growing wariness—expressed in the work of, amongst
others, David Riesman, Lionel Trilling, Richard Hofstadter and William Whyte
Jr.—of the insidious social, cultural and political ramifications of the expanding
forces of conformity, corporate life, and bureaucratization in America. This is not
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to suggest, however, that Mailer's work does little more than add another voice to
the chorus of postwar intellectuals decrying the "age of conformity" and issuing
grave warnings regarding the emergence of "mass politics" and "mass man."
Undoubtedly the specter of totalitarianism had a major impact on the path that
liberalism, and therefore American politics, would travel in postwar America, and
Mailer's work offers a compelling and often insightful perspective on the nature of
what Thomas Hill Schaub has called "the story of chastened liberalism," or the
postwar "liberal narrative" in America (Schaub viii).
According to many commentators, including such eminent historians of
American liberalism as Alan Brinkley and James P. Young, it was the growing
fears regarding the totalitarian threat to America that compelled liberals in the
postwar era to adopt a much more cautious and pragmatic approach to political
matters. Reacting to the horrors of World War II, the onset of cold war tensions
with the Soviet Union, and the growing concern over the Communist threat at
home, American liberals drifted toward the skeptical approach propounded by
figures such as Arthur Schlesinger Jr. and Reinhold Niebuhr who, as a response to
the distressing experiences of the mid-twentieth century, called for a "critique of
the traditional bases of faith in liberal democracy" (Schlesinger, Vital Center
Forward). The result of this growing skepticism, the preoccupation with
totalitarian ideologies, and the loss of faith in the relevance of liberal ideals to the
postwar world, was the emergence of the anti-ideological politics of the 1940s and
the 1950s.
Using Nazi Germany and Stalin's Russia as illustrations of the potential
dangers of popular political movements, a number of American social scientists in
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the late 1940s and 1950s began to push for liberal democracy to be understood, not
in terms of ideals or social visions—appeals to which, they argued, had been
shown to lead to extremism—but rather as a functional idea, or as Martin Lipset
would later put it, "the good society itself in operation"(Lipset 439). The notion
that ideology itself is totalitarian in nature reinforced the growing sense of
trepidation amongst liberals regarding the popular control of political life. By
asserting the fundamental triumph of liberal capitalism and democratic institutions
over fascism and socialism, "the end of ideology"7 was a theoretical position that
greatly appealed to liberals content with America's growing prosperity, and
nervous about any radical or divisive political ideas that might suggest a less than
unwavering rejection of totalitarian politics on the part of American liberalism. As
historian Richard H Pells puts it, "by the end of the 1940s, their [American liberal
intellectual's] minds and their essays were filled less with the dream of a social
democracy than with the harrowing imagery of totalitarianism," largely of course,
by this period, associated with the communist threat (83).
As the chastened liberalism of postwar America quickly adapted to the
emerging orthodoxies of the cold war political and intellectual consensus, Mailer's
work of the period, most prominently for our purposes The Naked and the Dead,
expresses the suspicion that the postwar disparagement of ideology, and its appeal
to replace traditional political ideological conflict with an
instrumental/technological approach to the advancement of social and political
change, was not a reflection of a strong attitude towards totalitarian encroachment,
7 "The end of ideology" is a theory generally associated with social scientists such as Edward Shils,
Raymond Aron, Seymour Martin Lipset, and perhaps most particularly with Daniel Bell, whose
book The End of Ideology: The Exhaustion ofPolitical Ideas in the Fifties arguably contains its
most sophisticated development.
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but rather a symptom of the already expansive presence of totalitarian tendencies
in the American psyche.
By moving the discussion of totalitarianism from an ideological to a
pathological emphasis, Mailer advances what is perhaps his most telling and
salient point on the matter—that, as it has manifested itself in America afterWW
II, totalitarianism has developed in a largely trans-political manner. He writes:
Totalitarianism has slipped into America with no specific political
face. There are liberals who are totalitarian, and conservatives,
radicals, rightists, fanatics, hordes of the well-adjusted.
Totalitarianism has come to America with no concentration camps
and no need for them, no political parties and no desire for new
parties, no totalitarianism has slipped into the body cells and psyche
of each of us. (Presidential Papers 184)
In America, for Mailer, totalitarianism functions as a kind of antipolitics, a
"shapeless force" and "obdurate emptiness" at the heart of American political
culture whose expansion spells, not so much the end of politics in America, as its
stagnation, its descent into technological and corporate stasis. The hope advanced
by those who looked forward to the "end of ideology," that political conflict could
be limited to experts debating technical, analytical, or scientific questions, looked
to Mailer not like the "end of ideology" at all, but more like a new kind of
ideology, an apolitical ideology that posed a direct challenge to American liberal
democracy.
Though it is to the political and social manifestations of this "post-
ideological core ideology," or "instrumental antipolitics" that Mailer applies the
term totalitarian—a term perhaps chosen as much for its impact as its justness—as
he develops and clarifies his political perspective the designation
"technocorporatist," or so I will argue, seems to acquire an increasing
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appropriateness (Schedler 1, 12)8. In fact, in an interview with Christopher
Hitchens, published in the "New Left Review" in 1997, Mailer goes some way
towards embracing the term, suggesting that resisting corporatism's growing
ideological presence in America is a matter central to his self-described political
position as a "left conservative." Asked to elaborate on just what he means by
"left conservative," Mailer answers:
You can define it by saying what you're against. You know, on the
one hand, I'd say that I'm against corporations. I think
corporations have done as much damage to the world, or certainly
will by the time they are finished, as the communists ever did to the
intelligence of Russians. That, in fact, corporatism and Stalinism
have many more similarities than differences. (Hitchens 117)
It may appear, upon first glance at such a statement, that by "corporatism" Mailer
is simply referring to the immense influence and power wielded in contemporary
America by large economic interests. Indeed "big business" is a ubiquitous villain
in Mailer's work, but a fuller appreciation of the breath of political insight that
surrounds his use of the term can only be achieved through close attention to the
range of political concerns that inhabit his writing, and especially to the political
themes that he consistently returns to and develops in his fiction. Mailer's use of
political terminology may often appear somewhat cavalier, and accusations of
irresponsibility and ideological incoherence are not unheard of, but it is quite clear
from the shrewd nature of his language that Mailer often uses political terminology
8 Marxist critic Richard Godden demonstrates the usefulness of the notion of corporatism for
reading Mailer's work in Fictions ofCapital: The American Novel From James to Mailer. While
Godden is more concerned with corporatism as an element of the evolution of Fordism ("that
regime of capital where centralized and hierarchic structures are developed to manage the
processes not only of production but also of purchase"), and not its role in the concerns regarding
the crisis of liberal democratic citizenship in contemporary America, his lively "close-reading" of
The Armies of the Night as "Mailer's struggle to locate a voice of resistance to the corporatist state"
provides a significant resource for, and challenge to, my attempt to locate Mailer's "theory of
citizenship" within a liberal democratic framework (Godden 3-4; 11).
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with a conspicuous understanding of its inescapable complexity as well as its
impact.
The term corporatism, as is the case with much distinctly political
terminology, lives a hotly disputed existence. Narrowly, corporatism can be
defined as a political relationship that exists between special interest groups and
the state, arrangements which seek to bypass the legitimate rights and institutions
of citizen-based democracy to promote policies and agendas based on the needs
and desires of a particular corporate or associational interest, rather than on any
notion of the broader public good. Corporatism is a kind of interest
intermediation, a manner of governing which substitutes "para-parliamentary, as
well as para-bureaucratic forms of decision making" for formal democratic
processes, and which does not seek to govern by democratic consensus but rather
determines state policy based on "a consensus resulting from informal, highly
inaccessible negotiations among poorly legitimized representatives of functional
groups" (Offe 167). In short, it is any political shift away from the primacy of the
participation of the individual citizen in a democracy towards the primacy of
associations or organizations and their power to influence state decisions without
electoral approval, mandate or legitimacy.
Corporatism, as John Ralston Saul proposes, is a term that, "better than any
other [...] describes the organization of modern society" (Doubter's Companion
74). Likewise, Mailer's interest in corporatism stretches well beyond its
legitimacy as a theory, or even practice, of state and bureaucratic structuring.
When Mailer describes contemporary America as "corporation-land" he is calling
attention, not only to the social and cultural dominance of corporate capitalism and
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its powerful institutions, but also to what is a primary component of a growing
social and political methodology that he believes is fundamentally transforming,
not just America's political landscape, but its psychological and epistemological
landscapes as well. Mailer recognizes, in contemporary American political
culture, a tendency to reduce democratic politics to a system for mediating
between powerful organizational interests and the demands and imperatives of an
increasingly technocratic worldview amongst those elites and experts with power
and influence over the public policy-making process. In the Presidential Papers
Mailer refers to this organizational and ideological challenge to liberal democratic
principles as "a plague" and as "the insert [ion] into each of us [...] of corporate
techniques" (184); in Ofa Fire on the Moon he calls it "the psychology of
machines" (155); and in The Armies of the Night "the walking American
lobotomy" (102).
What Mailer is dramatizing, as he endeavors to articulate the expanding
influence and efficiency of the administrative and technological organization of
America in his work, is the tension which necessarily exists between the growing
centrality of the technocratic worldview—marked by the evolution of a
technocorporatist state—and the possibility of a legitimate democracy and a vital
citizenry in America. Calling attention to the defining precept of this emerging
worldview—the technocorporatist animosity towards politics—Mailer's first
novel, The Naked and the Dead, illustrates this fundamental shift in American
political culture via a narrative that revolves around the tellingly impotent
ideological conflict between the "fascist" General Cummings and the "liberal" Lt.
Hearn.
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Most critics of the novel recognize the political allegory at work between
Cummings and Hearn, reading the narrative as Mailer's recognition of the death of
liberalism and the growing influence of totalitarianism in America. Jean Radford
argues that one of the chief ironies underlying this conflict is that Cummings and
Hearn "are both officers involved in fighting a war against fascism with a military
instrument which is itself fascistic in organization, structure, and ideology" (44).
It seems that on this one point—that the army is fascistic—Cummings and Hearn
agree, though certainly with greatly differing degrees of approval. Radford
explains that Mailer's portrayal of the army here is part of a larger challenge in the
novel to "expedient fascism," that is, to the notion that the totalitarian exercise of
power within certain organizations, such as the military or large corporations, can
be justified on the grounds that it maximizes efficiency and productivity. Radford
especially notes Mailer's distaste for the political hypocrisy that this matter seems
to expose in the American war effort, and which seems characteristic of both
military men such as Cummings and progressive thinkers such as Hearn.
On a certain level this may be the case. Mailer is assuredly not enamored
of the strict hierarchical structure and undemocratic nature of the military. Also,
undoubtedly, scenes such as the one in which Lt. Hearn protests the privilege
accorded the officers of receiving an unfair and unequal portion of meat, while the
enlisted men are left without, are meant to correspond ironically with the tales of
racism, poverty, and social inequality in American civilian life, which Mailer
unfolds by way of his "Time Machine" literary device. However, it is just as
obvious that what Mailer provides in The Naked and the Dead is not just a
depiction ofWW II America, but also a forward looking political perspective that,
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while certainly critical of the army and its officers, views the hypocrisy and fascist
mentality of American institutions like the military as antiquated, as the last
vestiges of an ideology that, by the time of the war in the Pacific, was
anachronistic, and whose transformation into more sophisticated and subtle forms
of totalitarianism was ultimately greatly facilitated by the war. While The Naked
and the Dead is most generally regarded as Mailer's novel about WW II, and
specifically about America's war in the Pacific—the fictional product of Mailer's
experiences as an army private serving during the conflict—the political roots of
the novel are firmly planted in the postwar world9, and in Mailer's evolving
perceptions concerning the diminishment and atrophy of liberal democratic
politics in early cold war America.
For General Cummings, the army constitutes a testing ground for his
fascist social theories. When Cummings asserts that one could "consider the
army... as a preview of the future," the irony lies not in the potential for the victor
to assume the fascist nature of the defeated, but rather in Cummings' failure to
perceive that changes already afoot in both American society and the army itself,
as the war draws to a close, have rendered his fascist ideals politically
anachronistic and socially irrelevant.
Cummings' fascism is of the heroic variety, full of glorifications of the will
and grandiose theories of power. Ideologically it is rooted in a particular
understanding of history and the purposes of conflict. In one distinctly
9 As Eric Homberger has pointed out this makes Mailer's novel typical of other American 'war
novels' of the late 1940's: "It is well-known that most of the war novels in America were written
after the war. It is a less familiar point that war novels, especially those which appeared soon after
the war, were often the vehicle for political and social tensions which found expression in the first
Cold War presidential election" (32).
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metaphysical passage Cummings associates his firm belief in the inevitability of
fascism with a larger historical process:
I like to call it a process of historical energy. There are countries
which have latent powers, latent resources, they are full of potential
energy, so to speak. And there are great concepts which can unlock
that, express it. As kinetic energy a country is organization, co¬
ordinated effort, your [Hearn's] epithet fascism.... Historically the
purpose of this war is to translate America's potential into kinetic
energy. (280)
All of the metaphysical trappings aside, the gist of what the General says here has
some validity in respect to postwar America. Indeed the process of state planning
and the coordination of governmental, economic, and military organizations which
the Roosevelt administration had made a central component of its wartime
mobilization policy, provided a kind of model for the corporatization and
militarization of American political policy that defined the early cold war period,
and that found ultimate expression in the Truman Doctrine of 1947 and the
development of the National Security State paradigm. Cummings' reference to a
"great concept" which can unlock the "potential energy" of America is
undoubtedly an allusion to the growing understanding among elites of "the
reciprocal relationship which seemed to exist between prosperity and armaments,"
and the potential that a national security based political agenda held for bringing
about the de-politicization of public decision making in America (Sherry 136).
It is, however, Cummings' great miscalculation that the dual forces of
militarization and organization, as they worked their way to the center of postwar
American political culture, would bring about an age dominated by the political
Right, by those who wanted a consolidation of power amongst elites. As Mailer
writes:
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There was the thing Cummings had never said, but it was implied
tacitly in all his arguments. History was in the grasp of the Right,
and after the war their political campaigns would be intense. One
big push, one big offensive, and history was theirs for this century,
perhaps the next one. The League of Omnipotent Men. [...] It
could be narrowed probably to a dozen, two dozen men, not even in
communication with each other, not even all on the same level of
awareness. (Naked 342)
Of course it was clear by 1948, the year that saw both the first cold war
Presidential election in America as well as the publication of The Naked and the
Dead, that it would not be a dozen or two men that would control the power
structure in postwar America. Rather, what began to develop was a very complex
and diverse system of interrelationships between interests, organizations, and the
state, buttressed by a unifying ideology—"the ideology of national preparedness,
and the state's dependence on war and defense for its role in national life" (Sherry
142). That the cultivation and propagation of this cold war ideology should not be
understood as a harbinger for the emergence of some new American fascism, but
rather as a catalyst for the expansion of corporatism and the ascendancy of the
technocratic worldview in postwar America, is a perspective central to Mailer's
political allegory in The Naked and the Dead.
By including Cummings' fascist theories as a central component of the
novel, Mailer achieves something much subtler than a warning about a nascent
American fascism, or a fictional personification of the fascist tendencies of the
American military mentality. There is an air of elegy surrounding Mailer's
depiction of Cummings and his metaphysics. Certainly he is every bit the
"monster" as Hearn describes him, but he is also engaging, charismatic, and
willing to appeal to the imagination. There is, as Mailer might put it, something of
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the existential in Cummings—a distrust of the purely rational and a certain flare
for the dramatic and the tragic. At the heart of Cummings' personality, though not
his ideology, is an enemy that Mailer can respect, a worthy adversary for those
who believe that to struggle with the devil is an existential act. For Mailer,
Cummings espouses the kind of ideas, and represents the kind of political
challenge, that has the potential to reveal "being," to force a man to explore his
soul, and a country to discover its meaning. In many respects The Naked and the
Dead is, at least in part, a lament for a vital style of politics that is now past, and a
nostalgic acknowledgement, by a determined leftist, of an often engaging, but now
passe, enemy.
Cummings' ideas, though thoroughly fascistic and reprehensible, pose for
Mailer, less of a threat to America's liberal democratic principles in the postwar
world then the "plague totalitarianism" of the corporation and of the technocrat.
Cummings' brand of fascism belongs to what Mailer has called "that first huge
wave of totalitarianism" which swept the Nazis into power and the world into war
(Mailer, Presidential Papers 182). This species of totalitarianism has been
thoroughly defeated and discredited by the forces of liberalism. However, as
Mailer points out, one of the truly haunting things about totalitarianism in the
twentieth century is the difficulty "of rebels to find a field of war where it could be
given battle" (182). Democracy, as Mailer conceives of it, is the institutional,
metaphysical, and epistemological framework on which a society assures the
presence of a political battlefield, a political arena where opposing ideas can meet,
and where the result of the fray is not predetermined. Totalitarianism, as Mailer
sees it evolving in the postwar world, seeks to supplant the need for that
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melaphoric battlefield with a worldview that promotes the priority of security,
efficiency, and organization over democratic processes and principles.
Michael Glenday is correct to point out the problems inherent in
identifying Cummings and Sgt Croft, the other "fascist" in the novel, with the kind
of totalitarianism in which Mailer is interested:
Readers are right to see the novel as an extensive political allegory
through which Mailer dramatizes for the first time in fiction his
enduring belief that America is being destroyed by totalitarianism.
The difficulties arise when we begin to consider Mailer's characters
and the extent to which they embody this political vision.
Cummings, Croft and Hearn have often been cast as the main
players in an ideological war [...] The problem with this
interpretation, as some critics have seen, is that by its logic
Cummings and Croft ought to emerge as victors [...] The flaw in
such a reading lies in its assumption that Cummings and Croft
simplistically embody the machine mentality of totalitarianism.
(Glenday 39)
Glenday goes on to argue that it is Mailer's preoccupation with the violent nature
of Cummings and Croft that underlies the ideological ambiguity of Mailer's
allegory, pointing to comments made by Mailer in The Presidential Papers as his
"confession" to harboring a "secret admiration" for characters like Sam Croft, read
fascists. As Glenday quotes it the passage reads, "behind [sic] the ideology in The
Naked and the Dead was an obsession with violence. The characters for whom I
had the most secret admiration, like Croft, were violent people...he yet possesses
certain qualities which make him an enemy, rather than a servant to a totalitarian
system" (as quoted in Glenday 39).
Mailer's comments here seek to further define his conception of
totalitarianism in its technocorporatist guise by distinguishing between two
conceptions of violence. Violence, as Mailer would have it, when it is expressed
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as an aspect of character, as a quality of an individual will, can be admired to this
extent—that it represents the possibility of resistance and affirms the capacity of
the individual to act existentially despite the hegemony of a particular ideology,
system, or worldview. As he goes on to say in The Presidential Papers "what I
still disapprove of is inhuman violence—violence which is on a large scale and
abstract" (136). Violence, as an extension of a methodology, or as an expression
of an organizational, systemic, or technological imperative, represents, for Mailer,
nothing more than the obliteration of dissent, difference, and possibility, and thus
should be understood as totalitarian. The appearance of ideological incoherence,
and Mailer's seeming equivocation on the subject of violence, can be viewed as a
reflection of Mailer's unwillingness to limit the existential and political scope of
individual dissent, part of the development of Mailer's larger political perspective,
and opposition to technocorporatism.
The significance of Cummings, to the technocorporatist future that Mailer
envisions, is finally his insignificance. In one discussion with Cummings, Hearn
remarks that "We're moving toward greater organization, and I don't see how the
left can win that battle in America" (280). Hearn, the single significant liberal
presence in the novel, is resigned to the fact that post-WW II American politics
will be dominated, not by ideological struggles between left and right, but by the
struggle for control of growing and increasingly powerful bureaucratic and state
systems and extra-governmental associations. Likewise, as the novel draws to a
close, General Cummings is left pondering his actual efficacy and importance as a
commander of forces and struggling to come to terms with the knowledge that the
ultimate victory of his campaign was less the result of his personal will and skill as
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a soldier Lhen the result of "a casual net of factors too large, too vague, for him to
comprehend" (622). Explicit in the denouement of the novel, and Cummings'
confrontation with his own inconsequence, is Mailer's recognition that the real
threat to democracy and existential self-determination in postwar America will not
come from fascism, but from America's increasing corporatization, and from the
power wielded by that particular ideology's devoted disciple—the technocrat. In
The Naked and the Dead it is Major Dalleson who most definitively exemplifies
this role.
Major Dalleson, the red-faced, thin-lipped mediocre bureaucrat whose
"only desire was to be promoted to captain, permanent grade," manages in the
closing pages of the novel, to steal General Cummings' glorious climax (Mailer
571). Through a combination of luck and benign opportunism, Dalleson finds
himself in command of the successful invasion of Botoi Bay which "in the official
history of the campaign sent to Army [...] was given as the main reason for
breaking through the Toyaku Line" and consequently the final occupation by the
American army of the island of Anopepei (571). It is this final turn of events,
layered with irony and allegorical significance, which compels Cummings to
finally accept that "it would be the hacks who would occupy history's seat after
the war" (623).
The future, Mailer seems to be suggesting, belongs to those like Dalleson,
who appear to derive immense pleasure and satisfaction from their own
instrumentality, who can accept as their greatest purpose their assigned role as part
of a larger system which they neither control nor completely understand. The final
image of the novel is of Dalleson sitting in his newly finished shack, going about
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his administrative duties and paper work, and contemplating new techniques for
his map-reading course with what Mailer describes as "a simple childish joy"—a
parting glimpse perhaps of the new American guardian of power, the technocratic
priest of the postwar corporatist configuration of America, going about his work
(626). This is a more archetypal image than it might first appear, especially when
one considers John Ralston Saul's assertion that "the first technocrat was not
produced by ENA or Sciences Po or Harvard. He marched out of the military
school and his profession was that of staff officer" (Voltaire's Bastards 179).
Equally as impotent in the face of the creeping spectre of the "new"
totalitarian organization of America as Cummings' naked fascism is Hearn's dead
liberalism. Many critics have addressed the issue of Hearn's liberalism in the
novel. Some, such as Robert Solotroff and Jennifer Bailey, read Hearn as
ultimately a defeated liberal whose eventual death confirms that Mailer regards
liberal ideology as ineffective and incapable of responding to a serious totalitarian
threat. Others, perhaps most vigorously Nigel Leigh, interpret Hearn as a kind of
martyred liberal, a figure of repression who struggles against his repressor, but is
ultimately sacrificed in recognition of "the immediacy and potency of the potential
domestic right-wing threat as perceived by Mailer" (Leigh 20). Joseph Wenke, on
the other hand, accepts neither the Hearn as "defeated liberal," nor the Hearn as
"martyred liberal" thesis, arguing that the political allegory of the narrative works
against both explanations:
What remains problematic about The Naked and the Dead is not the
symbolic significance of the decision to climb Mount Anaka but the
fact that the novel rejects liberalism yet allows its protagonist to
choose as his definitive expression of political protest an act that, in
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terms not only of the political vocabulary of the book but also of
the rhetoric ofMailer's entire career, is undoubtedly liberal. (39)
All of these readings seem content to interpret Hearn's, and arguably Mailer's,
liberalism exclusively in relation to Cumming's right wing ideology, thereby
designating the boundaries within which liberalism can be defined, and identifying
it solely in terms of its ethical and political resistance to fascism.
Certainly if one accepts the philosophical and political restraints of this
understanding of liberalism, then Wenke is correct to see Hearn's fate as
problematic in terms of a novel that he asserts "rejects liberalism". Significantly,
Wenke does not base this view on Mailer's sketch of Hearn as an ineffectual and
bourgeois liberal whose leftist inclinations only find expression in the abstract and
often platitudinous defenses of the liberal worldview he offers Cummings. On its
own, Mailer's characterization of Hearn does not constitute the novel's negation of
liberalism. It is the scene in which Hearn, put in command of a platoon, begins to
question his own motives and as a result recognizes the loose moral footing on
which his liberal positions are founded, that Wenke points to as the site in the
novel which manifestly expresses Mailer's exasperation and loss of confidence in
liberalism as a tenable political position. Wenke concludes from this incident that
Hearn's "recognition of moral ambiguity represents a movement away from
liberalism to the kind of 'moral radicalism' implicit in Mailer's existential ethic"
(39).
Hearn's personal confrontation with his own desire for power, and his
coming to terms with the knowledge that "when he searches himself he was just
another Croft," is indeed a significant aspect of the novel's probing of the social
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and moral foundations of liberalism (Mailer, Naked 503). Hearn, like most
liberals of his era, defined the liberal battle with fascism as much in moral terms,
as political or military ones. His identification with the liberal cause, and with
liberalism in general, while expressed as a kind of unclear but sympathetic
humanism, and a rather abstract sense of the desirability of justice and equality,
found its most substantial roots in liberalism's opposition to the amorality of
fascism. If Cummings had his metaphysics and grandiose theories of history, then
Hearn countered with the moral certainty that comes with supporting the more just
and right side of a profound conflict.
It is, however, a political world lacking the moral certainty that liberalism's
conflict with fascism underwrote, which confronts liberalism in postwar America.
This, rather than postwar liberalism's capacity to meet the challenge of a renewed
fascism, seems to be the issue Mailer is exploring via Hearn. In other words,
Hearn's fate is less a reflection of Mailer's concern with liberalism's ability to
resist the ideological and political forces of fascism in the postwar world, or of his
outright rejection of liberalism, than it is an expression of Mailer's growing unease
surrounding the postwar evolution of American liberalism set adrift without the
moral compass of its antifascism, and saddled with its apparent vulnerability to
totalitarian psychology. The experiences of depression and war had left postwar
liberalism struggling for an identity and unsure of its connection to the moral and
political complexities confronting the individual in postwar America. Unlike
James Gould Cozzen's character Jim Edsell in Guard ofHonor, whose professed
liberalism proves patently false, and Saul Bellow's character Joseph in Dangling
Man, whose commitment to individualism is left in shards by the existential trial
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of waiting to go off to war, Hearn retains at least some semblance of liberal faith,
even if it is only his distaste for capitulation, the sense that "for whatever reason
you had to keep resisting" (508).
Hearn, then, dies neither defeated nor martyred, but rather duped. He is,
finally, unable to recognize that the real dilemma of his situation, beyond the
philosophical wrestling match between his liberal convictions and the fascist side
of his personality, lay in his inability to take action based on what Frederic
Jameson has called "an existential choice of solidarity"—an imperfect, partly
irrational, and morally specific decision to take the side of the unempowered, the
nonsystemic, and the vulnerable (Seeds of Time 44). By continuing to assess his
situation via the ethicopolitical prism of the fascism versus liberalism model,
Hearn becomes mired in a kind of antiquated liberal universalism that renders him
incapable of fully appreciating the complexity of the power structure confronting
him, or of his uncertain relationship to it as an individual. Thus vulnerable, and
alienated from the political primacy of an existentially determined liberal
commitment, Hearn falls prey to Croft's Machiavellian manipulations, and is
killed.
It is Cummings, perhaps not surprisingly, who finally comes to the
realization that power in postwar America seems to have developed beyond the
scope of the traditional ideologies of left and right, and that, as he succinctly puts
it, "the route to control could best masquerade under a conservative liberalism"
(624). "The reactionaries and isolationists," he reasons, "would miss the bell,
cause almost as much annoyance as they were worth" (624). Perhaps, Cummings
finally resolves, "he might be smarter to take a fling at the State Department"
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(623). This is, of course, a thinly disguised reference to the ideological
development of cold war liberalism and the transformations in American politics
that accompanied the postwar preoccupation with security and international
questions that defined the national security state. It is largely understandable in
the context of the pressing political concerns of the late 1940's in America—
mainly the issues surrounding the impending presidential election of 1948.
However, there is also, albeit in a nascent form, a hint of what will become an
overriding political theme of much of Mailer's work—that what lies beyond the
old oppositions of left and right is not the "end of ideology," but rather the
paralysis of politics, the abandonment of the existential experience of the political
for an instrumentalism that breeds the sterile political imagination of the
bureaucratic, the corporate, and the technocratic society.
"So political and so primitive": Citizenship, Political Action, and the Vitality
of American Liberal Democracy in The Armies of the Night
"Political democracy, as it exists and practically works in
America, with all of its threatening evils, supplies a training-school
for making first-class men. It is life's gymnasium, not of good
only, but of all. We try often, though we fall back often [...]
Whatever we do not attain, we at any rate attain the experience of
the fight, the hardening of the strong campaign, and throb with
currents of attempt at least.
—Walt Whitman, Preface, 1855 in Leaves ofGrass
By 1968 and the publication of The Armies of the Night, his novel/history
of the events surrounding the previous year's anti-Vietnam war demonstration at
the Pentagon, Mailer's efforts to come to grips with the state of democracy in
postwar America, and his attempt to assess the depth to which technocorporatism
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had contaminated the American political imagination, would find a new form and
an updated historical context, but would tell its story with familiar villains. No
longer couched in allegorical language, Mailer's skepticism regarding the viability
of dissent and resistance in postwar America focuses, in The Armies of the Night,
on one critical directive—to discover if, in fact, the possibility for the existential
and the unpredictable in American life could somehow be rescued from the
technocrats. The answer, for Mailer, rests primarily on the revitalization of liberal
democratic citizenship in America, a recovery of a mode of political action able to
free itself from what Mailer calls the "sound-as-a-brickwork-logic-of-the-next-
step," that is, the logic of the technocrat, and to rediscover the imaginative aspect
of democracy and the existential value of dissidence, participation, and the idea of
the revolutionary.
Indeed it is the idea of the revolutionary that takes centre stage as Mailer
reveals a certain philosophical idealism in his approach to American politics; an
idealism that emphasizes the tension between America's foundational democratic
principles and its formal democratic practices. By backgrounding the various
ideological vagaries of the period in question in favour of a more
formal/conceptual approach, Mailer asserts an understanding of the priority of
political principles in American political culture that gestures towards what
Samuel Huntington has described as the "Ideals versus Institutions gap," or the
notion that "the widespread consensus on liberal-democratic values provides the
basis for challenging the legitimacy of American political practices and the
authority of American political institutions" (Huntington 32). "What seemed
significant," to Mailer, as he pondered the conceptual imperatives of the March,
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"was the idea of a revolution which preceded ideology" (102). By asserting the
idea of the revolutionary as a fundamental American political principle which
precedes ideological disagreements, and thereby challenges the legitimacy of
political institutions and practices which discourage or repress either its formal or
experiential influence, Mailer invokes the spirit of the Jeffersonian democratic
tradition and reminds us, as Judith Shklar has done in a somewhat different
context, that "Jefferson wanted not merely new politics, but a politics of perpetual
newness, as implicit in democratic principles" (Shklar 1998 174).
Technocorporatism, at its most fundamental level, seeks to exorcise the
experience of the new from the political realm by reducing politics "to the
technically oriented task of 'keeping the machine running,'" thus confining the
possible outcomes of democratic praxis within well-defined methodological
boundaries. In other words, those in authority, as Mailer sees it, have a vested
interest in the predictable, in being able to manage politics and political action to
the point where the democratic legitimacy of political practice is compromised,
and politics in America is transformed from an expression of the nation's
creativity and progressive energy, into a process which serves only to reinforce the
logic of a prevailing methodology, a mere matter of ensuring continuity and
stability. Such a worldview considers the idea of the revolutionary to be an
antiquated notion that, like individual consciousness and citizenship, is viewed as
an artifact of "an inappropriate and inferior decision-making system" (Fischer 16).
Under the thumb of the technocratic worldview, as Mailer depicts it,
American politics has become the staunch enemy of imagination and a means
towards the evisceration of the dialectical tensions which, for Mailer, are the
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source of everything healthy and vibrant in American democracy. Deeply invested
in Mailer's dialectical conception of democracy is his desire to revive the notion
that, in America, democracy should always be understood as revolutionary in form
if not necessarily in content. The political tension which exists in a dynamic
democracy between the "new" and the "status quo"—or what Mailer has referred
to as "the great and mortal debate between rebel and conservative" (Cannibals and
Christians 165)—is a fundamental source of the kinds of ideas and energies which
can create, challenge, and contest America's understanding of itself and its future.
In an American context the revolutionary, as Mailer conceives it, can never be
understood as the possible achievement or ultimate realization of specific
ideological or political imperatives. Rather, as Richard Poirer points out:
The odd fact of the matter is that while Mailer is always advocating
revolutions—of consciousness, of minorities, of sexual radicals—
no successful revolution is possible within the terms set by him and
none would be temperamentally acceptable to him. He does not
want an accomplished revolution, assuming there even is such a
thing. Rather he wants the intensification of the dialectical tensions
that induce revolutionary fervour. (Poirer 107)
In fact, for Mailer, the invigorating presence of the revolutionary all but ensures
the continuous play of opposing political perspectives that denies ultimate victory
to either the forces of the "new" or of the "old," but rather maintains the purchase
which both have on the American political consciousness.
Mailer's understanding of the idea of the revolutionary, and the role that it
plays in his dialectical model of democracy, is not grounded in any foundational
notion of historical progress, evolution, or transcendence, though he would
certainly argue that it remains open to the possibility, though not the historical
necessity, of all three. It is expressly Mailer's intention to root the crucial
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oppositional movement of democracy, at least as he conceives it, in an existential,
rather than teleological, ontological, or materialist, dialectic. That is, Mailer wants
to base the legitimacy of the democratic process on the degree of intensity and
passion with which individuals, together and in concert, engage with that process
rather than on the efficacy and wisdom of the decisions that that process happens
to produce. Thus, for Mailer, democratic politics must, by definition, "partake of
mystery," for it is the mystery of the origin of freedom—that existential dialectic
of dread and possibility, of anxiety and action—that confronts the existential
subject, which ultimately lends any decision making process, whether political or
personal, its authenticity (100). Political freedom, for Mailer, is intrinsically
linked to existential freedom, in that it is impossible to conceive without risk, and
is affirmed only through creative struggle and choice. Democracy, as Mailer
wants to define it, is the attempt to affirm this dynamic understanding of human
freedom within an ethicopolitical framework that puts the emphasis on political
struggle and resistance as the expression of that freedom, rather than as a means
towards its ultimate and final achievement.
Mailer's stance, then, is a manifestly formalist one. By positing the
primacy of the idea of the revolutionary as the affirmation of the fact of existential
freedom within the formal dialectical dynamic that both endows democracy with
its perpetual capacity to embrace political and social change, as well as to ensure
its ethical reproduction, Mailer rejects the conceptual connection of democracy
with the expression of any specific content, be it that of an ideology, institution,
group, historical circumstance, or class. However, it is not that the constant and
productive tension between the forces of continuity and those of the revolutionary,
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which Mailer portrays as the meta-historical substructure of all democratic
political and social struggles, divorces the question of content from the concerns of
democratic legitimacy. Nor does his formalist strategy aim to achieve a kind of
universality by conflating the imperatives of form with the emergence of a
substantive ethical or political content. Rather Mailer's approach is an attempt to
relate the preservation and influence of democratic principles (political equality,
self-determination, participation etc.) to the exercise of existential freedom
(struggle, choice, risk, and creativity) within a framework capable of
encompassing both the tension and identity which, for Mailer, characterizes their
association.
It is on these terms that Mailer engages with the perpetual dilemma of
liberal democracy—the reconciliation of the democratic demand for political
organization (the question of political and state power) with the liberal concern for
the freedom of the individual (the question of subjectivity). What keeps the on¬
going tension between the demands of a democratic state and those of existential
subjectivity productive rather than antinomian, for Mailer, is the crucial correlation
that emerges between democratic participation and existential action. Quite
simply, for Mailer, citizenship in a democracy bears inescapable existential
implications. Or otherwise stated, citizenship, which is a term that describes any
form of engagement with a larger political community, can only be considered
legitimately democratic, for Mailer, if the possibility to concurrently exercise
existential choice and political power is present.
This possibility, which we have been referring to as the "idea of the
revolutionary" in Mailer's work, draws together the existentialist imperative to
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confront the freedom inherent in the possibility of authentic choice and the
political responsibility inherent in exercising that freedom within a social, and thus
ethical, context. In this respect Mailer is neither a radical existentialist nor a
devoted idealist, just as he is neither an orthodox liberal nor a strict republican10.
It is, rather, obvious from Mailer's work, that his intention is to develop a political
approach that offers a dynamic and dramaturgical perspective, highlighting the
psychological and expressive aspects of American politics, rather than just its
institutional apparatus, and thus call attention to what he believes are the
inescapable aesthetic elements of liberal democracy and democratic citizenship.
Mailer's recognition of the technocratic negation of the presence of the
revolutionary within contemporary American politics reveals not just the
emergence of a reductive conception of political practice—what has been called
"an apolitical form of politics"—that is fundamentally at odds with the American
democratic tradition, but also a reductive aesthetic, a consequent depreciation of
the individual experience of the existential significance and power of the political
realm to the merely instrumental. In America, for Mailer, democracy is both
constituted by individual actions and is constitutive of those actions. The
democratic citizen is not an actor with a stable and fixed identity whose political
actions merely express a particular point of view. Rather democracy in America
is, at least in part, a performance, an institutional and psychic space where citizens,
individually and in groups, can discover the depth of experience that lies between
what is possible (politics) and what is conceivable (ideals and principles).
10 For an argument that attempts to place Mailer's work within a strictly republican tradition of
political rhetoric, see Sean McCann's "The Imperiled Republic: Norman Mailer and the Poetics of
Anti-Liberalism."
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This aesthetic sensibility, this understanding of the dramatic and creative
quality of democratic politics, is what informs Mailer's understanding of the
fundamental link between what he calls "existential styles of political thought" and
the American democratic tradition (Mailer 1968 137). It also accounts for
Mailer's hope that the March would mark, to some extent, a rediscovery of this
political aesthetic, and a significant return to the imaginative and inventive in
American politics:
The aesthetic of the New Left now therefore began with the notion
that authority could not comprehend nor contain nor finally manage
to control any political action whose end was unknown. They
could attack it, beat it, jail it, misrepresent it, and finally abuse it,
but they could not feel a sense of victory because they could not
understand a movement which inspired thousands and hundreds of
thousands to march without a coordinated plan. (102)
Seeking to explain the connection between what he calls Mailer's
"symbolic/existential" approach to politics, referring to the political aesthetic
alluded to above, and Mailer's obvious concern with the role of the individual in
mass politics, political theorist Joshua Miller points to what he argues is the core
political issue of the The Armies of the Night—"the self as the point of entry into
political truth" (Miller 381).
The importance that Mailer attributes to the existential and aesthetic
aspects of the March, for Miller, is indicative of a political approach that places
"an emphasis on experience and feeling over ideology" and that attempts to shape
power via "symbolic actions [...] [that] affect consciousness" rather than via more
mainstream and efficacious methods of achieving political ends (386-395). For
Miller, Mailer is not really interested in the New Left's "symbolic/existential"
approach as a method for influencing policy, but rather he is compelled by its
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attempt to transcend politics, to reach "a plane of truth or experience that exists
beyond the horizon of common sense thinking and everyday activity," and thus
approach political truth through feeling and subjective experience rather than
reason (388). Miller finds this approach inspirational but worries that "the danger
of the New Left's distrust of rationality is that they may be discarding reason along
with rationalism [arguing that] [...] if reason is disparaged, the basis for political
conversation is lost" (385-386).
Miller's concerns, with their Habermasian overtones, are both trenchant
and timely in that they rightly call attention to the practical consequences for
democracy of a mode of politics too enamored of expressivism and subjectivism,
and too dismissive of reason. However, Miller's insistence on drawing no
distinction between "existential" and "symbolic" politics in Mailer's work—or as
Miller puts it "I propose to keep the terms bound together like Siamese twins"—
fails to take into account the tension between the two, which for Mailer, is at least
as politically meaningful as their kinship (386).
Certainly both symbolic and existentialist modes of political practice
provide avenues of potential resistance to the kinds of instrumentalism that Mailer
identifies as technocratic and corporatist and which threatens to diminish
democratic practice in America, and as such Mailer recognizes their mutuality.
However, while both modes might offer a framework from which
technocorporatist instrumentalism can be critiqued, and perhaps resisted, their
respective frameworks are divergent in at least one significant respect. The fact
that this divergence happens to concern the issue that Miller recognizes as the
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political hub of the novel, the issue of political subjectivity, indicates the crucial
nature of the distinction.
Both the symbolic and the existential conceptions of the political challenge
the instrumental banishment of the aesthetic from the political realm by reasserting
the creativity and imagination of political subjects as central components of
legitimate democratic praxis. In fact, as Miller is right to point out, both are keen
to emphasize the ambiguities and mysteries (Mailer's preferred term) of subjective
experience, and its various representations, in their approaches to political action.
However, when the recognition of the aesthetic as a vital aspect of democratic
citizenship influences political action, as Mailer argues it does in the case of the
March on the Pentagon, the question of political subjectivity becomes manifest in
an assertion of political identity, and the symbolic and the existential political
modes begin to drift apart.
Symbolic politics, referred to by Miller as "representational actions at
emblematic targets," both, one presumes, recognizably political in nature,
advocates an expressive approach to political identity (386). That is, symbolic
political action is an attempt to articulate a kind of political consciousness, often
grounded in an appeal to an ethical, moral, or experiential truth, through a kind of
political practice which attempts to both transcend the political realm by
employing the aesthetic, and engage it by connecting subjectivity, via the
expression and interpretation of symbols, to the notion of citizenship. Thus, for
Mailer, the experience of political identity, with its distinctive truth claims,
individual passions, and moral visions, is projected onto the political realm.
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In contrast to the symbolic, existential politics emerges from a
performative, rather than an expressive, conception of political identity.
Emphasizing the historicity of subjectivity, which for Mailer refers to the
mutability that accompanies the dynamic imperatives of his democratic dialectic,
existential politics understands political practice to be constitutive of political
identity, as well as an articulation of it. In this sense political participation in a
democracy is an enactment of political identity, an activity in which a political
subject both produces an identity within the present power structure, and
simultaneously destabilizes it by reaffirming, via the exercise of the power of
decision, the possibility for the future subversion or disruption of the political
identity thus constituted. In other words, existential politics understands political
identity to be perpetually provisional and changeable, rather than transcendental in
nature, part of the self's larger engagement with existential freedom, as well as
with the sociopolitical dimensions of existence.
To conclude, as Miller does, that "symbolic politics and existential politics
can be distinguished for the purposes of theory, but in practice they are joined" is
to disregard the deep skepticism Mailer expresses regarding his experience of the
march, and in particular the existential validity of the kind of political action it
represents. In his speech at the Ambassador Theatre on the eve of the march,
Mailer presents the impending action to the audience in the following terms: "We
are up, face this, all of you, against an existential situation—we do not know how
it is going to turn out, and what is even more inspiring of dread is that the
government doesn't know either"(48). Beyond protesting the war in Vietnam—
the primary symbolic intention of the march—Mailer is keen to identify a
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concomitant existential message in the individual experience of anxiety that
accompanies participating in an act whose guiding principle is to rediscover the
political potency of the unforeseeable. Theoretically, Mailer finds it credible to
speak of the promise of the march as both an expression of a particular set of
political ideas, and a reaffirmation of the viability of political agency, or as he puts
it with uncharacteristic succinctness, to be "at once a symbolic act and a real act"
(57).
However, when Mailer turns his attentions away from theoretical
considerations and towards more pragmatic matters—such as assessing the
potential success and failure of the march—he is quick to acknowledge both the
limitations of the expressivist political approach and the complexity inherent in
existential political action. Certainly the symbolic elements of the march seek to
ascribe a particular content to the experience of the political, however, as Mailer
describes in the following passage, understanding the relationship between the
symbolic purpose of a political action and political participation as a mode of
human action, means resisting too easy an appeal to a particular content:
One did not march on the Pentagon and look to get arrested as a
link in a master scheme to take over the bastions of the Republic
step by step, no, that sort of sound-as-brickwork-logic was left to
the FBI. Rather, one marched on the Pentagon because...
because... and here the reasons became so many and so curious and
so vague, so political and so primitive, that there was no need, or
perhaps no possibility to talk about it yet. (100)
Ending the war in Vietnam is, for Mailer, certainly a worthy and desirable goal,
however, approaching the march as nothing more than a symbolic means towards
a political end is, in effect, to accept the technocorporatist reduction of the
meaning of the political to the merely instrumental. Political action, as Mailer
wauls lo define it, is a mode of human action that must be understood, not just in
terms of the pursuit of a larger goal or purpose, or even in terms of the expression
of the values and ideals that underwrite a purpose, but also in terms of its means,
in terms of its existential complexity. If one wants to understand the implication
of the march for political subjectivity, one has to come to terms with the
relationship between purpose and means that is embodied in political action. It is
to this relationship that Mailer is referring when he describes the reasons for
participating in the march as "so political and so primitive."
In The Armies of the Night, Mailer is clearly wrestling with what Yaron
Ezrahi calls "the liberal-democratic problem of action," or "the problem of
converting the actions of individual persons into legitimate public actions without
denying the integrity and autonomy of the actors" (15). It is, for Mailer, a matter
of fundamental existential importance that engaging in political action in a liberal
democracy should be understood as the equivalent of tugging the political subject
in two directions. The subject whose connection to certain values and ideals is
strong enough to shape a commitment to particular purposes (the emergence of
political subjectivity), but whose power to achieve those purposes is neither direct
nor immediate, can seek to express that commitment through political action.
However, the translation of purposes into political action opens up the possibility
that the values and ideals which are at the root of purposes, and to which the
subject is committed, may be undermined or significantly challenged, by exposing
them to the struggle with other ideals and opposing objectives which, for Mailer,
defines the political sphere. Thus, for the political subject, political action
expresses those values and ideals on which political identity is based, however, it
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also puis the integrity of those values, and the political identity thus enacted, at
risk of being compromised by engaging in political struggle.
Putting one's values and political subjectivity through the ordeal of
existential political action, risking the unknown consequences of translating values
into purposes and then acting with the understanding that those values and ideals
are both mutable and impermanent is, for Mailer, the most compelling reason for
participating in the march. For when political action is also existential in nature,
political participation becomes an opportunity for shaping and revealing identity
via the only means—conflict—which, in Mailer's view, can account for the
tension between the commitment to particular values that defines political identity
and the inescapable plurality, the absence of one ultimate purpose, that defines a
political association comprised of autonomous individuals. Technocorporatism
responds to the "tensions between the requirements of public action and the values
of voluntary individualism" by imposing an instrumental paradigm of action onto
the political sphere, thus attempting to dissipate the tension by delegitimizing
actions whose consequences are too unpredictable. Mailer, of course, paints this
instrumental colonization of the political sphere as totalitarian in nature,
embracing instead a mode of action that holds the interdependency and conflict
between individuality and public identity to be a reflection of vitality in a liberal
democracy, rather than a problem inherent in its framework.
Action, as Hannah Arendt famously argues in The Human Condition, is
intimately connected with the creation of the new, and therefore with
unpredictability. What Arendt calls "the primordial and specifically human act,"
or what she also describes as the "insertion of] one's self into the world" is a
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means of both revolution and revelation (Arendt 178, 186). These are the terms
which best correspond to what Mailer is getting at when he refers to the "political"
and "primitive" aspects of political action. Action, as Arendt would have it, is
"the actualization of the human condition of natality," or more plainly, it is the
performance of beginning and the manifestation of the unpredictable nature of
human life. For both Mailer and Arendt, inherent in the human capability to act,
the capacity to bring about the new, is the very possibility of freedom. However,
freedom, no matter how prehistorical in nature, does not generally provide action
with a particular character; it very rarely lends action a specific content. Rather
meaning is given to action, particularly political action, to the extent that it
discloses an agent, or as Arendt would have it, to the extent that "men show who
they are, reveal actively their unique personal identities and thus make their
appearance in the human world" (179).
This is not to imply, of course, that ideas and values are not important
aspects of political action, but rather that they are merely determinate in nature,
and that democratic politics, as a realm that deals with uncertainty, cannot be
reduced to an instrumental relation, however substantial, between action and the
manifestation of an end it is meant to advance. In fact, it seems clear to Mailer
that political action, understood from the viewpoint of sheer utility, amounts to the
disengagement of action from actors, and thus a denial of what, for him, are the
two fundamental pillars of liberal democratic citizenship—the unpredictability of
outcome that accompanies freedom, and the revelation of self which accompanies
action, and which is both an assertion and a putting at risk of individual identity.
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George Kateb argues that any attempt to understand this often-contrary
relationship between democratic political action and the liberal encouragement of
individuality, must take into account the perspective put forward on the matter by
Ralph Waldo Emerson, and his two famous intellectual descendents Henry
Thoreau and Walt Whitman. It is in this body of work, Kateb tells us, that we find
"the richest presentation of the doctrine of democratic individuality;" a tradition
that Mailer makes a clear effort to engage in The Armies of the Night (Kateb,
"Democratic Individuality" 332). What distinguishes the doctrine of democratic
individuality, both as a theory and as a moral ideal, is the notion that in American
liberal democracy the relation between the spirit of democracy and individualism,
between democratic political action and the expression of individual identity, is
marked by tension, but also defined by mutual dependence. As Kateb interprets it:
"The meaning of the theory of democratic individuality is that each moral idea
needs the other: both to bring out its most brilliant potentialities and to avoid the
most sinister ones" (333).
Mailer's Emersonian disposition toward democratic individuality is
evident, not just in the political and existential matters discussed above, but also in
the manner in which they relate to the very structure of the novel. By inscribing
his own subjectivity as such an unavoidable point of reference in The Armies of the
Night, Mailer makes the meaning of the political action being described, and the
individuality of the perspective offered, codependent and mutually refining aspects
of the narrative. The struggle that many critics identify in the book between
objective reporting and subjective experience may be an important issue in judging
the journalistic or historical merits of the novel, but it is the tense connection
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between Mailer's self-consciousness, and his participation in a mass political
action, that anchors the narrative, and which emerges as perhaps the most
fundamental political theme of the book.
As John Whalen-Bridge has rightly pointed out, "no postwar fiction was
more committed to a group political action than Mailer's Armies of the Night even
though that book expends half of its energy distancing its author from the social
movement with which he is inextricably linked" (107). Mailer's effort to reconcile
his idea of himself as a staunch individualist and anti-conformist with the moral
obligation he feels to participate in a mass action, whose organizational and
institutional aspects are antithetical to his individualistic mindset, reveals the
friction that lies at the heart of democratic individuality. This is not to suggest that
The Armies of the Night attempts to resolve the contradictions that inevitably
emerge between liberal individualism and the spirit of democracy simply through
an appeal for principled participation. Rather, Mailer's narrative strives to forge a
connection between the two often discordant ideas through a commitment to a
performative political identity, a voice that asserts itself aesthetically and
politically, but is self-conscious of its provisionality, of its historicity, of what
Mailer calls its "existential style."
Malini Johar Schueller claims that this authorial position is indicative of a
general impetus in The Armies of the Night toward what she calls a "politics of
difference." According to Schueller, Mailer "questions the concept of the unified
subject at the core of liberal ideology by speaking through a voice that resists
being singular or whole," and his whole political argument in the book "is
predicated on an authorial voice that is continually diverse and multiple and that
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stresses the numeruus (borrowed) literary and ideological voices within it"
(Schueller 125). While Schueller points to this narrative approach as evidence of
Mailer's preference for "a politics of radical heterogeneity, one without
ideological constants," one could just as easily interpret Mailer's position as a
reassertion of the Emersonian call for a philosophical or poetic apprehension of the
self, an aesthetic conception of the individual that expands both the political and
the existential possibilities offered by liberal democratic citizenship. Indeed,
Mailer's acknowledgement of the historicity and provisionality of political identity
is evidence enough that he resists the solidification or congelation of the political
subject, particularly around conceptions of universal or instrumental reason, and
considers such tendencies to be totalitarian. However, to characterize this
resistance as a repudiation of the liberal self, as a radical postmodern critique of
subjectivity, is to deny the emphasis that Mailer places on the importance of the
political as an extraordinary individual experience, as an occasion for individual
thinking, radical choice, and self-expression, or what Emerson famously termed
"self-reliance."
As Mailer "The Citizen" emerges alongside Mailer "The Novelist" and
Mailer "The Historian" in the The Armies of the Night, the implications of political
participation on his own sense of self, poses a crucial personal and intellectual
dilemma for Mailer. Is political involvement ever compatible with individuality,
or does citizenship always require, to some degree, the subordination of the self to
a greater purpose, process, or authority? Mailer makes it quite clear in The Armies
of the Night that like Emerson and Whitman, he considers his individual work to
be the most effective form of engagement available to him. Confronted with the
57
dilemma of whether or not to sign on to a protest refusing to pay a planned surtax
designed to help meet the costs of the war in Vietnam, Mailer "had piped up every
variety of the extraordinarily sound argument that his work was the real answer to
Vietnam, and these mass demonstrations, sideshows, and bloody income tax
protests just took energy and money away from the real thing—getting the work
out" (70).
What finally convinces Mailer to sign the protest is not a strong belief in its
potential to achieve its desired end, nor is it a compulsion to sacrifice his private
security for a greater cause. Rather, Mailer begins to perceive very strongly the
connection between his idea of himself and the moral and existential meaning of
political action. Mailer writes:
He had been suffering more and more in the past few years from
the private conviction that he was getting a little soft, a hint curdled,
perhaps an almost invisible rim of corruption was growing around
the edges. His career, his legend, his idea of himself—were they
stale? So he had no real alternative—he was not sufficiently
virtuous to eschew the income tax protest, and had signed, and to
his surprise had been repaid immediately by the abrupt departure of
a measurable quantity of moral congestion, a noticeable lowering of
his spiritual flatulence. [...] Yes, signing the protest had been good
for him. (71)
Despite references to notions of "virtue" and "morality" in connection to political
participation, Mailer is not, in this passage, restating the classical republican
sentiment of citizenship being founded on the individual desire to act virtuously,
on the subordination of individual interests to the interests of the public good.
Rather, Mailer simply recognizes that his idea of himself includes a conscience,
that while his work offers him a form of political engagement more consistent with
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his ideals and less likely to demand the subordination or denial of the self, he
could not shake the sense that "no project had seemed to cost him enough" (70).
Politics is without a doubt a lower realm for Mailer, a world where the
demands of compromise and self-denial abound, and where the dangers of
conformity and instrumentalism can restrict the expression and development of the
self. Thus, as Mailer's hesitancy regarding the protest indicates, he believes it
appropriate that the individual should enter the political realm with reluctance and
wariness. However, political action undertaken in accordance with one's
conscience, courting risk and self-loss as a moral choice, as a matter of conviction,
is an affirmation of the moral idea of individuality, an integral part of self-
development. Mailer's concerns regarding the dangers of mass politics on the
development of the individual are extensive and pervade the novel. But his
experience of citizenship, his decision to engage himself in political conflict, leads
Mailer to better understand the extent to which his identity, his understanding of
himself, is challenged by the ethical demands of America's democratic principles.
A vital democracy then, for Mailer, presents the individual with a moral
proposition, an existential choice, and a set of political institutions. By coming to
know himself better as a citizen, as an individual with a sense of moral
responsibility, capable of public action, despite the uncertainties and risks of the
political realm, and knowing the contingent and contestable nature of the beliefs
which compel him to action, Mailer stresses his allegiance to the set of principles
which animate the American democratic tradition, while affirming the diversity
and historicity of identity and values which underwrite the liberal ideals of
individual freedom and personal autonomy. If there is a theory of citizenship
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undergirding Mailer's participation in the March, it is one that remains committed
to a form of liberal selfhood capable of reason, self-consciousness, detachment,
and moral agency, but also to the democratic principles of the perpetual
contestability and plurality of values; to a politics which provides a context for
individual expression and experience, but which is also profoundly unsettling11 in
its exposure of the changeability and contingency of all conventions and
ideologies, including the conventions and ideologies of identity. For Mailer, the
conflict of positions, interests, and values is a permanent and indispensable feature
of democratic politics, but only an extraordinary feature of individuality. This
tension between democratic virtue and liberal individualism is not meant to be
resolved via citizenship, but only episodically experienced, intensified, performed,
and thereby sustained. Mailer makes it quite clear, in The Armies of the Night, that
when it comes to entering the political realm, reluctance, on the part of the
individual, is an appropriate approach. However, there are times and contexts,
conflicts and moral dilemmas, whose "logic might compel sacrifice from those
who were not so accustomed" (92). When such an instance does arise, and for
Mailer the war in Vietnam represents such an instance, it is the idea of the
revolutionary, with its formal and experiential possibilities that imbue the notion
of liberal democratic citizenship with existential and moral meaning, which is at
stake.
Mailer's description of himself as a Left Conservative, a position that he
defines as the belief that "radical measures were sometimes necessary to save the
" The term "unsettled" is used mindful of George Kateb's contention that "Democracy unsettles
everything (though not all at once) and therefore permits the slow growth of individuality. But it
unsettles everything for everyone, and thus liberates democratic individuality" (Kateb,
"Democratic Individuality" 339).
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root," is indicative of Mailer's insistence that his radical tendencies are in no way
foreign to his strong allegiance to the ideals and values on which the American
liberal democratic consensus has been built (207). For Mailer, there are precious
few political ideas more fundamental to the founding of America than the idea of
the revolutionary, the formal acceptance of the possibility of change and the
irreducibility of political conflict that provides the conditions under which liberal
democracy can be maintained. The danger posed by technocorporatism and its
attendant anti-political ideologies, the tendencies in American political life that
Mailer diagnoses as totalitarian, is the threat of stasis, the denial of the existential
and oppositional dynamics that both energize the forces of change and reaffirm the
value of consensus. John Diggins, in terms tellingly similar to Mailer's, has
described the kind of liberalism peculiar to America as "a liberalism that embraces
radical means to achieve conservative ends" (Diggins, Lost Soul 4). It is a kind of
liberalism that, to paraphrase Samuel Huntington, understands conflict to be the
child of consensus, and which, as Mailer's narrative in The Armies of the Night
seeks to demonstrate, opens up the political realm to the moral and existential
tension between individualism and social conscience which is the raw stuff of
citizenship in a liberal democracy.
In recent decades the emphasis on conflict and antagonism as fundamental
to the sustenance of liberal democracy has engaged the attention of many
contemporary political theorists. Thinkers such as John Gray, with his notion of
"agonistic liberalism12," Chantel Mouffe, with her appeal for an "agonistic
12 See Gray "Agonistic Liberalism."
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pluralism13," and William Connolly, with his theory of "agonal democracy14,"
have all attempted to reassert the primacy of the political over, amongst others, the
instrumental, juridical, or theoretical. Despite the differences in their ideological
and philosophical positions, these theorists all draw a crucial connection between
the contemporary crisis of liberal democratic citizenship and the growing influence
of anti-political ideologies, practices, institutions, and theories. They, like Mailer,
seek to pit the principle of liberal democratic tension, the legitimating and
constitutive role of political antagonism and struggle, against those forces that seek
the further neutralization of political possibility. Their work, in essence, is a much
more theoretically sophisticated expression of what underwrites Mailer's political
commitment in The Armies of the Night—the desire to reaffirm the experience of
the revolutionary, the individual encounter with contingency and the moral
implications of diversity in the political realm, that marks the foundational tension
between political action and existential subjectivity, and thus reclaim some of the
possibilities of liberal democratic citizenship.
13 See Mouffe The Return of the Political.
14 See Connolly Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations ofPolitical Paradox.
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CHAPTER TWO
Haunted Democracy: Secrecy, Paranoia and Legitimacy in Norman
Mailer's Harlot's Ghost, and Don DeLillo's Libra and Underworld
"Secrecy, being an instrument of conspiracy, ought never to
be the system of a regular government."
-Jeremy Bentham, "On Publicity"
One of the qualities that distinguish liberal democracy is the ambiguous
attitude it encourages toward state and political power. The fusion of liberal
individualism and democratic equality characteristic of liberal democracy creates a
tension between the deeply entrenched liberal suspiciousness regarding state
coercion and the democratic necessity of utilizing state power to pursue equality,
ensure popular participation, and to achieve common goals. In other words,
liberalism seeks to defend the primacy of the freedom of the individual against
state power, while democracy promotes the equality and the benefit of the
community largely through its employment. Liberalism demands the separation of
state and society, of the public and private realms, in order to safeguard individual
liberty, while democracy blurs this distinction in order to further the imperatives of
equality and the needs of the polity. This inherent tension in liberal democracy
creates a deeply rooted equivocalness concerning the uses of political power, an
ambiguity that underlies the liberal democratic belief in the legitimizing nature of
democratic processes and procedures. The formal and institutional arrangements
designed to ensure the transparency and accountability of the exercise of state
power is the primary means by which liberal democracies seek to balance
liberalism's inherent mistrust of government with the democratic need for it. A
fundamental tenet of liberal democracy is that political power is only legitimate if
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it is exercised within a system of rules and procedures that expose it to public
scrutiny and subject it to processes of popular control that formalize its claim to be
in the public interest. In itself this does not resolve the fundamental tension
between liberal principles and the demands of effective governance but rather
institutionalizes the liberal democratic faith that process can legitimately restrain
the secretive and exclusive tendencies it believes are inherent in the exercise of
power. The ever-present strain of this compromise, which liberal democracy
attempts to forge between the contradictory precepts of liberalism and the
requirements of state authority in a democracy, is perhaps most obviously apparent
in the state power deployed in response to the demands of national security.
In postwar America, the massive deployment of state power in the name of
national security, often referred to as the national security state, particularly in
response to the development of the cold war, has led to a series of scandals and
revelations concerning illegal, secretive, and covert actions taken by government
agencies or agents in violation of basic democratic procedures and processes, that
have fueled popular perceptions that the real political power wielded in America is
clandestine and operates outside of the liberal democratic system. What
investigations into the activities of the CIA and FBI and scandals such as
Watergate and the Iran-Contra Affair have exposed is the extent to which secrecy
is routinely utilized by intelligence agencies and other power structures attached to
the government, often to shield their activities from the constraints placed on them
by the American democratic process. While the paranoid excesses of the
McCarthy era had been stoked by fears of the dangers posed to American
democracy by communist infiltration, the popular paranoia and fascination with
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conspiracy encouraged by fears of an "invisible government"1 which secretly runs
America, and by the unresolved doubts surrounding the official explanation of the
Kennedy assassination, has exacerbated the growing skepticism in the American
public's attitude towards the democratic legitimacy of their political institutions
and encouraged the widespread belief that it is the CIA, large corporations, and
other shadowy organizations that are really in control of the government.
Aside from being an essential talking-point of politics in postwar America,
secrecy, paranoia, and conspiracy are a seemingly ubiquitous thematic interest of
the postwar American novel. A short list of narrative explorations of this cultural
and political motif could include such novels as William Gaddis's Carpenters
Gothic, Thomas Pynchon's The Crying ofLot 49, and Joan Didion's The Last
Thing He Wanted. These authors, and others such as William Burroughs, Kurt
Vonnegut, Kathy Acker, Joseph Heller, and of course the two authors whose work
is discussed in this chapter—Norman Mailer and Don DeLillo— are often referred
to as belonging to the "paranoid school" of American fiction, a designation that
points to their shared interest in conspiratorial explanations for historical or
political events, or as Timothy Melley explains, they "have all produced narratives
in which large governmental, corporate, or social systems appear uncannily to
control individual behavior and in which characters seem paranoid, either to
themselves or to other characters in the novel" (8). Of course, there is no shortage
of critical attention being paid to this preoccupation with paranoia, secrecy, and
conspiracy, not just in postwar American fiction, but also in postwar American
1 A phrase given popular currency by David Wise and Thomas Ross, in their influential book on
secret intelligence agencies in the United States, The Invisible Government, originally published in
1964.
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culture in a larger sense. Alongside Melley's Empire ofConspiracy: The Culture
ofParanoia in Postwar America (2000), recent years have seen the publication of
Peter Knight's excellent Conspiracy Culture: From Kennedy to the X-Files (2000),
and Patrick O'Donnell's Patent Destinies: Cultural Paranoia and Contemporary
U.S. Narratives (2000). It has also seen the publication of the first examples of
what one critic, Michael Wood, refers to as "post-paranoid" American fiction,
namely Thomas Pynchon's Mason andDixon (1997) and Don DeLillo's
Underworld (1997). It is Underworld which has particularly caught the attention
of observers of paranoid culture, with both Knight and O'Donnell, along with
Wood, finding in its self-conscious "end of the cold war" narrative perspective a
marked shift in DeLillo's approach to paranoia, now infused with a sense of irony
and even nostalgia. Paranoia, as it is presented in Underworld, is no longer a
subversive or even radical response to a world fraught with secrecy, threat, and the
abuses of power by an "invisible government," but has developed, in the post-cold
war world, into a style of resigned skepticism and pessimism tailored to fit an
irredeemably corrupted world controlled and determined by forces that are too
complex and enigmatic to understand and which operate far beyond the reach or
resistance of democratic agency.
The general claim presented here, that both Mailer and DeLillo offer
important narrative responses regarding the degree to which the postwar obsession
with secrecy and conspiracy has eroded faith in democratic legitimacy and
political agency in America, is one considered by most commentators on cultural
paranoia that express an interest in "paranoid fiction." Often, however, this
political thread is left dangling by critics in order to pursue lines of inquiry that
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stress the epistemological, historical, overtly cultural, or even spiritual issues
raised by their interpretive approaches. The discussion of Mailer's Harlot's Ghost
and DeLillo's Libra and Underworld which follows, draws extensively on the
insights, perceptions, and theoretical interpretations proffered by the growing
number of critiques of paranoia as an important characteristic of contemporary
American fiction, but attempts to offer a distinguishing emphasis on how this
thematic interest in secrecy and conspiracy, particularly as it is represented in their
novels which reflect back on events during the cold war period in America, might
offer a response to the cynical and skeptical state of American liberal democratic
morale. Even if, as Wood suggests, "the great age of American paranoia" is now
past, there is little doubt that both Mailer and DeLillo seem keenly interested in
tracking the residual impact of America's cold war experience with secrecy and
conspiracy, as well as emerging forms of paranoia, as it continues to shape
institutional attitudes and imprint on the American political consciousness (Wood
3).
Spooks and Agencies; Harlot's Ghost as a Response to the Culture of
Secrecy
In an interview with Scott Spenser, which appeared in the Guardian
following the publication of Harlot's Ghost, Mailer provides this insight into his
shift in attitude towards the CIA, precipitated by his research for the novel:
By the time I started Harlot's Ghost my attitude towards the CIA was no
longer hostile. At one point, I believed that the CIA was the most sinister
organization we have, but I came to think it was the most sinister
bureaucracy—and my novel became a comedy of manners. (Spenser 21)
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In fact, it is this representation of the CIA, as "an overgrown bureaucracy, forever
tripping over its own feet," that Louis Menand, reviewing Harlot's Ghost in The
New Yorker, finds most disagreeable about the novel (Menand 118). He contrasts
Harlot's Ghost's rather comic portrait of the cold war CIA and its various
clandestine machinations, plots, and operations—particularly the rather fanciful
schemes to assassinate Fidel Castro—with what he calls the "uncanny prescience"
which characterizes so many of the "CIA eminences" Mailer portrays (118). That
an organization, whose "conspiratorial energies are shown to be wasted in turf
wars with the FBI and the State Department," and whose operational terrain "is so
slippery that all its intelligence turns out to be moot anyway," was staffed at the
highest levels by agents with an underlying strategy, which now appears to have
been efficacious, to exaggerate the extent of the Communist threat in order to
"stoke anti-Communist militancy in the American public," promote American
military spending and buildup, and "thus hurry the inevitable day when
Communism would collapse of its own inefficiency," seems, to Menand, to be an
indication that "Mailer is now apparently happy to accept this version of winner's
history" (118).
According to Menand, Mailer's novel fails to address the political,
intellectual, and economic damage, particularly to the political left in America,
wrought by the forty years or so of "hysterical accusations and counter-accusations
of being 'soft on Communism,"' and the often quite terrible human consequences
of the interventionist foreign policy justified by the American government and its
agencies in the name of anti-Communism (118). He takes exception to what he
describes as Mailer's "fantasy" that the kind of anti-communism propagated by the
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CIA during the cold war amounted to little more than "a chess game played to
perpetuate the illusion that Communism was a greater threat than we secretly knew
it to be," arguing that "if Mailer believes this [...] there is no indication in Harlot's
Ghost that he thinks any less of American foreign policy, or of the CIA, for it"
(118-119). However, it is probably too perfunctory a political reading that
concludes that Harlot's Ghost is an apology for the CIA, or Mailer an example of
a prominent former critic of American cold war policy "jumping on the band¬
wagon" of "winner's history." Rather, a more sympathetic reader, one not looking
for a blanket condemnation of "the cold war mentality," might plausibly regard
Harlot's Ghost as Mailer's imaginative attempt to account, not for the contribution
of the CIA and its methods to the West's victory in the cold war, but rather for the
curious failure of the CIA to provide accurate intelligence, its inability "to see
clearly the nature of the Soviet threat," which was, as Daniel Patrick Moynihan
reminds us in his 1998 book Secrecy, "the very purpose it [the CIA] was designed
to serve" (Moynihan 181). Rather than expressing outright condemnation or
disdain, Mailer, in Harlot's Ghost, encourages a better understanding of the nature
of the CIA as the most effective approach to confronting its cold war ghosts that
continue to haunt the corridors of both the American government and the
American political imagination.
While it is certainly the case that Mailer's novel ventures down many an
imaginative path that a social scientist like Moynihan would surely object to as
unsubstantiated speculation, both books are the product of their authors' intense
interest in the many historical, political, and ethical controversies which cluster
around the apparent failure, on the part of the American government, to foresee the
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collapse of the Soviet Union, despite the immense expense and expansion of
American intelligence agencies2. Both Moynihan and Mailer point the finger
directly at what Moynihan calls "the culture of secrecy" which developed around
issues of national security during the uneasy days of the cold war (16). However,
while the two writers pursue a similar historical theme—the nature and impact of
the burgeoning of state secrecy in America—Mailer, having recourse to the tools
of a novelist rather than those of a senate committee member or a social scientist,
argues he is afforded "a unique opportunity" to fashion a "superior" history of the
CIA "out of an enhancement of the real, the unverified, and the wholly fictional"
(Mailer, Harlot's Ghost 1173). Mailer contends that Harlot's Ghost is an attempt
to "offer an imaginary CIA that will move in parallel orbit to the real one," and
thus delve deeper into the broader meaning of the CIA and its secretive actions
during the cold war than can be revealed by a more empirical effort to outline and
assess "the spectrum of facts and often calculated misinformation that still
surrounds them" (1173-1174). Claiming that following the evidential rules of
traditional historical enquiry—providing the reader "every instant with a scorecard
of what actually happened and what was made up,"— would fail to adequately
engage the imagination of his audience, Mailer mingles "the factual with the
fictional" in order to better "nourish [...) our sense of reality" (1173). More than
present a historically or ideologically correct portrait of the CIA, Harlot's Ghost,
2 The contention that the CIA overestimated the strength of the Soviet military and failed to predict
the collapse of the Soviet Union is a matter of ongoing debate amongst historians of American
intelligence. Perspectives which reject Moynihan's charges can be found in: Douglas J.
MacEachin's CIA Assessments of the Soviet Union: The Record Versus the Charges, Richard
Kerr's article in the New York Times, "CIA's Record Stands Up to Scrutiny," and Gerald K.
Haines and Robert E. Leggett's CIA Analysis of the Soviet Union 1947-1991. Haines and Leggett,
in particular, respond to Moynihan's arguments in Secrecy.
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according to its author, endeavors to "understand the tone of its inner workings"
(1169).
Harlot's Ghost traces the development of the CIA, from its origins in the
OSS after World War II, through the heady days of the early cold war period, the
remarkable episodes of the Cuban missile crisis and the Bay of Pigs invasion, the
turbulent era of the Vietnam War, the murky events ofWatergate, and into the
early Reagan era, depicting the decline of the CIA into a breeding ground, not just
for conspiracy and covert activity, but also for elitism, adventurism, and egotism.
In effect, Mailer offers an account, partly fiction and partly fact, of the downward
path of the CIA, from an agency designed to help defend American democracy by
providing its duly elected representatives with vital intelligence, an organization
which aspired to become "the mind of America," into a vast and unmanageable
bureaucracy capable, in the name of national security, of indulging its most absurd
fantasies of power and control—how else can one characterize a plot to kill Fidel
Castro with an exploding seashell.
It is not difficult to see why many critics characterize Mailer's narrative
approach to the CIA in Harlot's Ghost as an expression of a paranoid style of
fiction, or an example of the fascination of contemporary American culture with
conspiracy theories. Peter Knight, in particular, points to Mailer's "deep attraction
to the generic conventions of the thriller and the clandestine romance of the
intelligence agencies," as an example of the "dialectic of fear and fantasy" about
"the world of secret power" that has "permeated American fiction and films" in
the postwar period (Conspiracy Culture 29-30). Indeed, there is little doubt that as
a tale rife with conspiracies, cover-ups, official secrets, and clandestine operations,
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Harlot's Ghost contains all the conventions of a spy thriller—the fact that the
novel's protagonist and narrator Harrick "Harry" Hubbard works as a ghost-writer
of "pro CIA novels" as part of his duties as an agent, does indicate that Mailer is
quite aware of the appeal and power of these conventions. However, as a rather
detailed immersion into the technocratic inner structure of a vast bureaucracy
whose primary function seems to be the systemic creation and retention of secrets,
Mailer's novel spends at least as much time and effort relating the intricacies and
rituals of a rationalized organization, as it does romanticizing about some murky
and sinister "clandestine other world" (30).
Still, there is no doubt that Harlot's Ghost taps into postwar America's
obsession with conspiracy, calling on the general sense of suspicion and mistrust
of government which colors the image of the CIA in the popular American
political consciousness to lend plausibility to the host of speculations he offers
surrounding the activities of the CLA, ranging from the well-worn suggestions of
possible Agency involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy and the
death ofMarilyn Monroe, to a rather complicated plot involving CIA finances, the
Watergate break-in, and the death of Agency operative, and author of spy novels,
E. Howard Hunt's wife in a plane crash. Public disclosure of the covert,
unauthorized, and illegal nature of many CIA operations and activities, particularly
those brought to light by the 1975 Senate Select Committee on Government
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, whose investigation Harry
Hubbard refers to in the novel as "the exposure of the Family Jewels," as well as
revelations regarding Watergate, the Iran-Contra affair, the existence of FBI files
on sixties dissidents and protest groups, and the ever-lingering suspicions
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regarding the Kennedy assassination, have all contributed to a general atmosphere
of suspicion and secrecy that, as Mailer argues, bestows the events as he describes
them in Harlot's Ghost, if not the authenticity of an historical account, then at least
the sense that they respect the "proportions of the factual events" (1174).
In Harlot's Ghost, Mailer seems to have embraced the logic of what
Richard Hofstadter, in his seminal 1952 essay, refers to as "The Paranoid Style in
American Politics." Hofstadter argues that what "distinguishes the paranoid
style," is not "the absence of verifiable facts [...] but rather the curious leap in
imagination" that is always employed "at some critical point in the recital of
events" (37). Mailer's "paranoid style," his manner of bringing together an
accumulation of factual personages and circumstances which he then extrapolates
into a fictional narrative that moves towards conspiracy as an explanation for real
historical events, is exemplified in the following passage from Harlot's Ghost, in
which the formidable figure of Harlot, Harry Hubbard's godfather and mentor, sets
Harry straight regarding the real priorities of the CIA in the cold war world:
[Harry asks Harlot] 'But isn't it our priority in Europe to
know when the Soviets might attack?'
[Harlot responds] 'That was a pressing question five or six
years ago. The Red onslaught, however, is no longer all that
military. Nonetheless, we keep pushing for an enormous defense
buildup. Because, Harry, once we decide that the Soviet is
militarily incapable of large military attacks, the American people
will go soft on Communism. There's a puppy dog in the average
American. Lick your boots, lick your face. Left to themselves,
they'd just as soon be friends with the Russians. So we don't
encourage news about all-out slovenliness in the Russian military
machine.'
[...] 'I'm confused,' I [Harry] said. 'Didn't you once say
that our real duty is to become the mind of America?'
'Well, Harry, not a mind that merely verifies what is true
and not true. The aim is to develop teleological mind. Mind that
dwells above the facts; mind that leads us to larger purposes.
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Harry, the world is going through exceptional convulsions. [...J
Communism is the entropy of Christ, the degeneration of higher
spiritual forms into lower ones. To oppose it, we must, therefore
create a fiction—that the Soviets are a mighty military machine
who will overpower us unless we are more powerful. (355)
By accounting for the apparent failure of the CIA to predict the collapse of the
Soviet Union by hypothesizing about a conspiracy amongst high ranking agency
figures to hide CIA intelligence of Soviet military and economic weakness from
the American government and the American people in the name of a messianic
anti-communism, Mailer's novel, if we accept Hofstadter's terms, is following in a
longstanding American tradition, perpetuated by voices coming from both the
political Right and Left, of hunting for secret conspiracies to explain historical
events. This tradition, according to Hofstadter, is the product of a mentality
unable to grasp that "mistakes, failures, or ambiguities" must always be taken into
consideration when attempting to explain historical events, and that any attempt to
understand history in terms of a "motive force" or "one overreaching, consistent
theory," is a fundamental misunderstanding and distortion of how things happen
("Paranoid Tradition" 36-37, 29).
However, it is exactly the ambiguities and failures in the American
democratic system that have been highlighted by repeated revelations in recent
decades of conspiracies, cover-ups, and abuses of power that Mailer does take into
consideration in his narrative method in Harlot's Ghost. As Mailer himself tells
us, Harlot's Ghost is a product of his longstanding preoccupation with the
"ambiguous and fascinating moral presence of the Agency in [American] national
life" (1169). It calls attention to the conflict between the American liberal
democratic ideal of openness and transparency in public affairs, and the many
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instances of secret interventions and illegal subversions perpetrated by a state
intelligence apparatus that acts under the auspices of a democratic government.
However, the critique of America's experience of secrecy in Harlot's Ghost goes
beyond just reinforcing this fundamental observation concerning democratic
values. In Harlot's Ghost, Mailer suggests that the CIA, and the significant place
it seems to occupy in the American imagination, reflects an important element in
the prevailing character or spirit of postwar American society, a sensibility that
continues, even in the post-cold war period, to haunt the American consciousness.
Why are Americans so fascinated with secrecy and conspiracy? For Mailer, as his
statement in his interview with Scott Spenser indicates, the answer seems to lie in
the growing bureaucratization and corporatization of America. It reflects the kind
of organizational and systemic culture that increasingly dominates the lives of
American individuals. To borrow a common idiom ofMailer's, not for nothing is
the CIA nicknamed "the Corporation."
The bureaucratic routinization of secrecy in America during the Cold War,
epitomized in Mailer's novel by his depiction of the CIA as the fusion of
rationalized administration and the generalized fantasy world of spies and
clandestine plots, has not only lent paranoid political sensibilities and conspiracy
theories a semblance of plausibility and even reasonability, but has, to a large
extent, led to an overdeveloped fascination with state secrecy, and an obsession
with the idea of secrecy in general within American politics and culture, that
works to undermine the American individual's faith in the value of democratic
politics. One of the aspects of the CIA that Mailer's depiction accentuates is that
much of what it got up to, and labored to keep secret, during the Cold War, was
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pretty petty and irrelevant business. Rather than as a sinister means for the CIA to
manipulate and control political and historical events, secrecy, as Mailer's novel
punctuates, was most often utilized by the CIA as a tool in the internal battle for
influence and resources between governmental bureaucracies. It is a case that
Senator Moynihan also makes when he points out how "within the confines of the
intelligence community, too great attention was paid to hoarding information,
defending boundaries, securing budgets, and other matters of corporate survival"
(79). As one character in Harlot's Ghost puts it, when it comes to the CIA,
"We're dealing with bureaucracy, and that's a whole other kingdom" (218). One
of the ironies pursued by Mailer in Harlot's Ghost is that while secrecy became
the dominant precept of that kingdom, which certainly put it in violation of what
are supposed to be the democratic values underlying the American political
system, often the significance of the secrets being protected did not necessarily
merit the effort expended on keeping them secret.
This anti-democratic and disproportionate emphasis on secrecy did,
however, magnify the significance and prominence of secrecy itself in the
American political imagination. Confronted with a series of very public scandals
detailing how arms of the American government sought to circumvent democratic
processes and procedures to cover-up illegal and unethical activities, generally
justified in the name of national security, Americans' faith in the democratic
legitimacy of their government was significantly eroded.3 Richard Gid Powers is
quick to point out that while most Americans were not as dedicated to the thesis
that that the presence of a secret, covert, "invisible government", whose power
3 For a discussion of this "massive erosion of trust the American people have in their government,"
see Lionel Cliffs "Explanations: Deception in the U.S. Political System" (Cliff 57).
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permeated all levels of American society, was the real key to understanding the
history of the cold war, as the proliferation of revisionist historians, conspiracy
theorists, and purveyors of paranoid culture might indicate, the notion that
important information was being collected, manipulated, and kept secret by the
state, and that significant power was being wielded by institutions whose practices
flouted democratic openness and accountability, did have a profound effect on the
mainstream American political consciousness. Encouraged by revelations
concerning the state abuse of secrecy, a growing chorus of voices amongst
journalists, academics, and political commentators for whom, as Powers puts it,
"secrecy became the explanation for almost everything that ailed America," and a
government which continued to utilize official secrecy to an absurd extent4,
secrecy was increasingly presumed to be a measure of the inherent value of
knowledge and an indication of the influence and power of an organization (41).
In other words, the situation seems to have developed within American politics
and culture that anything kept secret accrues a greater aura of importance and
power, no matter its actual significance, than that which is not.
Mailer's style of narrative speculation certainly engages and reflects the
skeptical and conspiracy-minded mood of contemporary American political
sensibilities. However his fictional effort to "understand the tone of its [the CIA's]
inner workings," reveals a "sinister bureaucracy" rather than a "sinister
organization," a CIA more Weberian than Machiavellian. We are told that in
4 As John Ralston Saul points out, "The problem of retention is so great that today 3.5 million
Americans must be given various levels of security clearance in order to keep the system
functioning" (Voltaire's Bastards 289). Moynihan argues that "The Cold War has bequeathed to
us a vast secrecy system that shows no sign of receding," pointing, as partial evidence, to the fact
that the US still produces over 6 million classified documents per year (214).
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order Lo concentrate on writing the "detailed memoir of [his] life in the CIA,"
referring to the fictional "Alpha" manuscript which constitutes the bulk of
Harlot's Ghost, Harry had to abandon his agency sanctioned literary project, "a
monumental work on the KGB whose in-progress title was The Imagination of the
State" (30). The notion, evoked in the title of Harry's abandoned work, that the
purpose of official secrecy is to serve and enhance the mythological or fabulous
elements of state power, is the constant subtext of Mailer's narrative. As the state
becomes more rationalized and bureaucratic, secrecy as a means of controlling
information has less to do with the sensitivity of the content of this or that
particular fact to the interests of the state, and more to do with the exercise of
structural or administrative power by those with technocratic interests at heart. In
a society becoming increasingly technocratic, the measurement of any
bureaucracy's, and by extension any bureaucrat's, power, is largely based on the
amount of knowledge and information it/he/she controls. As John Ralston Saul
points out, "One of the truly curious characteristics of this society is that the
individual can most easily exercise power by retaining the knowledge which is in
his hands" (Voltaire's Bastards 287). This fundamentally undemocratic tendency
creates a general atmosphere in which individuals "must treat the secret as a cult,"
and encourages the rise of a political and cultural logic based around "a
generalized fantasy life" in which "the fictional spy [...][becomes] a glorified
reflection of the citizen" (288). The act of keeping something secret, of retaining
the most banal piece of information, is transformed by the technocratic
imagination, into proof of its importance. Of course, the fact that something is not
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kept secret, that information is public, is, by the same imaginative logic, proof of
its unimportance.
As Saul recognizes much of the damage wrought by the heightening mood
of suspicion and skepticism in American politics and culture can be measured by
the impact that this "worship of the idea of secrecy" has on the individual's
conception of his/her democratic agency (287). Saul argues that if the perception
that the real power determining the historical and political fate of the country is
always wielded in secret continues to gain strength in the American imagination,
and if, as Saul puts it, government bureaucracies continue to function as if
"everything is secret unless there is a conscious decision to the contrary," the view
that participation in democratic politics is an important and worthwhile exercise
will continue to lose credibility (287). As Saul observes:
The generalized secret has introduced such a terrible uncertainty
into our society that citizens's confidence in their own ability to
judge public matters has been damaged. They constantly complain
that they don't know enough to make up their minds. They have a
feeling that the mass of information available would not be
available if it were truly worth having. The result is a despondent
mental anarchy which prevents them from actively using the
considerable powers democratic society has won. They are
convinced that essential information is being held back. (288)
For Saul, as for Moynihan and for Mailer, one of the residual effects of the
"culture of secrecy" that flourished during the cold war is the cultivation, in
America, of a widespread belief that all the important decisions are taken by
secretive government agencies and corporations, a perception that leads to a
general cynicism and fatalism regarding the value of political engagement. The
overwhelming image of the CIA that one takes away from Harlot's Ghost is not
that of a powerful invisible government or shadowy puppet-master of history—
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though Mailer's portrayal of agency elitists whose desperation to believe just that
conception of the CIA greatly enhances the novel's "comedy of manners"
sensibility—but rather that of a massive, convoluted, poorly scrutinized
bureaucracy whose obsession with collecting, retaining, and controlling
information, mostly of the most mundane and banal nature, achieved fetishistic,
and certainly paranoid, proportions.5
Rather than simply confirm the notion of an irredeemably corrupt invisible
government that has taken over the reigns of the Republic, what Mailer attempts in
his fictionalization of the cold war history of the CIA is to dramatize the tensions
that always exist between the exercise of state power and the values of
transparency and public accountability that legitimize American democracy. At
the core of Mailer's imaginative depiction of the CIA—and particularly evident in
his theory of the "High Holies"—is a bureaucracy with an inherent tendency to
seek to hide, or even free itself altogether, from the restrictions and scrutiny of
democratic processes and procedures. The critique of secrecy that Mailer offers in
Harlot's Ghost is consistent with the liberal tradition in which state secrecy and
democracy represent conflicting systems of political values. However, the
5
Perhaps one of the most telling passages in the novel concerning the extent of the CIA's fetish for
secrecy is the following, in which Harry recalls the everyday practices of safeguarding information
for a CIA agent during the Cold War:
For years there were none of us who did not lock every last piece of paper in our safes,
and put whatever needless notes were left into the paper-shredder, but if one was in a
hurry to get out after work, we deposited trash and empty milk cartons in our private safe
to be disposed of in the morning. Reprimands for leaving any kind of paper behind were
too serious. [...] I do not know what else it accomplished, but it gave gravity to our
labors. Each piece of paper that one handled took on a density more palpable than
ordinary paper until sometimes in the outside world, reading a magazine or merely
handling a piece of stationary, or an ordinary letter, one would be struck with its ineffable
lightness, and so much so that years later on reading Kundera's The Unbearable Lightness
ofBeing, I thought immediately of the difference between papers that were secret and full
of their own weight, and the lightness of free paper that you could throw away without
any concern larger than that you might not be totally tidy (903).
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perspective that Mailer offers is not reducible to the promotion of the universal
maxim that "openness is good and secrecy is bad," that K.G. Robertson ascribes to
the more "normative" elements of that tradition (9). Nowhere in Harlot's Ghost
does Mailer insist that state secrecy is, in every case, an illegitimate and insidious
enemy of the interests of liberal democracy. What is insistent, however, is
Mailer's determined effort to represent the banal bureaucratic details underlying
the clandestine fantasy world of intelligence agencies in order to provide his
readers with a vantage point, somewhere between "those separate playhouses of
paranoia and cynicism" that Harlot mentions in his High Thursday lectures, from
which to engage and consider the challenges and ambiguities that the "culture of
secrecy" and the need for "sinister bureaucracies" like the CIA, continue to pose to
American liberal democracy.
'Clear Sighted" and "Reasonable": Libra as a Response to the Politics of
Conspiracy
Much has be written about the theme of conspiracy and paranoia in the
work of Don DeLillo, a writer who has been famously described by one critic as
the "chief shaman of the paranoid school of fiction," though DeLillo himself has
resisted the characterization of his work as paranoid, arguing that his fiction is
simply informed by the "suspicion and distrust and fear" that he senses in the
world around him (Towers 6; DeCurtis 66). DeLillo claims that, rather than
paranoid, his fiction is in fact "clear sighted" and "reasonable," that he is "a
completely rational person who is simply taking what he senses all around him and
using it as material" (DeCurtis 66). DeLillo's interventions in the representations
of consumer culture, paranoid politics, and corporate power—"It's my idea of
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myself as a writer [...] that I can enter these worlds"—are an act of citizenship,
perhaps "bad citizenship"6 as his more right-wing critics have accused, but
nevertheless one that demonstrates a perspicacious, rather than simply paranoid,
concern with the American political experience (66).
Many critics trace a direct link between what they perceive as DeLillo's
paranoid sensibility and the mode of social and political critique characteristic of
his work. Patrick O'Donnell is concerned with paranoia as a "cultural symptom"
of late capitalism and postmodernity and presents it as an integral part of any
understanding of history and identity "conceived in the after burn of master
narratives" (viii). He argues that paranoia functions as a form of recognition
which DeLillo posits as "the idealized condition of knowing in the moment when
identity has become multiple, virtual, and open to all the available connections," a
way of thinking that is able to at least partially represent the totality of the shifting,
interconnecting, and proliferating matrices of postmodern culture and global
capitalism (159). Frank Lentricchia also sees in DeLillo's work "an effort to
represent [...] culture in its totality" and a "desire to move readers to the view that
the shape and fate of their culture dictates the shape and fate of the self' (2). For
Lentricchia, DeLillo's paranoia is a reasonable response to the way that the
ideology of modernization, conceived in a Foucauldian sense as discursive and
social systems of power, and in a Jamesonian sense as the total logic of late
6 In an article in the Washington Post, conservative commentator George Will famously
characterized Libra as "an act of literary vandalism and bad citizenship." When asked to respond
to Will's comments in an interview in 1997. the year of the publication of Underworld, DeLillo is
quoted as saying: "I don't take it seriously, but being called a 'bad citizen' is a compliment to a
novelist, at least in my mind. That's exactly what we ought to do. We ought to be bad citizens.
We ought to, in the sense that we're writing against what power represents, and what the
corporation dictates, and what consumer consciousness has come to mean. In that sense, if we're
bad citizens, we're doing our job" (Remnick 48).
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capitalism, presents itself only as an unrepresentable shifting web of connections
and convergences. Paranoia, conceived along these lines, represents a kind of
political awareness, in DeLillo's work, that struggles to map the inescapable and
nebulous entanglements and networks of power that construct and discipline the
self in the postmodern world.
Timothy Melley also theorizes paranoia as a response to the totalizing
power of discursive and social systems, however Melley argues that contemporary
American fiction's paranoid style is less a critique of the way power is exercised
then an expression of the anxiety caused by the threat which poststructuralist and
postmodernist re-conceptions of power and subjectivity pose to autonomy and
individualism. He terms this response "agency panic," or the act of rhetorical
transference which attributes the human qualities of motive or intention to
systems, institutions, or organizations in order to preserve some sense of
autonomous agency consistent with a liberal conception of personhood. For
Melley, DeLillo's paranoid sensibility points towards a residual attachment to
liberal individualism in his work, an unwillingness to abandon the comforts of
liberal agency or individual identity and embrace new models of subjectivity and
human action. Paranoia, for Melley, is representative of the conflict occurring
within postmodern narratives that are reluctant to "abandon the coherent, liberal
subject" and embrace a subject re-imagined in relation to a systemic rather than
centralized understanding of power (41-42).
According to O'Donnell, Lentricchia and others, DeLillo's paranoia is best
understood as a mode of ideological critique, a method of revealing an important
but increasingly illusive dimension of the multiple and stratified relationships
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between cultural, social, political and economic systems of power; while for
Melley, DeLillo's paranoia functions as a way of re-asserting, and even
amplifying, the agency and autonomy of subjectivity in a post-human world that
has "exploded the assumptions of liberal individualism" (14). At best a rhetorical
gesture of ideological unmasking, the result of DeLillo's attempt to describe the
unrepresentable intersections of corporate capitalism, the security state, and
consumer culture, and at worst, the narrative ghost of the dying myth of
individualism, the effect of a rhetorical defense mechanism triggered to preserve a
masculinist, neo-liberal, and antisocial view of selfhood, paranoia in DeLillo's
work is often characterized as symptomatic of the conflict between an
understanding of human agency made meaningful only when expressed in terms of
historical determinism, epistemological certainty, and ideological coherence, and a
production of subjectivity dislocated and situated in relation to historical
contingency, epistemological uncertainty, and radical skepticism.
Both O'Donnell's sympathetic socio-symbolic and Melley's less-
sympathetic socio-psychological readings deal with paranoia in DeLillo's work on
an abstract and largely epistemological level, interpreting it as a symptom of a
crisis of identity or subjectivity within postmodern circumstances. Alongside
these perspectives, I believe that there is a sense in which paranoia and conspiracy
in DeLillo's work can be read as an articulation of a persevering populist political
sensibility in America. DeLillo recognizes that the exaggerated levels of anxiety
and suspiciousness in contemporary America represent a quite reasonable reaction
to the democratic illegitimacy of the intensification and expansion of state and
corporate power, particularly during the cold war era, but one whose tendency to
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Gothicize, in Mark Edmondson's sense of the term, to express or narrate the
experience of that power as preternatural, ubiquitous, and proof of the existence of
a "vast world that serves as a dark double to the visible everyday world," often
encourages popular cynicism and fatalism rather than a sense of popular political
engagement (Edmondson 22).7 And while this often melodramatic reaction to the
mundane exercise and expansion of bureaucratic and systemic power yields some
crucial insights regarding the routinization of anti-democratic and quasi-
totalitarian practices within structures of state, cultural, and economic power, it
ultimately, as DeLillo intimates in his work, offers no purchase or leverage on
those systems, since paranoia functions, as O'Donnell tells us, largely as a mode of
perceiving the monolithic networking of power rather than an effective mode of
resistance to it. Resistance requires the possibility of identifying vulnerability or
ambiguity in the system to which one is opposed, thus preserving some sense of
agency, intention, or subjectivity capable of directing, restraining or influencing
it.8 Conspiracy theories often posit a world where contingency plays no part,
where events are determined by forces whose power is ubiquitous, total, and
invisible, and thus beyond the moral, ethical or political reach of democratic action
or constraints. DeLillo's work reflects on the political and social context in which
conspiracy as a mode of popular politics is no longer easily dismissed as
unreasonable, but also insists on contingency as a vital element in affirming that a
7 The discussion of the connection between populism and conspiracy theory that follows is largely
indebted to Mark Fenster's Conspiracy Theories: Secrecy and Power in American Culture.
8 This is the democratic "problem of the political" as Sheldon Wolin identifies it: "The problem of
the political is not to deny the ubiquity of power but to deny power uses that destroy common
ends" (Practice ofPower 198).
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"clear sighted" response to the challenge to democratic legitimacy and agency
posed by state secrecy, corporate power, and globilization remains possible.
In Libra, DeLillo's fictional account of the assassination of President John
F. Kennedy, the tension in DeLillo's work between paranoia and contingency is
managed, almost schematically, as DeLillo undermines the logic of both
conspiratorial and "lone gunman" versions of the killing by bringing together two
narrative lines to suggest a way of thinking about the assassination that eludes the
overstated coherence of the account of events offered by both.9 In Libra, neither
conspiracy nor contingency are discounted as contributing factors in understanding
the assassination, however DeLillo refuses to have his imagination of events
"constrained" or "overwhelmed" by either. Like Mailer, DeLillo is forthright in
discussing his fictional methodology, assuring his readers in an "Author's Note"
that what he offers in Libra is "a work of imagination," that makes "no attempt to
furnish factual answers to any questions raised by the assassination." In fact, it is
DeLillo's intention that Libra offer its readers "refuge" from the "gloom [...] of
unknowing" that perpetually surrounds the Kennedy shooting—"a way of thinking
about the assassination without being constrained by half-facts or overwhelmed by
possibilities, by the tide of speculation that widens with the years" (Libra Author's
Note). Also like Mailer, DeLillo asserts the novelist's entitlement to assume the
proportion of truth without claiming factuality, and seeks to "nourish our sense of
reality," while simultaneously altering and embellishing it (.Harlot's Ghost 1173).
9 The reading of Libra offered here is significantly influenced by Skip Willman's "Traversing the
Fantasies of the JFK Assassination: Conspiracy and Contingency in Don DeLillo's Libra" in which
he argues that DeLillo formulates "the JFK assassination as the result of both conspiracy and
contingency" (407). Where it differs from Willman's reading is in the emphasis Willman puts on
conspiracy and contingency theories as ideological explanations for the "failure of society to
constitute itself as a harmonious whole" (408).
86
This speaks lo what DeLillo has referred to as the novelist's pursuit of a "a kind of
redemptive truth," the capacity of fiction to "leap across the barrier of fact" in
order release our imagination from a too confining desire for certainty or a too
bewildering confrontation with ambiguity (DeCurtis 48).
In Libra, David Ferrie, an eccentric and shadowy figure with ties to the
CIA, the mob, and various clandestine political organizations, as well as a
penchant for astrology and mysticism, theorizes the novel's "aspirjation] to fill
some of the blank spaces in the known record" without resorting to the causal
logic of either conspiracy or contingency by invoking the presence of a quasi-
metaphysical force that lies outside historical or political experience to sketch a
dimension of contiguity between the conflicting approaches.
'Think of two parallel lines,' he said. 'One is the life of Lee H.
Oswald. One is the conspiracy to kill the President. What bridges
the space between them? What makes a connection inevitable?
There is a third line. It comes of our dreams, visions, intuitions,
prayers, out of the deepest levels of the self. It's not generated by
cause and effect like the other two lines. It's a line that cuts across
causality, cuts across time. It has no history that we can recognize
or understand. But it forces a connection. It puts a man on the path
of his destiny.' (339)
Peter Knight suggests that the "third line" which Ferrie mentions, is that level at
which "the conspiratorial has become inseparable from the coincidental, or more
accurately," as he qualifies, the point at which "we need to read coincidences as if
they were signs of a conspiracy, without necessarily equating the two"
0Conspiracy Culture 108). His reading is persuasive, and there is little doubt that
DeLillo's novel insists on blurring the line between accident and intention in
history, but it is unclear how Knight's interpretation would deal with the notion
suggested in Ferrie's remarks that what connects conspiracy and contingency,
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Oswald to the plot of renegade CIA agents, the lone gunman of the Warren
Commission to the paranoid sensibilities of conspiracy theory, "comes of our
dreams, visions, intuitions, prayers, out of the deepest levels of the self." Knight
offers the notion of "coincidence as a realm between simple conspiracy and
contingency," but insists on coincidence as merely a kind of signification, a
position that seems to dismiss DeLillo's appeal to the deep self as a source of
connection (260). This is, of course, not to suggest that Knight is incorrect in
insisting on DeLillo's willingness to question historical explanations which are
based on either causal or contingent meta-narratives of history, however, as Paul
Maltby points out, "Libra is neither consistently nor unequivocally postmodern,"
and it is important to keep in mind how Libra "appeals to the truth and sovereignty
of 'the deepest levels of the self'," to the trans-historical forces whose invocations
Paul Maltby calls DeLillo's Romantic metaphysics, when considering the kind of
social or political critique characteristic of DeLillo's work (Maltby 510).
What DeLillo asserts in Libra is a way of thinking about the assassination
that seeks its veracity and impact in its appeal to the imagination, to those insights
and intuitions that connect, as Ferrie says in the novel, "on some deeper plane"
(Libra 330). Neither a theory of conspiracy nor a theory of contingency, the "third
line" is DeLillo's metaphor for an impression of truth that resides, "outside
politics" and "outside history," but deep in the psyche of "the idiosyncratic self'
(DeCurtis 289; DeLillo, "Power" 5). DeLillo objects to both the conspiracy and
contingency version of the assassination not because they are irrelevant or
foundationless, but because they are necessarily incomplete in their attempts to
account for the unfolding of events systematically—leaving no room for the
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deeper ambiguities of human desire and belief. In Libra, both conspiracy and
contingency are integral ingredients of an event which DeLillo depicts as carrying
such significance and magnitude that it challenges the circumscriptions of people's
sense of reality, forcing people to become "more aware of elements like
randomness and ambiguity and chaos" in everyday life (DeCurtis 48). It is
commonplace among DeLillo's critics to refer to the passage in Libra in which the
assassination is described by Nicholas Branch, an ex-CIA researcher who is
working on a secret history of the assassination, as "an aberration in the heartland
of the real" in reference to DeLillo's statement in an interview regarding the
fissure he detects in the American psyche, a lost "sense of a manageable reality,"
that can be "traced to that one moment in Dallas" (Libra 15; DeCurtis 48). Just as
important, however, are Branch's comments regarding the aura of the
assassination, a quality that Branch describes as "a strangeness [...] that is almost
holy" (Libra 15). "Aberration," according to the OED, can mean both "a deviation
from what is normal," and "a [...] moral lapse," one definition adopting the tone of
an empirical observation, while the other imbues the term with metaphysical
significance. Speaking of the assassination as an "aberration" preserves the sense
of the event as a disruption of a legitimate and accustomed state of affairs by an
act of random violence, an interpretation that while conceding the vulnerability of
American life and institutions to the forces of irrationality and "an addled
individual's inner turmoil," to borrow a phrase from George Will, dismisses the
popularity of conspiracy theories of the assassination as the product of a general
psychological need for a less disconcertingly random explanation of Kennedy's
death (Will 57). However, it also communicates a sense of the assassination as a
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sign of America's moral decline and fall from grace, the notion that Kennedy's
murder reveals elements underlying American life and experience that reach well
beyond the issues surrounding Oswald's guilt or the questions of conspiracy into
issues concerning faith, communal values, and intimations of lost virtue10.
The ground DeLillo is treading here seems familiar enough. Tony Tanner
reminds us that DeLillo is working in a furrow well-labored by Thomas Pynchon,
positing and oscillating between "two dominant states of mind—paranoia and anti-
paranoia, [...] shifting from a seething bland of unmeaning to the sinister apparent
legibility of an unconsoling labyrinthine pattern or plot" (Tanner 210)11. This
seems to sum up the dilemma in which Nicholas Branch finds himself in Libra,
unable to risk interpreting the evidence he has spent three decades collecting
regarding the assassination for fear that he might be guilty of distorting,
misrepresenting, or even fabricating the real meaning of the event. Branch is
overwhelmed by the sheer quantity of related material and evidence he has
collected, and his choice seems to lie between giving-up his search for the truth or
giving-in to paranoia, to either "despair of ever getting to the end," or accept "the
powerful and lasting light, exposing patterns and links" which the assassination
appears to emit (57-58). For Knight, and others, Branch's situation is
10 A more straight-forward expression of this notion is Christopher Lasch's observation that for
many, "Speculation about the assassination [...] came to hinge not on the question of whether
Oswald could have murdered Kennedy unassisted but on the seemingly much larger, momentous
question of what his action revealed about the national psyche. The question so often raised in the
hours following the assassination—'What have we come to?'—prompted an orgy of national soul-
searching" (470).
11 The exemplary passage from Pynchon, which Tanner quotes in this regard, is from The Crying of
Lot 49: "Either Oedipa in the orbiting ecstasy of a true paranoia, or a real Tristero. For there either
was some Tristero beyond the appearance of the legacy of America, or there was just America, or
there was just America and if there was just America then it seemed the only way she could
continue, and manage to be at all relevant, was as an alien, unfurrowed, assumed full circle into
some paranoia" (Lot 49 126).
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representative of an epistemological crisis, a particular condition of consciousness
that "is very much in tune with a postmodern distrust of final narrative solutions"
(Conspiracy Culture 116). His anxiety and paralyzing uncertainty—"He concedes
everything. He questions everything, including the basic suppositions we make
about our world [...] solid objects and ordinary sounds, and our ability [...] to see
things as they are, recall them clearly, be able to say what happened"—is, for
Knight, a result of his never-ending search for closure, his perpetual pursuit of a
narrative in which to encompass the "endless suggestiveness" of facts, to contain
the seemingly infinite patterns, connections, and symmetries that the evidence
seems to present (DeLillo, Libra 300-301). In Knight's interpretation, "Libra
embraces the possibility that closure and certainty are no more than convenient
fictions" (Conspiracy Culture 109). This is, undoubtedly, a valid point and
skepticism and nervousness regarding narrative is a consistent characteristic of
DeLillo's work. Branch's dilemma, his perpetual paralysis stemming from the
disparity between his desire for closure and the endless suggestiveness of the facts
is, for Knight, indicative of the postmodern incredulity towards narrative—"In
effect it makes Nicholas Branches of us all" (109). However, to safeguard the
consistency of DeLillo's postmodern sensibility Knight feels it necessary to
characterize as "somewhat disingenuous" DeLillo's claims that narrative "rescues
history from its confusions," and has the potential to provide a form of
"redemptive truth"(109).
Timothy Melley agrees with Knight that Branch "finds himself in an
epistemological crisis," overwhelmed by the immense volume of evidence
regarding the assassination to the point where "he is unable to produce his history"
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(Melley 139). Branch's problem, as Melley sees it, is not only that he is unable to
determinately solve the historical case, "but that the production and management
of documents overrides the interpretive impulse that justifies gathering those
documents in the first place" (139). In other words, Branch has, in effect,
abandoned any effort to produce a coherent history of the assassination, and adopts
what Melley identifies as an "archeological" approach to the case, a methodology
that replaces the work of historical interpretation with the collection and
organization of artifacts, the amassing of materials and documents which generate
their own series of links and connections. For Melley, Branch's dilemma is
largely historiographical, he is stuck between his obsession with accumulating
evidence, and his lingering desire to produce an historical narrative that interprets
it, a desire that Melley points to as a symptom of "agency panic." Melley finds
this "methodological boundary" an interesting one because it seems to demarcate
the territory shared by the interpretive impulse of "traditional historiography" and
what is generally understood as paranoia (141). However, what Melley and
Knight seem to discount are the insights which Branch is able to glean from his
stubborn efforts to interpret the evidence, insights which affirm the worth and
significance of his narrative project, and the interpretive desires which continue to
haunt it, despite his recognition that any final narrative of intention, determination,
or coherence which he might construct from the historical evidence of the
assassination would be incomplete and distorting, as much a product of his own
ordering consciousness and imagination as an objective reflection of the facts.
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One such insight regards the essential flaw of conspiracy theories, their
inability to account for the contingent elements of chance and coincidence that,
Branch believes, played a vital role in the assassination.
If we are on the outside, we assume a conspiracy is the perfect
working of a scheme. Silent nameless men with unadorned hearts.
A conspiracy is everything that ordinary life is not. It's the inside
game, cold, sure, undistracted, forever closed off to us. We are the
flawed ones, the innocents, trying to make some rough sense of the
daily jostle. Conspirators have a logic and a daring beyond our
reach. All conspiracies are the same taut story of men who find
coherence in some criminal act.
But maybe not. Nicholas Branch thinks he knows better.
He has learned enough about the days and months preceding
November 22, and enough about the twenty-second itself, to reach a
determination that the conspiracy against the President was a
rambling affair that succeeded in the short term due mainly to
chance. Deft men and fools, ambivalence and fixed will and what
the weather was like. (Libra 441)
Such a provisional conclusion, while not venturing another "gleaming theory,
supportable, assured," does have the effect of undermining the notion of the
assassination as the result of a monolithic and masterful conspiracy. It suggests a
way of thinking about the assassination that allows for the popular skepticism
surrounding the version of events offered by the Warren Commission without
accepting the totalizing logic of conspiracy theory. In effect, this "rescues" the
suspiciousness and distrust of authority that characterizes much of the tone of that
skepticism from the need to "invent the grand and masterful scheme" which
defines what Richard Hofstadter calls the "paranoid style of politics" (Libra 58).
"There is," Branch tells us, "enough mystery in the facts as we know them, enough
of conspiracy, coincidence, loose ends, dead ends, multiple interpretations," to
suggest that popular skepticism regarding the "lone gunman" theory of the Warren
Commission is more than the product of mass irrationality or, as many
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commentators on the popularity of conspiratorial explanations of the assassination
argue, the result of a general "desire to deny the existential horror of Kennedy's
death by reducing it to a plot" (Libra 58; Lasch 473).
It also, as SkipWillman points out, undermines the conception of the CIA
as "the 'invisible Master' of the geopolitical sphere," a fantasy embraced by the
conspiratorial imagination and often encouraged by elements of the CIA itself,
while also calling attention to the extent to which the culture of secrecy that
characterized the way the CIA operated during the cold war, had a dangerous and
corrosive effect on the legitimacy of state and governmental institutions,
particularly regarding the CIA's efforts to shield itself from mechanisms of
democratic oversight and restraint (414). The CIA's obsession with secrecy, in
Libra, does not reflect its mastery of events or control over history, but rather has
the more mundane and bureaucratic function of providing the CLA with a layer of
protection and obfuscation, shielding its activities from the scrutiny and control of
12the larger democratic system. In Libra, as the following passage describing the
CIA's plans regarding the Bay of Pigs invasion indicates, the secrecy that
characterizes the CIA can be viewed as largely a matter of bureaucratic and
systemic routine, a way of avoiding responsibility, accountability, and
administrative rivalry:
Knowledge was a danger, ignorance a cherished asset. In many
cases the DCI, the Director of Central Intelligence, was not to know
important things. The less he knew, the more decisively he could
function. It would impair his ability to tell the truth at an inquiry or
a hearing, or in the Oval office chat with the President, if he knew
12 Bill Millard, in his essay "The Fable of the Ants," argues that in the national security state as it is
depicted by DeLillo, the "deliberately fragmented bureaucracy" that is "the form of rationality
peculiar to such organizations [CIA] depends precisely on minimizing the possibility that anyone
might know enough to comprehend the full narrative" (218).
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what they were doing [...]. The Joint Chiefs were not to know.
[...]. The Secretaries were to be insulated from knowing [...]. The
Deputy Secretaries were interested in drifts and tendencies. They
expected to be misled. The Attorney General wasn't to know the
queasy details [...]. The White House was to be the summit of
unknowing [...] the system operated as an insulating muse. Let
him see the softer tones. Shield him from responsibility. Secrets
build their own networks, Win believed. The system would
perpetuate itself in all its curious and obsessive webbings, its
equivocations and patient riddles and levels of delusional thought.
(21-22)
The routinization of secrecy by the CIA is, for DeLillo, more an indication of a
lack of absolute power, or an illusion of absolute control, than a confirmation of its
status as a plenipotentiary of an omnipotent invisible government. Everett's plan
to stage an assassination attempt on JFK in order to implicate pro-Castro elements
in America, and thereby frustrate moves within the American government to
improve relations with Cuba, ultimately breaks down because he cannot control
the proliferation of contiguous secret plots, networks, and individual motives with
which it overlaps, or, to use DeLillo's own image, the original conspiracy
"grow[s] tentacles" (Begley 331). Like Mailer's depiction of the CLA in Harlot's
Ghost, DeLillo's CIA in Libra is more "sinister bureaucracy" than "invisible
government," whose technocratic habit of secrecy is more indicative of an illusion
1
of control than a means for determining the unfolding of events.
Nicholas Branch seems to understand the bureaucratic nature of the CIA
and its culture of secrecy. His time in the agency, we are told, provided him with
insight into the essentially insignificant and frivolous nature of much of its vast
collection of secrets.
13
Skip Willman calls attention to this aspect of the novel, arguing that "the 'secret parallel power'
that DeLillo deconstructs in Libra is the CIA," pointing out that "Everett is exposed [...] as an
imposter, an 'invisible Master' who fails in his conspiratorial efforts" (411-412).
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Before his retirement, Branch analyzed intelligence, sought patterns
in random scads of data. He believed secrets were childish things.
He was not generally impressed by the accomplishments of men in
the clandestine service, the spy handlers, the covert-action staff. He
thought they'd built a vast theology, a formal coded body of
knowledge that was basically play material, secret-keeping, one of
the keener pleasures and conflicts of childhood. (442)
And yet Branch is paralyzed by the notion that the CIA is withholding vital
information from him in an effort to protect "something very much like its
identity—protecting its own truth, its theology of secrets" (442). For DeLillo, the
structural identity of the CIA, its understanding of itself and, more importantly, of
its power, is anchored in its worship of secrecy, its ability to collect and control
information. Branch is "disheartened, almost immobilized" by the thought that
"there's something they aren't telling him" (442-444). His belief that, as Mark
Osteen puts it, "the most essential information is always that which nobody
shares," keeps him trapped in his room, convinced that the key evidence that will
finally allow him to "master the data" is being kept from him (Osteen 153; Libra
442). With Branch, DeLillo is dramatizing a general feeling of powerlessness, a
nagging sense of uncertainty and suspiciousness that is the result of both being
overwhelmed by the sheer quantity of information that is collected and retained by
modern information systems, and a cultural and political imagination that worships
secrecy, that defines power as the ability to retain and control knowledge.14 To
Branch, the CIA appears to possess an unlimited supply of information with which
to provide him, most of which, when collected, constitutes nothing more than "a
14 "What good is knowledge," asks a character in DeLillo's White Noise, "if it just floats in the air?
It goes from computer to computer. It changes and grows every second of every day. But nobody
knows anything" (148-149). The glut of information supplied and managed by advancements in
information technology, as Neil Postman has pointed out, is a primary source of the "breakdown of
psychic tranquility and social purpose" in contemporary America (72). In the service of
government agencies, bureaucracies, and corporations, as John Ralston Saul says, "the factual
snow job is one of the great inventions of the late twentieth century" (Voltaire's Bastards 288).
96
mined city of trivia," but the sheer amount of data which the CIA controls also
means an unlimited capacity to keep information from him, a capacity to keep him
in his little room forever wondering, "What are they holding back? How much
more is there?" (442). Ultimately, the central question troubling Branch about the
CIA is not whether there is a motive force behind the organization that consciously
wants to deny him from ever learning the truth about the assassination, but rather
whether the structural and bureaucratic nature of the CIA makes full disclosure a
systemic impossibility, whether there might not be "some limit inherent in the
yielding of information gathered in secret" (442).
For DeLillo, the rapid advancements made in science and technology,
particularly information technology that developed after World War II, and the
emergence of the cold war "security state," particularly the expansion of state
intelligence agencies like the CIA and FBI, brought about what he calls in an
article published in Rolling Stone, a "clandestine mentality" in America. This
"clandestine mentality," the individual and collective obsession with secrecy and
the control of information reflects a central characteristic of the bureaucratic age,
the way that rationalized administrative structures accumulate, organize, and
withhold information in their struggle for, and exercise of, power. Secrecy, as one
of the keys to the exercise of modern power, becomes completely affiliated with
the systems and structures that control and collect information. According to
DeLillo, "in an era of massive codification and storage of data, we are all keepers
and yielders of secrets" ("American Blood" 27). Branch, as an exemplar of this
mentality, conflates the structural and bureaucratic obsession with secrecy with the
deeper mysteries of human experience and motivation, with the human desire for
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recognition, a sense of belonging, community, and individuality. In this regard, as
a keeper and yielder of secrets—he is after all working for the CIA and writing a
secret history of the assassination— he seems obsessed with excavating the
"secrets" underlying the assassination in the compendium of facts and information
which he continues to collect, rather than concerning himself with the deeper
understanding which his research reveals regarding the pervasiveness of
alienation, desperation, loneliness, and social division in America.
The illuminating glimpse which the assassination offers under the surface
of the American "heartland of the real" revolves, in Libra, around the figure of Lee
Harvey Oswald and his conception of himself as "a zero in the system" (Libra
357). Oswald's frustrated desire to "sense a structure that includes him, a
definition clear enough to specify where he belongs," seems to confirm the picture
of him as an alienated and antisocial individual whose act of random violence,
however historically significant, was simply a reflection of personal psychological
frustrations and anxieties (357). As Branch discovers, however, Oswald's story is
too suggestive of the anxiety, frustration, and estrangement that pervades
American social and cultural experience to attribute his actions to mere
contingency. Though replete with errors, omissions, and questionable
conclusions, Branch has, we are told, "long since forgiven the Warren Report for
its failures. It is too valuable a document of human heartbreak and muddle to be
scorned or dismissed" (182). DeLillo's suggestion that Oswald's disaffection,
loneliness, and violent behavior be considered as, at least partly, a by-product of
those forces that constitute American social life, rather than a deviation from them,
highlight the alienating and fragmenting nature of the systems which define
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cultural, political, and social experience in postwar America. Branch's research
into the assassination, the years living with the loneliness, sadness, and death that
he senses pervades the objects, pictures, personal stories, and state documents that
he collects as evidence, convinces him that "his subject is not politics or violent
crime but men in small rooms" (181). Oswald's alienation, his "life in small
rooms," is, according to DeLillo, "the antithesis of the life America seems to
promise its citizens: the life of consumer fulfillment" (DeCurtis 52).
The terms "citizens" and "consumer" point to central elements of the
critique of social fragmentation and disconnection that DeLillo ascribes to the
postmodern forms of cultural and social institutions with which his work is
concerned, systems through which consumer capitalism, the technocorporatist
state, and advancements in technology and information systems interweave to, in
large part, circumscribe the fate of collectivities and individuals in America.
Oswald is depicted as a casualty of those systems, as a citizen who finds precious
little to feel connected to, or included by, in what John Schaar characterizes as a
"state, economy, and society [that] are remote, huge, and thoroughly technicized
and bureaucratized" (as qtd in Young 301). Alienated from the conditions that
make even the degraded citizenship of consumer society available, Oswald "feels
he is living at the center of an emptiness," and conceives himself "a zero in the
system" (DeLillo, Libra 357). "Again we come back," DeLillo comments in an
interview, "to these men in small rooms who can't get out and who have to
organize their desperation and their loneliness, who have to give it a destiny"
(DeCurtis 57-58). This then becomes the fatal force, the third line that connects
the conspiracy and contingency theories of the assassination. Oswald's restless
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desire for a destiny, his frustrated attempts to "merge with the world in general or
with history in particular," intensified by his social alienation and inability to
identify a sense of commonality or collective identity in which he might
participate, a frustration only nourished by the culture of secrecy perpetuated by
the state and bureaucratic systems which surround him, and, ultimately, woven
into the history of the illegitimate and undemocratic practices utilized and
routinized by the American state and its agencies during the cold war, sets the
stage for an event that seems, for DeLillo, to act as a "dark center" around which
the paranoia, confusion, distress, mistrust, anxiety and suspicion that DeLillo
perceives "in the air and in the culture" congregate.15
Libra never offers a clear motive for Oswald's actions, no clear indication
as to whether they were politically, emotionally, or psychologically driven.
Oswald's forays into Marxism and self-exile, in the novel, are unconvincing, and
his need for belonging and recognition presented more-or-less sympathetically.
Here is Larry Parmenter discussing Oswald with Ferrie:
"You mentioned politics," he said. "How far left is this
young friend of yours?"
"There is politics, there is emotion, there is psychology. I
know him quite well but I wouldn't be completely honest if I said I
could pin him down, pin him right to the spot. He may be a pure
Marxist, the purest of believers. Or he may be an actor in real life.
What I know with absolute certainty is that he's poor, he's
dreadfully, grindingly poor. (Libra 56)
DeLillo highlights the inescapable social and economic division that Oswald
represents in the novel, but as for ascribing a motive DeLillo's working model
seems to be the one attributed to Parmenter by his wife Beryl:
15 In an interview, DeLillo tells Anthony DeCurtis that, "As I was working on Libra, it occurred to
me that a lot of tendencies in my first eight novels seemed to me to be collecting around the dark
center of the assassination" (47-48).
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He believed that nothing can be finally known that involves human
motive and need. There is always another level, another secret, a
way in which the heart breeds a deception so mysterious and
complex it can only be taken for a deeper kind of truth. (Libra 260)
Like Win Everett, the rogue CIA agent and leader of the conspiracy, DeLillo's
narrative compels us to accept "the fact that Lee Oswald existed independent of
the plot," that depicting him as a patsy or as a crazed gunman writes the mystery,
idiosyncrasy, and complexity of human agency and imagination—the "notion of
coincidence and dream and intuition and the possible impact of astrology on the
way men act"—out of the narrative of the assassination (DeCurtis 55-56). This
leaves us with Oswald as a puppet constructed and controlled in the service of an
all-powerful conspiracy—"He [Win Everett] felt marvelously alert, sure of
himself, putting together a man with scissors and tape"—or with a conspiracism
that is the product of a mass psychological drama, yet another example of the
"paranoid style" in American politics (Libra 178). As ways of thinking about the
assassination neither theory, for DeLillo, satisfactorily comes to terms with either
the many ways in which Oswald functions as a "symptom" of the breakdown in
the civic fabric of American life—highlighted by the failure of modern American
consumer culture to provide a vigorous and attainable sense of social participation
or communal vision for Oswald16—or with the crisis of democratic legitimacy—
represented by the novel's interest in the expansion of the bureaucratic and
technocratic structures of state and corporate institutions, the anxieties concerning
16 At one point in Libra, after watching Suddenly, a Frank Sinatra movie about a combat veteran
who plots to assassinate the president, Oswald contemplates the answer to his sense of alienation
and frustration offered by consumer society: "He would start saving right away for a washing
machine and car. They'd get an apartment with a balcony, their own furniture for a change,
modern pieces, sleek and clean. These are standard ways to stop being alone" (371).
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privacy which advancements in technology generate, and the entrenchment of a
"culture of secrecy" that makes the suspicions and questions raised by conspiracy
theories of the assassination so compelling and reasonable to the popular political
imagination.
Dramatizing the Kennedy assassination as the product of conspiracy,
contingency, and Oswald's frustrated yearning for a destiny, of forces socio¬
political, historical, and metaphysical, is most certainly a response to those for
whom conspiracy theories regarding the assassination are little more than
psychological fantasies concocted by the masses in reaction to the stress and
anxiety left in the wake of what they construe as Oswald's act of derangement.
Such explanations do little justice to the feelings of discontent, mistrust of
authority, political disengagement, and skepticism regarding political institutions
that often link conspiratorial explanations of the assassination with populist
critiques of power, official secrecy, and elitism. DeLillo also responds to
conspiracy theory's tendency to misrepresent the singularity and coherence of the
forces behind historical events, the way that totalizing narratives leave little room
for the complicating presence of contingency, human longing, and their own
attraction to a pessimistic and Gothic sensibility, a point which we will explore
further in relation to Underworld,18 This approach takes advantage of the standing
17 In Libra, Win Everett contemplates the significance of advancements in surveillance technology:
"Spy planes, drone aircraft, satellites with cameras that can see from three hundred miles what you
can see from a hundred feet. They see and hear. [...] I'll tell you what it means, these orbiting
sensors that can hear us in our beds. It means the end of loyalty. The more complex the systems,
the less conviction in people. Conviction will be drained out of us. Devices will drain us, make us
vague and pliant" (77).
18 In many ways, DeLillo's project seems similar to the one discussed by Mark Fenster: "Linking a
progressive critique that recognizes the structural inequities of economic, political, and cultural
power to a focus on cultural practices makes possible an analysis that recognizes the political and
cultural role of conspiracy theory in popular conceptions of power, noting both their ideological
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invitation that conspiracy theories regarding the assassination offer for a critique
of the systemic intensification of power that accompanies the expansion of state
and corporatist structures and postmodern technological and cultural production,
while maintaining a credible voice of opposition and resistance to that power by
insisting on a counterforce which exists alongside the contingent and systemic
forces of history. For DeLillo, that counterforce is a manifestation of the yearning
for transcendence that resides in the visions, dreams, intuitions, and other
intimations of the deep self, those elements of the life of the individual
imagination capable of envisioning possibilities, personal and political, outside of
those circumscribed by the power of systems and institutions.19 On the other hand,
it is also capable of envisioning a fate circumscribed by "the movement or the
configuration of the stars, which is one reason the book is called Libra" (DeCurtis
55-56).
"Nothing you can believe is not coming true": Underworld and the End of
the Cold War Gothic
The assertion which critic Michael Wood makes, that Libra is the last good
novel of "the great age of American paranoia," and Underworld an initiation into
the age of the post-paranoid novel, would appear to be based around the notion
that with the end of the cold war and its attendant apocalyptic anxieties and
pathological suspiciousness, paranoia and conspiracy have lost much of their
misrepresentations and their nascent desire for a politics in which 'the people' can affectively and
effectively engage" (Fenster 62).
19 Besides Paul Maltby, other critics who have emphasized DeLillo's tendency to "endorse his
characters' beliefs in transcendent realities" rather than dismiss them include John McClure and
Mark Osteen (Maltby 510). Mark Osteen, in particular, discusses DeLillo's exploration of "the
myriad magical antidotes to postmodern dread" which, even when they fail, "provide glimpses of a
potentially transcendent realm" ( 3).
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political and cultural currency in America. However, as Wood makes clear in his
review of Underworld, in the post-cold war world as DeLillo portrays it, paranoid
politics and conspiracy theories have become, not so much antiquated, as
reconfigured to suit a new age, an age in which fears and anxieties concerning
nuclear holocaust and communist spies now appear rather quaint and suitably
nostalgic. Where Harlot's Ghost and Libra could root their interest in conspiracy
theories and secret plots in the clandestine practices and secrecy fetishism of the
cold war CIA and the popular skepticism surrounding the less than convincing
official government explanation offered for the assassination of JFK, the
suspiciousness, anxiety, and paranoia that floats through the pages of Underworld
is less bound to a particular event or gap in the historical record, giving it an all-
together more diffuse, indefinite, and uncertain quality. Wood attributes this to a
rather perverse mourning period which he believes is bound to follow an age
replete with conspiracy and secrecy—"those paranoid habits," DeLillo seems to be
saying in Underworld, "are hard to shake" (Wood 3). However, the sense which
Underworld seems to communicate is not just that paranoia and conspiracy are
winding-down, being flattened-out and divested of their political potency by their
absorption into mainstream consumer culture—the scene in the "Conspiracy
Theory Cafe" comes immediately to mind—but also that new modes are emerging,
styles and forms of paranoia and conspiracy suitable to encounter the fears and
anxieties in a world dominated by the forces of global capitalism rather than the
ideologies of cold war politics.
Many critics have pointed to the revised tone of paranoia adopted in
Underworld, marking a shift, not just in DeLillo's work, but also in cultural and
104
political attitudes towards conspiracy theories in general in post-cold war America.
Peter Knight, in particular, provides an account of what he calls the "broad shift
from secure to insecure paranoia" dramatized in Underworld ("Everything is
Connected" 823). "Secure paranoia," as Knight defines it, is the paranoia
characteristic of the cold war age, the anxiety produced by the threat of nuclear
war, the impositions on personal freedoms and state violations of individual rights
justified in the name of containment, and the ideological politics of anti-
communism and militarism. It is labeled "secure paranoia" by Knight in
comparison to the "insecure paranoia" which, as Knight argues, "DeLillo presents
as an effect of the Kennedy assassination's effects," a degree and depth of
uncertainty which, in retrospect, makes the "paranoia of the cold war years take on
a comforting solidity" (Conspiracy Culture 229). This, for Knight, accounts for
the rather nostalgic attitude that many of DeLillo's characters in Underworld seem
to hold towards the cold war. Prominent amongst these cold war sentimentalists is
Klara Sax, an artist whose latest project includes the repainting of disused B52's.
Discussing her work with a French journalist she offers the following assessment
of the shifting nature of power in the post-cold war world:
Power meant something thirty, forty years ago. It was stable, it was
focused, it was a tangible thing. It was greatness, danger, terror, all
those things. And it held us together, the Soviets and us. Maybe it
held the world together. You could measure things. You could
measure hope and you could measure destruction. Not that I want
to bring it back. It's gone, good riddance. But the fact is.
(Underworld, 76)
Underlying Klara's curious nostalgia for the days of Mutually Assured Destruction
is a sense that despite the fears and anxieties of living under the shadow of the
Bomb, the cold war provided a sense of commonality and nationhood rooted in the
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profound shared experience of, as J. Edgar Hoover puts it in the prologue to the
novel, "sitting in the furrow of destruction" (28). This, of course, rehearses the
notion that the circumstances of the cold war provided America with a renewed
sense of national identity and purpose, a broad cold war consensus that served the
political and economic interests and designs of the forces of conformity.
Underlying Klara's comments is the recognition that with the onset of the cold war
the often-strained fibers connecting the fate of the individual to the common fate
of the nation in America became intensified, the story of individual hopes and
fears for the future largely subsumed by the apocalyptic anxieties and paranoia of
the nuclear age.
This notion is perhaps best summed up in the novel by the comedian Lenny
Bruce, who during the Cuban missile crisis, adopts the line "We're all gonna die!"
as part of his routine. We are told that, "Lenny loves the postexistentialist bent of
this line," because in it "the audience can hear the obliteration of the idea of
uniqueness and free choice. They can hear the replacement of human isolation by
massive and unvaried ruin" (507). Like Klara, Lenny respects the capacity of the
bomb to speak to a yearning for transcendence in the individual, to displace the
alienation and fragmentation of modern life with a sense of being connected, by
the dangerous presence of an all-powerful force, to a common historical destiny.
Lenny opens his routine by saying "Good evening, my fellow citizens," parodying
the opening line of President Kennedy's address to the nation and layering with
dark irony the solidification of national identity under the threat of nuclear
annihilation. Of course true to form in DeLillo's work, Lenny's response to
Kennedy's "grim speech" also exhibits elements of conspiracy theory—
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"Powerless. Understand, this is how they remind us of our basic state. They roll
out a periodic crisis. [...] You know what this is? This is twenty-six guys from
Harvard deciding our fate" (505-507). In Lenny's sardonic response to the Cuban
missile crisis DeLillo teases out the paradoxical nature of cold war paranoia—the
fear of nuclear conflict as a form of both anxiety and stability, as a source of both
individual tension and national communion.
It is a paradox also postulated in the novel by Marvin Lundy as he explains
to Brian Glassic how his nostalgia for classic cars—"You look at old cars and
recall a purpose, a destination"—is related to the winding down of the cold war:
You need the leaders of both sides to keep the cold war going. It's
the one constant thing. It's honest, it's dependable. Because when
the tension and rivalry come to an end, that's when your worst
nightmares begin. All the power and intimidation of the state will
seep out of your personal bloodstream. You will no longer be the
main [...] point of reference. Because other forces will come
rushing in, demanding and challenging. (170)
DeLillo looks back on the cold war in Underworld, and finds not just a source of
anxiety, distress, and dread, though certainly that, but also a framework within
which those fears had been managed, a sense that the forces capable of shaping the
individual and common fate while terrible and powerful, were still subject to
control and containment, still a matter of competing ideologies, governments,
military interests, foreign policies, and national identities. Power during the cold
war, for DeLillo, was still thought largely definable, exercised by institutions,
states, and leaders, even if often in a manner both elitist and clandestine. From
DeLillo's post-cold war perspective, where power seems to be becoming ever
more amorphous and indiscernible, the old points of reference—the state, political
leaders, and government agencies—no longer appear to exert control or even
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influence over the forces which circumscribe the fate of the individual and society.
For DeLillo, the bipolar rivalry of the cold war nuclear standoff functioned in
retrospect as a kind of gauge for the anxieties and fears of everyday life, a state of
tension that seemed to impose ultimate borders, real and metaphoric, on the reach
and exercise of power and its instruments. Here again is Klara Sax:
Many things that were anchored to the balance of power and the
balance of terror seem to be undone, unstuck. Things have no
limits now. Money has no limits. I don't understand money
anymore. Money is undone. Violence is undone, violence is easier
now, it's uprooted, out of control, it has no measure anymore, it has
no level of values. (76)
Besides money and violence, DeLillo's novel seems keen, as the above passages
intimate, to add paranoia to Klara's list of things unstuck by the end of the cold
war. No longer tethered to the atomic-age fears of nuclear conflict and secret
government plots, to the bygone era of cold war America now bathed in a
nostalgic light, DeLillo turns his attention to new modes of paranoia in America,
to an emerging nightmare vision of forces and systems of power that seem to
function beyond containment, beyond control, and even beyond resistance.
Underworld portrays a world haunted by massive systems of power whose
ubiquity, diffusiveness and almost invisible menace seem to acquire an almost
preternatural and spectral potency. In this world paranoia and conspiracy theories
can only hint at the insidious and invisible forces and systems that determine and
shape it, raising ambiguous fears and self-reflexive paranoia consistent with what
Mark Edmundson in his book Nightmare on Main Street describes as the culture of
Gothic pessimism. It is a culture replete with a kind of "religion of skeptical
response" and political cynicism, a pessimistic sensibility combined with the
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conviction that "nothing you can believe is not coming true" (Underworld 314;
802).20 In Underworld, DeLillo enters this Gothic realm, portraying its shifting
dominant anxieties and fears, but also acknowledging those forces that
demonstrate a potential to act as a counter to those anxieties, to offer contesting
visions and voices.
"This is when your worst nightmare begins"
The Gothic sensibility invoked by DeLillo in Underworld is perhaps most
obvious in his use of Gothic and medieval imagery. In Underworld, we "make our
way through the world and come upon a scene that is medieval-modern," and are
given a vision of a suburban condom shop at the center of a satellite city that is
"like some medieval town with the castle smack at the center" (104; 109). We are
shown a "gothic cathedral of pork," and introduced to a character who uses his
"head as an instrument of medieval siege" (214; 338). A child's game of "tag"
intimates "something old and dank, some medieval awe," and a fancy dress party
is attended by woman in "modified medieval dress" (678; 574). The Gothic
qualities of New York, aka Gotham, in particular are emphasized with its
"medieval turrets in the distance," and its streets which, at different points, take on
"a late medieval," and later simply "a medieval," texture (380; 391; 494). In the
South Bronx, as we are told, nuns in their habits and friars in their robes are a
"natural sight," since "what figures could be so timely, costumed for rats and
plague?" (240). And there is the motif of Peter Bruegel's 16th century painting
20 Edmundson writes that, "contemporary Gothic is often an exercise in what we might call the
reductive fallacy, the conviction that the worst truth that you can come up with about any person or
event is the most consequential truth" (67).
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The Triumph ofDeath, which, as a reproduction torn out of, inevitably, Life
magazine and thrown towards the field at a baseball game, floats down into the
hands of J. Edgar Hoover in the opening scenes of the novel. Also later, when
recalling a police photo of Lenny Bruce's dead body, J. Edgar Hoover deems the
picture to be an appropriate image of a "hellish sense of religious retribution out of
the Middle Ages" (574).21
There is also, consistent with the Gothic mode, a threatening and terrifying
agency haunting the novel, or I should say two, twin forces of apocalypse whose
ultimate conjoining in the novel's epilogue represents the apotheosis of the
paranoid consciousness—a summary image demonstrating that "everything is
connected," which is a phrase repeated so often in the novel that it seems to
constitute a kind of mantra. The first threatening presence is, of course, the Bomb.
Casting its shadow over the whole of the novel, the Bomb is "the force in the
world [...] that displaces religious faith with paranoia," a faith that replaces God
with radioactivity, the power of alpha particles and the all-knowing systems that
shape them, the endless fitted links" (241; 251). The invention of the Bomb, for
DeLillo, transferred the power and mystery characteristic of the mystical realm to
21 DeLillo's many references to Bruegel's painting could be said to indicate an interest in the
"affinities between narrative and pictorial art" that Eve Kosofsky Sedgewick tells us is an
identifiable characteristic of the Gothic novel. Other elements of Sedgewick's influential catalogue
of the Gothic novel's preoccupations which are present in Underworld are represented by the
attention it pays to: "the priesthood and monastic institutions" (Nick spends time in a reform school
run by priests, talks of his interest in a book written by an anonymous mystic and given to him by a
priest, and one of the major characters Sister Edgar is a nun); "subterranean spaces and live burial"
(the implication of the novel's title is the driving of American life metaphorically underground by
the threat of nuclear war, an image extended throughout the novel and particularly by a scene
which takes place after the end of the cold war in which people emerge from subway gratings
escaping a fire underground); "doubles" (the doppelganger motif traced in the names of Edgar
Hoover and Sister Edgar, the constant doubling of images of weapons and waste, and the
appearances of coincidences regarding places and people that appear throughout the novel); and
"apparitions from the past" (Matt, as a six year old, waits in the balcony of a movie theater for "the
ghost or soul of his father to make a visitation" (Underworld 408), and Nick, Matt's brother, senses
his "own ghost father" (Underworld 276) living in the walls of the Watts Towers (Sedgewick 10).
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the technological and political context of the cold war—"The mushroom cloud
was the godhead of Annihilation and Ruin," ruminates J. Edgar Hoover before a
party, "The state controlled the means of apocalypse" (563). The cold war order,
as DeLillo makes clear in the novel, was founded on the connection between
secrecy, death, and systems, the massive networking of the security apparatus of
the state, the economics of corporate capitalism, and the dark eschatology of the
Bomb—a configuration that, aside from the genuine anxiety and trauma it
engendered in the American psyche, created the conditions, political and
metaphysical, under which conspiracy, secrecy, and paranoia could prosper.
It is one of the unavoidable consequences of the cold war, for DeLillo, that
it left as part of its legacy a ripe environment for paranoia and suspicion, that it
created a sense amongst people that history was no longer a public matter; that
important events and decisions were, as Mark Osteen aptly puts it, "founded upon
acts perpetuated in secret" (221). Hoover, in Underworld, foresees this
consequence of the nuclear age, after being informed by his agents that the
Russians had detonated a second nuclear device, effectively marking the beginning
of the cold war:
There is the secret of the bomb and there are the secrets that the
bomb inspires, things even the Director cannot guess—a man
whose own sequestered heart holds every festering secret in the
Western world—because these plots are only now evolving. This is
what he knows, that the genius of the bomb is printed not only in its
physics of particles and rays but in the occasion it creates for new
secrets. For every atmospheric blast, every glimpse we get of the
bared force of nature, that weird peeled eyeball exploding over the
desert—for every one of these he reckons a hundred plots go
underground, to spawn and skein. (51)
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The Bomb, for DeLillo, is not just a source of anxiety and terror, but also a force
that inspires a kind of secular theology of secrecy, a conviction which DeLillo
describes as "the faith of suspicion and unreality" that gives shape to a popular and
institutional consciousness that becomes obsessed with secrecy as the root of
power and as the only defense against the dangers of a hostile and insecure world
(251). The state itself, in DeLillo's version of the cold war, is depicted as both the
subject of paranoia and the paranoid subject, as one character makes clear in the
novel when he advises Matt Shay that, "You can never underestimate the
willingness of the state to act out its own massive fantasies," a bit of cold war
wisdom symbolically represented in the novel by both the figure of Richard
Nixon, cast in the shadow of the Watergate scandal—"[Matt] thought of the
photograph of Nixon and wondered if the state had taken on the paranoia of the
individual or was it the other way around"—and by J. Edgar Hoover's
pathological fear of germs, a paranoia which DeLillo describes as a fear of
"contagion" and "infiltration," a rather obvious metaphoric reference to the anti-
communist paranoia of the McCarthy years and to Hoover's secret personal FBI
files which he gathered on celebrities and political activists22 (Underworld 421;
557). For DeLillo, a fundamental aspect of the national pathology wrought by the
anxiety and trauma of nearly forty years of living in the shadow of nuclear
destruction, and the obsession with secrecy that the cold war age engendered, is
the entrenchment of what could at best be called a deep suspiciousness, and at
22 In this regard DeLillo writes: "He [Hoover] likes to be around movie idols and celebrity athletes
[...] Fame and secrecy are the high and low ends of the same fascination, the static crackle of some
libidinous thing in the world, and Edgar responds to people who have this energy. He wants to be
their dearly devoted friend provided their hidden lives are in his private files, all the rumors
collected and indexed, the shadow facts made real. (Underworld 17).
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worst a largely justifiable skepticism and cynicism, regarding the democratic
legitimacy and transparency of political institutions and authority, that remains a
significant influence on the post-cold war popular American cultural and political
imagination.
To put this a different way, paranoia, suspiciousness, and a general feeling
of insecurity are, for DeLillo, a significant part of the residual psychic waste of the
cold war, and indeed waste is the other implacable Gothic force that haunts the
novel. Nick Shay, the sometimes narrator of Underworld, works as a public
relations officer for a "waste containment" company, a business he describes in
terms which mirror the reverential and mystical tones used to describe the Bomb:
My firm was involved in waste. We were waste handlers, waste
traders, cosmologists of waste. I traveled to the coastal lowlands of
Texas and watched men in moon suits bury drums of dangerous
waste in subterranean salt beds many millions of years old, dried-
out remnants of a Mesozoic ocean. It was a religious conviction in
our business that these deposits of rock salt would not leak
radiation. Waste is a religious thing. We entomb contaminated
waste with a sense of reverence and dread. It is necessary to
respect what we discard. (88)
If, for DeLillo, the Bomb is the god of war which threatens "death from the sky,"
then waste, the bastard child of the union between the nuclear age and consumer
capitalism, is the god which threatens death from below—"We built pyramids of
waste above and below the earth. The more hazardous the waste, the deeper we
tried to sink it. The word plutonium comes from Pluto, god of the dead and ruler
of the underworld" (458; 106). Waste, in Underworld, is the Bomb's "mystical
twin," the largely hidden but ubiquitous presence that "comes back to consume us"
(791). In the residue and fallout of cold war paranoia and consumer excess
DeLillo unearths an ecological mode of apocalyptic Gothic in which the terrors
113
and ghosts of the past continue to haunt and threaten the present—"waste is the
secret history, the underhistory," suggests Viktor Maltsev, a Russian executive of a
company that sells nuclear explosions as a way of destroying dangerous waste,
"All those decades [...] when we thought about weapons all the time and never
thought about the dark multiplying byproduct" (791). Significantly, Victor makes
these remarks while positioned in what DeLillo describes as "something of a
gargoyle squat" (791).
It is no surprise then to find a conventionally Gothic tale making the
rounds at the waste-handling conference Nick attends in the novel, a story
concerning "a spectral ship" that has been sailing from port to port for two years
because no country will accept the toxic cargo it is rumored to be carrying (278).
For Nick, "all these ghost-ship stories" seem a natural outgrowth of the notion,
promoted by "garbage theorist" Jesse Detwiler at the conference, that "waste is the
best-kept secret in the world" (281). Detwiler promotes the "ominous and
magical" qualities of toxic waste, touting the mystical aura that surrounds the kind
of substances that have to be isolated and buried deep in dump-sites. "The more
dangerous the waste," he argues, "the more heroic it will become. Irradiated
ground. The way the Indians venerate this terrain now, we'll come to see it as
sacred in the next century" (289). Like the "religion of nuclearism," a morbid
reverence for the secret power of the Bomb shared by J. Edgar Hoover and Sister
Edgar, Detwiler is an adept of the "religion of waste," a mystical attitude toward
garbage which Nick dismisses as the ramblings of a "talk-show [...] waste
hustler," but which engages his interest nonetheless—"I didn't think I liked
Detwiler but I liked to listen to him" (Osteen 237; Underworld 287; 289).
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Despite Nick's recognition that the "ghost-ship" stories are little more than
"elusive hearsay," and his suspicions regarding the careerist motives behind
Detwiler's theorizing—"He was [...] looking for book deals and documentary
films"—Nick still finds that "there is a whisper of mystical contemplation that
seems totally appropriate to the subject of waste," a subject which he turns to
because, as he says, "I was ready for something new, for a faith to embrace" (281;
287; 282).
Nick's attitude toward the paranoia of Detwiler's contention concerning
the mysterious ship, that he can believe in its existence because, "it's easy to
believe. We'd be stupid not to believe it," is telling in its ambiguity (289). Nick,
like another of DeLillo's Nicks, Nicholas Branch in Libra, is well aware of the
paranoia behind conspiracy theories, or what he terms "Dietrologica," defined by
Nick as "the science of what is behind something. A suspicious event. The
science of what is behind an event" (280). Agreeing with his colleague Sims that
"we have real sciences, hard sciences, we don't need imaginary ones," Nick mocks
the kind of "facile sentiments" and "cheap and easy delusions" that constitute the
framework of a "personal conspiracy credo" (280; 336). Still, Sims seems
compelled to spread the rumors of the ship and even speculate about the possibility
that the ship's cargo might be CIA heroin or that the ship might be owned by
organized crime, showing no hesitation in invoking two of the common bogeymen
of many conventional conspiracy theories. And in a later conversation with Nick,
Sims, an African American, contends that the government is deliberately
underreporting the number of black people in America because "if the real number
is reported, white people gonna go weak in the knees and black people gonna get
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all pumped up with, Hey we oughta be getting" more of this and more of that and
more of the other" (335). Nick responds to Sims' suspiciousness by recalling their
previous agreement regarding conspiracy theories—"Am I right? You and I. We
don't believe that what is behind an event is so organized and sinister that we have
to make a science out of it" (336). When Nick describes Sims' speculations as
"genuine paranoia," we are told that Sims "seemed to take pleasure in this" (336).
In fact, Sims' reaction to Nick's remonstrations indicates that there is something
less than genuine about Sims' paranoia, a kind of thin sheet of irony and self-
reflexivity between Sims and his theories that insulates him from accusations of
either naivete or cynicism. What it fails to insulate him from, however, are
America's unresolved anxieties regarding race and government secrecy, the real
issues that seem to underlie Sims' paranoid speculations.
Sim's brand of conspiracy theory functions as a way for him to
acknowledge his suspicions regarding the existence of secret forces and motives
while never having to risk any faith or conviction in their veracity. They are
stories told as much for the pleasure of the telling, and for the effect on their
audience, as for their speculations concerning the nature of power and injustice in
the world around him. "He liked saying this," Nick observes after listening to
Sim's speculate regarding the possibility that the "ghost ship" was not only owned
by their company, but that their company was controlled by the mob, "Not that he
believed it. He didn't believe it for half a second but he wanted me to believe it, or
entertain the thought" (280). This kind of ironic attitude toward paranoia is
expressed more directly by Eric Deming, a colleague of Nick's brother Matt, who,
consistent with the doubling framework of waste and the bomb in the novel, works
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on weapons research at a facility nicknamed "the Pocket" in New Mexico. Eric is
a devotee of rumors regarding what he calls "downwinders," people who have
suffered horrible and grotesque physical effects from the radioactive fallout
produced by the testing of nuclear weapons in Nevada, incidents that are widely
rumored but reported to have been "hushed up" by the government. Eric gives
Matt reports of deformed children, cancer outbreaks, "ravishing" brunettes losing
all their hair after washing it, and "Old Testament outbreaks of great red boils.
Great big splotches and rashes. And coughing up handfuls of blood" (406).
Asked by Matt whether he really thinks that such stories are true, Eric answers no
and tells him that the reason he insists on spreading such rumors is "for the tone,
of course [...] For the edge. The bite. The existential burn" (406).
The style of paranoia that was DeLillo's concern in Libra, those conspiracy
narratives that serve as an expression of the popular mistrust and suspicion toward
the motives and transparency of those forces which wield power in American life,
abide in Underworld but in a mode more cynical and equivocal, aware of its
capacity to generate fear, mistrust, and anxiety but tentative and ambiguous in its
representation of what to fear, who to mistrust, and the source of those anxieties.
It is a mode that is fascinated with secrecy, power, and fear, a kind of conspiracy
narrative which thrives on elements of tone and a cultivated cynicism, but which is
ultimately highly skeptical about its own status as a critique of or engagement with
recognizable or discernable structures of power. Paranoia, in Underworld, offers a
disorientating and complicating vision of power rather than a simplified causal
explanation for events and circumstances. It tunes into the popular sense that there
are larger forces at work, agencies that haunt all aspects of our personal and public
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worlds, forging connections and networks of power relations largely indiscernible
and indeterminate beyond the suspicions that they are always present and at work.
After smoking "something that had made him immobile," Matt experiences just
such a paranoid vision:
He was surrounded by enemies. Not enemies but connections, a
network of things and people. Not people exactly but figures—
things and figures and levels of knowledge that he was completely
helpless to enter. [...] He was bent to the weight of the room,
distrustful of everyone and everything here. Paranoid. Now he
knew what it meant, this word that was bandied and bmited so
easily, and he sensed the connections being made around him, all
the objects and shaped silhouettes and levels of knowledge—not
knowledge exactly but insidious intent. But not that either—some
deeper meaning that existed solely to keep him from knowing what
it was. (421)
Matt is troubled by a malevolent and evanescent presence whose potency and
reach cannot be circumscribed by reference to "The state, the nation, the
corporation, the power structure, the system, the establishment," a catalogue of
possible names offered by a young New Leftist revolutionary to Clyde Tolson,
Hoover's closest aide and confidant, at a party in 1966, for whatever powerful
entity was mnning America (575). Matt's vision is of a form of power that is
threatening and diffuse, but which is too shadowy and phantasmagoric to allow
him to determinately locate or identify it. As opposed to the young revolutionary,
who looks around the room at Hoover's party and recognizes the rich, powerful,
and famous people present as "all part of the same motherfucking thing," Matt
struggles to either identify or name his antagonist (575).
The world which Matt glimpses in his drug-induced "paranoid episode," is
one in which "the limits of human perception and dread" which were redefined by
the invention of the bomb, as the novel repeatedly emphasizes, have once again
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been redrawn by the emergence of global capitalism. Paranoia, in Underworld, is
recast by Matt as the state of being "systemed under," a condition in which the
merging of the warfare security state and consumer capitalism characteristic of the
cold war era, when extended and intensified by the forces of globalization,
produces a mode of disorientation and uncertainty that retains a potent sense of
threat and fear, but for which any framework or perspective from which those
forces might be confronted or resisted is rendered dubious (465). "And how can
you tell the difference," Matt wonders, "between syringes and missiles if you've
become so pliant, ready to half believe everything and to fix conviction in
nothing?" (466). In Matt's dystopic vision of the New World Order, the forces
and systems that shape and structure this new world are so complicated and
sophisticated, move so rapidly and coerce so subtly, connect and network on so
many different levels, that they are not only beyond the control of political entities
such as nations or ideologies, but are also largely unrepresentable, able to forge
connections and exert influences which reach far beyond the comprehension of
even those, like Matt, who feel haunted by their presence. The emergence of
global capitalism and advancements in technology that have greatly enabled its
expansion have, to a large degree, dislodged the economic, political, and social
frames of reference with which nations, institutions, and individuals understood
the limits of the exercise of power, inspiring, in Underworld, nightmare visions in
which one cannot "tell the difference between orange juice and agent orange
[because] the same massive system connects them at levels outside your
comprehension" (465).
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Matt's conclusion regarding his vision, that "everything connects in the
end, or only seems to, or seems to only because it does," maps with apprehension
and uncertainty a world in which the forces of war and of waste, the systems
created for capitalist production and those created for the production of fear and
death, have completely merged, producing a network of endless connections
through which a form of power functions disembodied from national, institutional,
or individual limitations, and which appears to have attained, as Edmundson puts
it, "capacities of motion and transformation that make it a preternatural force [...]
something more potent than humanity" (465; Edmundson 42). As Underworld
draws to a close, DeLillo offers a panorama of what Anthony Giddens has
described as "a runaway world," a global market that connects across multiple
frontiers at speeds largely beyond the range of people's understanding, and beyond
the possibility of being effectively governed or controlled. Recounting remarks
made by Viktor Maltsev, Nick holds forth, for the benefit of his friend Brian
Glassic, on the paradox of the "changeover" to the global marketplace:
Some things fade and wane, states disintegrate, assembly lines
shorten their runs and interact with lines in other countries. This is
what desire seems to demand. A method of production that will
custom-cater to cultural and personal needs, not to cold war
ideologies of massive uniformity. And the system pretends to go
along, to become more supple and resourceful, less dependent on
rigid categories. But even as desire tends to specialize, going silky
and intimate, the force of converging markets produces an
instantaneous capital that shoots across horizons at the speed of
light, making for a certain furtive sameness, a planing away of
particulars that affects everything from architecture to leisure time
to the way people eat and sleep and dream. (786)
While on the surface the "new" capitalism appears to offer a mode of production
which counters the mass conformity of cold war Fordism, it in fact, according to
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Maltsev, works just as intensively as a force that "burns off the nuance in a
culture," but more furtively and via a market-system which, as it produces capital
that "shoots across horizons at the speed of light," appears to operate beyond
restraint or containment (786). George Soros describes this as the "dynamic
disequilibrium" of global capitalism, a social, political, and economic context in
which events move "too rapidly for people's understanding, causing a gap between
thinking and reality to appear" (Soros 71). The irony that pervades Underworld's
staging of the shifting nature of paranoia in the postwar world, is that it has
become precisely those forces which link and interconnect distant realities in an
ever growing network of economic, social, and cultural relations, forces which
helped bring down the BerlinWall and diminish the threat of nuclear destruction,
that now intensify the atomization, disconnection, and anxiety that, for DeLillo, is
the continuing legacy of the cold war. Underworld dramatizes a condition in
which the seemingly unrestrained proliferation of connections and systemic
integration that characterize the post-cold war world reproduces, in a less stable,
less definable, and less coherent form the ingrained paranoia and implacable sense
of foreboding which is part of the invisible psychic fallout of "the bombs [that]
were not released. [...] The missiles [that] remained in the underwing carriages,
unfired" (76).
"This is not surreal"
The event that begins Underworld, the 1951 playoff baseball game
between the New York Giants and the Brooklyn Dodgers, is depicted lyrically and
with a definite sense of nostalgia. DeLillo partly describes the game through the
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experience of a fourteen-year-old African-American boy named Cotter (DeLillo
was also fourteen in 1951) whose eventual capturing of the baseball hit by Bobby
Thompson for the game winning home run—later dubbed in the New York papers
as "The Shot Heard 'Round the World"—is the final link in the on-going narrative
of the baseball that eludes sports memorabilia collector Marvin Lundy' s attempt to
fully account for and document the veracity of the object's history. However, as
DeLillo tells us, he is also concerned with the game as what he calls "an example
of some unrepeatable social phenomenon," a mode of public experience which
DeLillo believes is no longer possible in contemporary America ("Power" 3).
DeLillo imbues his image of the gathering crowd with a sense of democratic
possibility—"Longing on a large scale," ventures DeLillo, "is what makes history"
(11). Describing Cotter's arrival at the stadium DeLillo writes:
This is just a kid with a local yearning but he is part of an
assembling crowd, anonymous thousands off the buses and trains,
people in narrow columns tramping over the swing bridge above
the river, and even if they are not a migration or a revolution, some
vast shaking of the soul, they bring with them the body heat of a
great city and their own small reveries and desperations, the unseen
something that haunts the day—men in fedoras and sailors on shore
leave, the stray tumble of their thoughts, going to a game.
(Underworld 11)
The crowd gathers with a vague yearning for some sort of shared expiatory
experience, for what Osteen identifies as a "purgative ritual" to militate against
"the unseen something that haunts the day," and for a broad sense of solidarity,
defining themselves as Dodger or Giant fans, a simple Us-versus-Them allegiance
that less threateningly mirrors what would become the bipolar ideological world of
the cold war (3). People's urge to congregate, to seek an experience that "joins
them all in a rare way, that binds them to a memory with protective power,"
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constitutes, for DeLillo, what radio announcer Russ Hodges in the novel describes
as "another kind of history," a "people's history" that "enters the skin more
lastingly than the vast shaping strategies of eminent leaders, generals steely in
their sunglasses" (59). For DeLillo, the celebrations following Thompson's
homerun demarcate the end of a certain vitality of public life in America—"Maybe
it was the last time people spontaneously went out of their houses for something.
For some wonder, some amazement"—the final momentary representation of a
"halfway hopeful" postwar social vision before the atomic age engendered the
"textured paranoia that replaces history" in American life (Underworld 1; DeLillo,
"Power" 2).
The "binding power" of the game—"This is the nature of Thompson's
homer. It makes people want to be in the streets, joined with others, telling others
what has happened, those few who haven't heard—comparing faces and states of
mind"—is contrasted, in the novel, to the public's experience of the assassination
of JFK—"When JFK was shot, people went inside. We watched TV in dark
rooms and talked on the phone with friends and relatives. We were all separate
and alone. But when Thompson hit the homer, people rushed outside (47; 94).
The possibility of a sense of shared experience and communal expiation that drove
people out onto the streets celebrating the dramatic manner of the Giants victory,
had for DeLillo, by the time of the Kennedy assassination given way, under the
pressure of cold war anxieties and the influence of television, to a more isolated
and fragmented experience of history. For DeLillo, the game seemed to briefly
illuminate the potential of certain public events, even if only briefly, to forge
connections across the divisive elements of class and race in American society, to
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provide images and experiences around which "the local yearnings" and individual
"reveries and desperations," what DeLillo sums up as "the sand-grain manyness of
things that can't be counted" in America, might briefly collect and enable a
momentary experience of commonality (60).
DeLillo's general presentation of the dissolution of public life in America,
its fragmentation into an atomistic television audience, is certainly a lamentation
for a kind of drama of commonality that itself partakes of the sort of nostalgia in
which many of his characters indulge. In this regard, John Duvall correctly points
to the ideological role played by baseball in American history, what he describes
as its "aesthetic ideology that participates in masking the hidden costs of
America's cold war victory and in erasing race and class difference" in its
mythological representation of the nation (Duvall 258). Indeed DeLillo's
utilization of the Thompson baseball as an object with almost mystical qualities to
connect disparate American voices and lives adds something of a sentimental
burnish to the novel. However, DeLillo does brandish his nostalgia purposefully
in Underworld, juxtaposing his detailed fictional narrative of a significant public
event experienced on the very day that America pivoted into the cold war era,
against the kind of endless repetition of images and news stories detailing danger,
disaster, and terror—the Cuban missile crisis, the Kennedy assassination,
rampaging serial killers, the explosion of the Challenger, Chernobyl, AIDS—
which, in the novel, constitute the shared historical experience mediated and
disseminated by the mass news media during and after the cold war. "People seem
to need news," DeLillo has said in an interview, "any kind—bad news,
sensationalistic news, overwhelming news. It seems to be that news is a narrative
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of our time" (Remnick 44). If, as Mark Edmondson writes, "it's on the news that
the diverse images of Gothic coalesce into a world-view," than DeLillo's weaving
together of a series of disastrous news-worthy events in his narrative certainly
emulates this mood, adopting and critiquing what Edmundson argues is the most
influential Gothic idiom of contemporary America (30).
In Underworld, Sister Grace attempts to talk Sister Edgar out of giving
credence to stories of an "uncanny occurrence" related to the murder of a young
homeless girl named Esmeralda. "'You know what this is?" Grace argues, " It's
the nightly news. It's the local news at eleven with all the grotesque items neatly
spaced to keep you watching the whole half hour'" (819). Grace's conviction that
the news acts largely as a spectacle which only panders to and confirms people's
least critical hopes and fears —"'It's how the news becomes so powerful it doesn't
need TV or newspapers. It exists in people's perceptions. It's something they
invent, strong enough to seem real. It's the news without the media'"—does little
to dampen Sister Edgar's "need to see this thing" (819). Throughout Underworld,
characters express views concerning what they perceive to be an "unreal turn" in
reality, a sense that, as Klara Sax says, "everything is vaguely—what—fictitious"
(73). Beyond the postmodern self-reflexivity of such comments, DeLillo is also
calling attention to the pervasiveness of a cultural and intellectual fascination with
narratives, images, and spectacles that ratify an otherworldly sense of horror,
threat, or presence. Mark Edmundson argues that, "we [Americans] now find
ourselves in a culture where the Gothic idiom has slipped over from fiction and
begun to shape and regulate our perception of reality" (63). Tony Tanner calls
attention to this element of Underworld, when he describes its interest in "a string
125
of more or less sensationalistic news items or crisis," and its presentation of Gothic
images such as "a man who'd cut his eyeball out of its socket because it contained
a satanic symbol," and a "Museum of Misshapens," complete with its resident
Cyclops, which Nick visits in Russia, as DeLillo's indulging in a "certain amount
of atrocity tourism" (Tanner 207).
DeLillo demonstrates that he is well aware of the Gothic tone he is
adopting in the novel, and its implications. The excesses of the culture of Gothic
spectacle in which DeLillo is both indulging and critiquing is staged with mordant
exaggeration, in Underworld, as a tour of the Wall, a deprived New York City
neighborhood that is described as "a tuck of land adrift from the social order"
(239). Sister Grace and Sister Edgar visit the Wall to hand out food and advice to
its residents who include a prostitute whose silicone breasts have exploded, the
one-eyed man that Tanner mentions, and a crew of orphans lead by graffiti artist
Ishmael Munoz, who paint a memorial angel onto an exposed wall of a derelict
tenement for every child that dies in the neighborhood. Strewn with the rubble of
demolished buildings, littered with abandoned cars and bags of hospital waste,
infested by rats, plagued by AIDS, and inhabited by robed monks who run a
shelter for the homeless nearby and by "a band of charismatics who dance, weep
and speak in tongues on the roofs of buildings, the Gothic drama of the Wall
becomes a stop on the South Bronx Surreal bus tour. Coming across the "tour bus
in carnival colors" unloading its tourists to snap pictures of the area, Sister Grace
goes "half berserk," screaming out the window of the van she is driving, "It's not
surreal. It's real, it's real. Your bus is surreal. You're surreal" (247). Grace's
protest is a comment on the relationship between the kind of culture of
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disengagement that results when the boundary between sociopolitical reality and
the aesthetics of spectacle becomes distorted and blurred, and the post-cold war
fascination with Gothic imagery, with spectacles of dread, danger, and gaudy
abominations that confirm a picture of the world as ever-threatening, out of
control, and irretrievably in decline.
Sister Edgar, we are told, understands the compulsion of the tourists—
"You travel somewhere not for museums and sunsets but for ruins, bombed-out
terrain, for the moss-grown memory of torture and war" (248). She is, of course, a
devotee and proponent of the Gothic sensibility, and particularly of Edgar Allan
Poe, whose poetry she teaches and with which, not surprisingly considering her
name, she strongly identifies:
Alone in her room she wore a plain shift and read "The Raven."
She read it many times, memorizing the lines. She wanted to recite
the poem to her class when school reopened. Her namesake poet,
yes, and the dark croaking poem that made her feel Edgarish again.
[...] she wanted to teach them fear. This was the secret heart of her
curriculum and it would begin with the poem, with omen,
loneliness and death, and she would make them shake in their back-
to-school shoes. (775-776)
Edmundson identifies Poe with the ascendant Gothic impulse in the contemporary
American consciousness, the propensity to view the world as replete with dark and
powerful forces against which there is no means of defense beyond the cynical
fatalism that marks a sophisticated paranoia, and what Edmundson calls "the ethos
of facile transcendence," images and fantasies which promise a quasi-mystical
release from the anxieties, dangers, and injustices of the real world. For
Edmundson, the ascendancy of the culture of Gothic pessimism and the yearning
for "facile transcendence" have a reciprocal relationship, an affinity which DeLillo
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seems to dramatize when Sister Edgar's "raven's heart" is stirred by an "angelus
of clearest joy," as she watches what she believes is the face of the murdered girl
Esmeralda—which is likely just the image of a "papered-over ad show[ing]
through the current ad"—miraculously appear on a billboard, a structure which, of
course, Edgar is said to regard as the equivalent of "medieval church architecture"
(249; 822; 820).
Like Edmundson, DeLillo locates "a credible yearning for some better
form of life" in his characters' attraction to crude forms of mysticism and their
promises of easy redemption or transcendence, particularly as they offer more
affirmative and hopeful visions of the world than the culture of Gothic pessimism
with its dominant tones of paranoia and cynicism (xvi). However, Underworld
does not retreat from its own indictment of the political and material reality of
America to embrace or encourage a fantasy of post-cold war regeneration. For
DeLillo, the psychic, political, environmental, and social waste left over from the
cold war is too toxic to be buried deep in the sacred-ground of history and
forgotten. The cold war may be over, but for DeLillo as the specter of nuclear war
and the communist threat seep out of the national bloodstream, the forces of
runaway global capitalism, environmental degradation, political
disenfranchisement, urban decline, and the unsolved issues of race and inequality
emerge out from under the shadow of the bomb. But critically, while clearly the
prevailing mode of the novel, the voice of Gothic pessimism does not go
uncontested in Underworld.
Richard Rorty worries that when confronted with the consequences of
globalization, the malaise of contemporary American democracy, and the
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enervated state of the Left in American politics, an unchecked Gothic drive can
result in the entrenchment of a "spirit of detached spectatorship" at the heart of the
American political imagination, the relinquishing of a sense of agency or
citizenship in favor of "a Gothic world in which democratic politics has become a
farce," and in which real change is conceived as only possible via "inexplicable,
magical transformations" (Rorty Achieving 11; 95; 102). In Underworld, amongst
the paranoid visions, ghost stories, and medieval ruins, and in the midst of the
iconography of angels, tabloid miracles, and talk-show theories, DeLillo posts
signs of engaged agency, representative images and attitudes not given over to the
twin temptations of Gothic despair and the desire for some form of quasi-mystical
redemption. We are given the voice of Sister Grace, who objects to the angels
painted on the Wall as a distraction from the material concerns that directly impact
on local and community improvement:
"I wish they'd stop already with the angels," Gracie said, "It's in
totally bad taste. A fourteenth-century church, that's where you go
for angels. This wall publicizes all the things we're working to
change. Ishmael should look for positive things to emphasize. The
townhouses, the community gardens that people plant. Walk
around the corner you see ordinary people going to work, going to
school. Stores and churches." (239)
Sister Grace, as Sister Edgar puts it, is best described as "a soldier, a fighter for
human worth" (249).
And, as already mentioned, we are also given Klara Sax's artistic vision,
her repainting of B52 bombers as a means of refocusing attention on "the ordinary
thing," on the "individual life" as a "sign against death," as a representation of the
power of the "kind of history" that takes place in the "remote and common streets"
to reassert itself even after the invention of the bomb, the thing which, as Klara
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says, can't be named because it is "too big or evil or outside your experience" (78;
781; 77)
'See, we're painting, hand-painting in some cases, putting our
hands to great weapons systems, to systems that came out of the
factories and assembly halls as near alike as possible, millions of
components stamped out, repeated endlessly, and we're trying to
unrepeat, to find an element of felt life, and maybe there's a sort of
survival instinct here, a graffiti instinct—to trespass and declare
ourselves, show who we are.' (77)
Klara's art is a symbolic declaration of agency, an assertion of the idiosyncratic
self against the massive systems of consumer capitalism and war, the twined
forces of weapons and waste that, embodied in the disused bombers, she
appropriates as her artistic medium. The politics of the "remote and common
streets" is also at the heart of the graffiti writing of Moonman 157, whose work
gives a voice to "all those empty tenements that have people living there even if
you don't see them," confronting commuters with "his letters and numbers [that]
told a story of tenement life, good and bad but mostly good" (440). His is an "art
of the backstreets" which asserts the vital presence of diverse voices in American
life—"you can't not see us anymore, you can't not know who we are" (440).
In such voices and images Underworld states its "adversarial relationship"
with what DeLillo has referred to as "the monotone of the state, the corporate
entity, the product, the assembly line" ("Power," 2). They also embody, in
DeLillo's work, a half-buried but resilient impulse to counter the Gothic fears and
images which are an inescapable element of American life after the cold war, with
more hopeful visions capable of inspiring a less spectatorial and fatalistic
engagement with "the intersecting systems [that] help pull us apart, leaving us
vague, drained, docile, soft in our inner discourse, willing to be shaped, to be
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overwhelmed," than those offered by consumer culture or the mass media
(DeLillo, Underworld, 826). Discernable in DeLillo's representation of Sister
Grace's pragmatic faith in the struggle for social improvement, Klara Sax's
symbolic transformation of the systems of war and waste, and the evocative
demand for recognition expressed in Moonman 157's graffiti, is a yearning for a
productive response to the prevailing Gothic gloom in America, one that affirms
expressions of social engagement, agency, and diversity as a means of resisting the
hardening sense of resigned pessimism, cynicism, and fatalism that accompanies




Just Vineland?: Pynchon's Vision of Hope, Justice and the State of
American Liberal Democracy
"Without any shadow of doubt, amidst this vertigo of shows
and politics, I settle myself ever the firmer in the creed, that we
should not postpone and refer and wish, but do broad justice where
we are, by whomsoever we deal with, accepting our actual
companions and circumstances, however humble or odious, as the
mystic officials to whom the universe has delegated its whole
pleasure for us. If these are mean and malignant, their contentment,
which is the last victory of justice, is a more satisfying echo to the
heart, than the voice of poets and the casual sympathy of admirable
persons."
—Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Experience"
Thomas Pynchon's work has been the subject of incredible critical
scrutiny, generating an exegetical industry whose growth is attributable to both the
dense and esoteric allusiveness of his writing, and to the centrality of his major
themes—entropy, technology, paranoia, and communication—to the postmodern
critical mood. Interpreters have meticulously and convincingly mapped out the
Pynchonian critique of the post-Fordist, late capitalist world, tracing the myriad
lines that run through the references, allegories, and self-reflexive parallels of his
novels, and in general confirming the predominant characterization of Pynchon's
vision of modern Western civilization as dark, disillusioned, and radically
skeptical (or even relativist).
This general critical framework alters very little when the subject of the
political aspects of Pynchon's fiction is addressed. The political dimension of his
work is most often characterized as nihilistic or absurdist, as constituting what
Louis Tyson refers to as Pynchon's "politics of despair" (Tyson 8). There is very
little doubt among critics that Pynchon is in some sense sympathetic with the left,
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however his disillusionment and pessimism is such that, as Tony Hilfer concludes,
his work "seems located not before or during the rebellion against the rationalized
death-world but after the surrender" (153). Pynchon thus has become America's
most celebrated literary chronicler of the "one-dimensional world," with whatever
immediate political concerns or distinct political philosophy that might surface in
his work, subsumed by the shadow of the monolithic System, that amalgamation
of power structures and organized authority which, as the argument goes, has
achieved totalizing power in the world that Pynchon portrays.
Reading V., or his magnum opus, Gravity's Rainbow, leaves little doubt
that the train of Pynchon's political thinking runs through some fairly apocalyptic
and pessimistic territory. With the emergence of the cold war, and the growing
instrumentalization of systems of authority as an historical and social context—
particularly in Gravity's Rainbow—Pynchon conveys a strong sense of political
constriction, by depicting, with both the content and language of his fiction, the
shrinking space in the emerging technocorporatist order for the kind of political
dissent, individualism, and resistance to authority that are supposed to lie at the
heart of the American experience. In this respect, as is often pointed out,
Pynchon's work is said to follow in the Puritan tradition of the American
Jeremiad, his fiction a "cry in the wilderness" that, to paraphrase Sacvan
Bercovitch's influential understanding of that tradition, laments the waning, while
simultaneously celebrating, the founding ideals of America. This sermonistic
political tone in Pynchon's work mingles with his self-professed Ludditism, or
what he calls the "profound unwillingness to give up elements of faith, however
'irrational,' to an emerging technopolitical order," to suggest a rather fatalistic
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attitude towards contemporary politics, a highly critical, but finally hopeless, view
of a world where resistance to the expanding power of "the machine" is noble, but
ultimately futile (Pynchon, "Luddite" 40).
There are, however, some critics who argue, perhaps most persuasively
Mark Conroy, Jerry Varsava, and Cyrus K. Patell, that such a characterization of
Pynchon's political view overlooks a more determinate political stance that lies
beneath the surface of his pessimism, and that understands Pynchon to be, less a
disillusioned postmodernist or a disappointed humanist, then a liberal, a novelist
offering in his work, particularly his domestic novels The Crying ofLot 49 and
Vineland, what Varsava calls "a powerful, if often diffuse and indirect, defense of
American political liberalism"^).1 Such an approach is readily reconcilable with
the jeremiadic elements of Pynchon's work. It claims to identify, in Pynchon's
vision of contemporary America, a sacred-secular critique of a fallen nation,
alienated from the high sense of moral mission that defined its Puritan origins, and
betraying the founding liberal values that were, to a significant extent, the political
legacy of that moral idealism. If we are to believe those who portray Pynchon as
an exponent of liberalism, it is this fusion found in Pynchon's fiction, of the
apocalyptic tone of the jeremiad and the affirmation of the political ideals of
liberalism, which is the most definitive and determinate feature of Pynchon's
political philosophy.
Pynchon's liberalism is manifest, as Varsava tells us, not in any direct or
concise expression of liberal ideology or theory, but rather in the rejection, implicit
' Varsava's short list of liberal beliefs and virtues include: "toleration, respect for civil liberties,
acknowledgement of property rights, concern for the disadvantaged, (qualified) faith in reason"
(Varsava 64). These beliefs are implicit, for Varsava and Mark Conroy, in the Pynchonian slogan
from V. "keep cool but care," and in his support for "excluded middles" in The Crying ofLot 49.
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in his work, of those antagonistic ideologies and political philosophies,
specifically communitarianism and libertarianism", which have mounted
significant challenges to liberalism in postwar America. What Pynchon does not
seem at all interested in defending, however, is the economic and technological
idea of progress that has been such an important element of liberal ideology since
the Enlightenment, and a central feature of America's liberal tradition since the
Revolution. The Luddite sensibility, so obviously invoked in Pynchon's work,
may not imply a repudiation of liberalism, but it is undeniably hostile to the faith
in modernization that has so often driven liberal political praxis, striving to counter
the liberal tendency to represent change and technological development as
synonymous with progress. Certainly it could be said that Pynchon's work is as
much a critique of liberalism in postwar America, as it is a defense of it in the face
of contemporary ideological challenges. In fact, much of what can be considered
political in Pynchon's work addresses some of the most pressing and contentious
issues surrounding the development and practice of liberalism in postwar America,
not just as a means of underlining the American betrayal of its liberal tradition, but
also as part of a liberal democratic critique of contemporary America's central
political institutions.
There seems a delicate balance attempting to be struck in Pynchon's work,
that very difficult tightrope walk between striving, as Pynchon puts it, to "deny to
2 Varsava identifies the libertarian and communitarian challenge to liberalism with, respectively,
Pierce Inverarity in Lot 49, and Brock Vond in Vineland. His argument is constructive and points
rightly in an ideological direction however, I would argue, he caricatures the communitarian and
libertarian positions a little too reductively to be wholly convincing. Specifically, I would point to
Varsava's association of communitarianism with the position that "authority must be respected
unconditionally and must not be placed under the lens of liberal skepticism," and his presentation
of Inverarity as representing pure libertarian ideals despite the care Pynchon takes to point out the
connections of Inverarity's economic interests with the government and with the military industrial
complex, as particularly contentious issues. (Varsava 79).
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the machine at least some of its claims on us," without being perceived to be
engaged in a reactionary assault on the idea of modernity and progress as such
(Pynchon, "Luddite" 40). Leo Marx has identified this kind of dynamic as a
strong characteristic of the American literary tradition, tracing it through writers as
central as Hawthorne, Melville, Twain, and Henry Adams, and ascribing it to the
peculiarly American susceptibility to a fatalistic view of technology, that is part of
what he describes as "pastoralism in the American context" ("American Literary
Culture" 187). For Marx, America has always struggled "to embrace-
simultaneously and as if reconcilable—the progressive and the pastoral world-
views," and its most astute writers, recognizing the inherent instability and
contradictoriness of this combination, express, in their work, a pastoralism that
entails "neither an uncritical embrace of material progress nor its total repudiation"
(187). They attempt to give voice to their concerns and disaffection with the
apparent absence of limits on technological and economic progress, while at the
same time recognizing technology, or "The Machine," as Marx labels the defining
metaphor of American pastoralism, as unquestionably the primary force of
contemporary history.
As Marx points out, this distinctive form of secular fatalism is itself an
expression of political discontent, and often indicates a disaffection with the
complexity of politics and a tendency towards "disengagement from the public
realm and a reversion to inaction and privacy" (207). In contemporary America,
as in the Americas of Twain and Adams, this discontent often manifests itself in a
reaffirmation of those liberal values seen to be most consistent with the American
creed—mainly virtues such as individual rights, the pursuit of private happiness,
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compassion, and tolerance. However, today this tendency to set aside the difficult
tensions and problems posed by the political realm and political theory in favour
of the cultivation of a consensus built around private virtues and individual liberty,
is often presented as part of a pragmatic response to a political sphere still infected
with the language and metaphysics of Enlightenment rationalism.
Antifoundationalist in nature, contemporary pragmatism approaches the
modernist belief in progress, not as a matter of philosophical, moral, or even
historical truth, but rather as a contingency, as a concept that has arisen in a
specific cultural context, and which is rooted in a given social practice. Thus, the
continuing tension between the progressive and pastoral world-views, that Marx
identifies as a significant element of the often fateful and apocalyptic idea of
technology that has been a distinguishing feature of the American literary
tradition, is, for liberal pragmatists, most usefully approached with self-
consciousness and irony, with an awareness of the shifting and provisional nature
of all ideas, values, and beliefs.
Liberal pragmatism formulates its values, not by grounding them in any
metaphysical or rational account of human nature or worth, but rather by
recognizing them as the beliefs and convictions which are presently central to the
community in which we inhabit, a community which Richard Rorty refers to as the
"North Atlantic Postmodern Bourgeois Liberal Democracy" (Contingency, Irony,
and Solidarity). This vision of liberalism, which denies the necessity, or even the
possibility, of providing liberal convictions with a philosophical footing, seeks to
affirm such ideals as pluralism and individual freedom as cultural, as belonging to
the shared set of contingent practices and beliefs which constitute the background
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against which our particular community, the group with which we identify, reflects
on, and converses about, political and moral issues. Indeed, according to Varsava,
Pynchon is an exponent of just this kind of pragmatic position. Without
attempting to root his defense of American liberal convictions and institutions in
the language of transcendental truth claims or Enlightenment ideology, Pynchon
recognizes the dangers that the communitarian and libertarian challenges pose to
the understanding of justice, fairness, and tolerance in contemporary America, and
responds with irony and parody, engaging in both an appeal to the worthiness and
desirability of liberal values, as well as a constant self-questioning which
emphasizes the subjective and linguistic nature of his liberal commitments.
Liberalism then, for Pynchon, can be understood as "really nothing more
than a series of dialogues played out over time," an ongoing discussion, amongst a
community which uses a particular political vocabulary, based on a set of
historically contingent but generally shared understandings regarding what is
important, justifiable or reasonable grounds for public debate regarding those
convictions central to our existing liberal democratic society (Varsava 92).
Viewed in this manner, liberalism does not, and cannot, provide an absolute
ground for this vocabulary, but rather rests its ethical case on its dedication to
freedom as its supreme value, a dedication that cannot be justified by any moral
recourse independent of the current beliefs and practices of the liberal democratic
community. It is a position Varsava refers to as "postmodern liberalism," and
identifies most closely with the work of John Rawls and Richard Rorty.3
3 For what it is worth, Rorty seems not to recognize in Pynchon's work a political point of view at
all sympathetic with his own. In fact, in his book Achieving Our Country, Rorty refers particularly
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If it is the case, however, as I shall argue, that Pynchon is engaged, not just
in a defense of liberal values, but also a critique of existing liberal democratic
institutions and practices, then it seems reasonable to explore the extent to which,
and on what ethical or political grounds, Pynchon furnishes a basis for his social
and political criticism. Certainly, following Leo Marx, it is helpful to be aware of
the American susceptibility to pastoral idealism, and the fatalistic view of
technology that is often its product, when considering Pynchon's Luddite
tendencies. However, Pynchon's willingness in his work—particularly in
Vineland, the novel which will dominate our attention here—to engage with the
central institutions of his time, to mark the expansion of power that has often been
the price of progress, without losing faith in the potency and relevancy of
American liberal democratic principles as a basis for social criticism and
institutional indictment, indicates that, at the very least, Pynchon's pastoralist and
Luddite tendencies cannot be said to signal a disengagement from politics or a
reversion into relativism or radical skepticism.
Nor can it be said that Pynchon's work is entirely given over to the mythic
or religious withdrawal from experience, to the "refusal to confront the present,
fear of the future, [and the] effort to translate 'America' into a vision that works in
spirit because it can never be tested in fact," that Bercovitch tells us is
characteristic of the American Jeremiad (xiv). Undeniably, Pynchon's political
perspective offers much in the way of disappointment and very little in the way of
optimism, but there is a need to distinguish between optimism and hope in
to Pynchon's novel Vineland, as a novel "not of social protest but rather of rueful acquiescence in
the end of American hopes" (6).
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Pynchon4. Pynchon's vision of America, and his critique of its culture and
institutions, is underwritten by an understanding of the contradictory implications
of American exceptionalism. Historian John Patrick Diggins clearly formulates
this contradiction when he writes that:
Embedded in the phrase "American exceptionalism" are two
contrasting meanings, one upholding differences, rare conditions,
and a sense of destiny; the other concentrating on deficiencies and
common shortcomings that cast doubt on whether America will
succeed. (Hallowed Ground 103)
In other words, American exceptionalism can mean "either deliverance or
deprivation," the promise of progress or the frustrations of inadequacy (103). It is
often assumed that Pynchon's work focuses exclusively on the latter; that he
implicitly ties the notion of American exceptionalism to the debasement and
corruption of America at the hands of capitalists, imperialists, fascists, and military
technocrats. As one critic would have it "Pynchon focuses upon the exploitation
of cultural mythology ['the mythology of exceptionalism'] to perpetuate internal
class divisions and to further America's imperialistic ambitions" (Madsen 1998).
It seems to me that this view, while certainly legitimate, is too narrow to
fully circumscribe the breath of political perspective that Pynchon offers in his
work. Pynchon's particular inclination towards American exceptionalism stops
short of being purely jeremiadic, largely because he goes beyond just positing
America as, in the words of one of the most quoted of Pynchonian phrases, a land
where "the chances [were] once so good for diversity," to take seriously the hope
embedded in the political and moral principles which gave rise to reform
4
My endeavor to differentiate between hope and optimism is significantly informed by the
emphasis the distinction receives in the work of Christopher Lasch.
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movements as varied and flawed as progressivism, populism, and the sixties'
counterculture (Pynchon, Lot 49 181).
Even if we accept the pragmatic temperament of Pynchon's liberalism, an
attribute that Varsava identifies with the antifoundationalist neopragmatism of
Rorty, and that Baker identifies with the progressive pragmatism of Dewey, we
must also address those elements of Pynchon's work, particularly in Vineland, that
evidence Pynchon's recognition of the limits of that pragmatism. What follows
accepts the view that Pynchon's liberalism is essentially pragmatic in orientation,
but argues that this pragmatism is tempered by a sense of fate, an insistence on the
recognition of the limitations imposed on progress and freedom, and the demands
placed on social virtue, by the contingencies of history, the constraints of nature,
the inescapability of human imperfection, and the inadequacy of political
institutions. The tone of lament which often underlies the political perspective
offered in Pynchon's work, for the loss of democratic values and the diminishment
of the democratic character of political institutions in America, indicates a refusal
to dissociate what has been lost from the past from the choices of the present, and
thus evokes a kind of liberal democratic hope that is defined, not by the
circumscriptions of present power arrangements, or by the ritual political idealism
of the jeremiad, but by the conviction, often re-animated through remembrance of
the past rather than anticipation of the future, that a staunch belief in justice is
never completely without justification in America. In Vineland, Pynchon looks to
the American experience of these limitations, filtered largely through the political
hopes, frustrations and failures of his reform minded characters, not as an exercise
in liberal nostalgia, but as an affirmation of liberal democratic belief, an assertion
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of faith in the goodness of what has often been called the unachieved
"philosophical cause" of America in the face of the glaring hypocrisy, cynicism,
uncertainty, and injustice which define the contemporary state of the nation in his
work.
Of Murals and the Megastate: Postwar American Liberalism and Pynchon's
Discontent
In his review of Vineland, published in The New York Times, Salmon
Rushdie describes Pynchon's novel as "that rarest of birds: a major political novel
about what America has been doing to itself, to its children, all these many years."
Rushdie's characterization of Vineland as less than optimistic concerning recent
political developments in America will hardly startle any reader of Pynchon's
fiction, but what may provide pause, as it seems to have for Rushdie, is the sense
of nostalgia he detects in Vineland, the hint of possible redemption surrounding
Pynchon's presentation of the values and political ideals which were in the
ascendancy in the America of the 1960's, "values that Vineland seeks to recapture,
by remembering what they meant before the dirt got thrown all over them." In fact
for many readers of Pynchon's work, as Joseph Tabbi has pointed out, Vineland
has finally exposed "Pynchon's true face," identifying him once and for all as "an
old lefty nostalgic for the lost history of Pacific northwest unions and Wobbly
politics [...] who is willing to assert, against all the co-opted radicalism, fallen
ideals, and unfulfilled 'acid adventures' of the sixties, a positive sense of
community with his contemporaries" (Tabbi 92). For such critics, Pynchon's
fictional foray into the recent American past is little more than yet another method
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of disparaging the present, the product of a political sensibility driven by
disillusionment and compelled to revisit the innocence and idealism of a period
now lost and irretrievable to a reprobate present, in order to locate any framework
of values or community on which to hang a very precarious final hope of
redemption.
In this sort of politicized context, using the term "nostalgic" to characterize
Vineland seems as much an accusation as a description, implying, as it usually
does, a political perspective clinging to a rather romanticized interpretation of the
past against the absence of a hopeful vision of the future. What the nostalgic
politics of Vineland fails to provide, as Tabbi goes on to suggest, is anything like
"a new style of resistance" with which to confront the repressive political situation
that the novel, he admits, so accurately presents (99). Tabbi accuses Vineland of
raising important political concerns only as a means to more powerfully evoke a
generation's experience of disillusionment. It is the irretrievability of an earlier
time, of possibilities and innocence now past, that drives the political agenda of
Vineland for Tabbi, an approach that drains the political issues raised by the novel
"of any felt urgency," and simply reinforces the rather paralyzing notion that
against the kind of cultural and institutional hegemony that defines contemporary
America any "'underground' resistance has long since stopped being viable" (99).
Rushdie's review and Tabbi's objections share the perception that, in some
sense, Vineland"s style of reminiscence offers a kind of refuge from the current
state of affairs, though they assess the political implications of this nostalgic
attitude quite differently. Rushdie identifies what he calls "a hint of redemption"
in this longing to recapture the innocence and hope of a period now irretrievable,
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arguing that Pynchon's nostalgic approach in Vineland, even if guilty of
sentimentality, cultivates a sense of the past, an understanding that history can
offer an alternative vision which, in contrast to the despondency and cynicism
inspired by the political realities of the present, keeps alive the possibility of what
another critic has called "a recuperated salvation" (Pittman 39). Where Rushdie
detects Pynchon asserting a growing understanding of the redemptive power of the
past in Vineland, Tabbi finds only a deepening sense of resignation about the
novel. For Tabbi, Vineland's apparent enthrallment with the past is an indication
of Pynchon's lack of faith in the future, further evidence that he has consigned the
progressive hopes for political reform and social equality to some lost golden age,
and contented himself with a spectatorial and retrospective fictional mode that,
producing a narrative vulnerable to accusations of political indeterminacy and
ineffectualness, left Tabbi "doubting the seriousness of his project in the book"
(97).
Pynchon's pessimistic representation of the present, his apparent lack of
confidence regarding the future, and his evocation of a past when the leftist values
that seem to inform his politics were vibrant and relevant, lead both Rushdie and
Tabbi to approach Vineland as something of a lament, as a novel that seeks to offer
an uncompromising satire of contemporary America grounded in political realism,
but tempered with a sense of commiseration, with an appreciation that there is
some comfort, however cold, to be found in fiction that revisits a more optimistic,
less cynical period of American history. For both Rushdie and Tabbi, Pynchon
evokes the recent past to emphasize just how little hold it seems to have on the
present, to demonstrate the extent to which the hopes and aspirations of two
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generations of the progressive left have been thoroughly undermined by the
shifting power dynamics of contemporary American life and politics.
There is no doubt that Pynchon is reacting to the eclipse of post WWII
American progressive liberalism in Vineland, but to characterize his narrative of
this stunted development as nostalgic or as merely an act of recollection, whether
interpreted as an affirmation of the possibility of redemption or as a sign of
resignation, seems to miss the sense of persistence which pervades his evocation
of the past, to disregard the effort Pynchon makes, in the novel, to trace the
multifarious ways that the past, and our understanding of the past, continues to
influence all aspects of our present day lives. What Pynchon provides in Vineland
is a sense of history as the shifting current of human experience, not as merely a
study in corruption and the loss of innocence. He does not bury the past in
nostalgic images nor represent it as something dead, lacking either relevance or
influence in the face of the dynamic progress of the contemporary world; rather
Pynchon's understanding of the state of American liberalism and democracy,
dramatized in his rather dystopic vision of contemporary American social and
political life, is haunted by the past, by both the ever-changing construction of
history and its undeniable consequences.
Pynchon has too pragmatic an understanding of history, despite his much
discussed affinity for the notion of entropy, to fully despair of the American
republic in the fashion of Henry Adams. Nor does the kind of dystopic writing in
which he engages in Vineland simply present, as Booker M. Keith suggests, "a
vivid and chilling picture of contemporary America as a land of lost hopes and
broken dreams, a place where huge, impersonal forces have subtly gained the
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power to dictate the courses of individual lives" (5). Vineland goes well beyond
just offering the rather banal observation "that America is not the land of dreams
envisioned in [the] long-lived Utopian fantasy," to vigorously engage many of the
most cmcial and urgent issues facing contemporary American liberal democracy
(7). The impossibility of disentangling these issues from the choices, struggles,
and failures of the past, individual as well as political, lends much of the potency
to Pynchon's central political themes, particularly the meaning of justice and the
conception of progress at work in the contemporary America he portrays.
The principles of justice and progress are not merely the distant echoes of
an anachronistic and defeated utopianism in Vineland, but rather they provide
markers, historical and ideological, by which the novel seeks to situate and
contextualize the current state of American liberal democracy. In both a thematic,
and sometimes literal sense, as we can see from the following passage describing
Frenesi's first encounter with the figure of Brock Vond, they serve as a kind of
thematic mise-en-scene against which Pynchon's Reagan-era drama of
compromised ex-hippies, power-mad bureaucrats, and media-saturated teenage
nihilists unfolds:
Brock had convened his roving jury up in Oregon to look into
subversion on the campus of a small community college, and 24fps
had gone there to film the proceedings, or as much as they could
find with Brock always changing venues and times on them at the
last minute. They chased him from the courthouse, the drive-in
movie lot, finally back to the courthouse again, where Frenesi, by
then not expecting him, just trying to shoot some old WPA murals
about Justice and Progress, if she could figure a way to compensate
for the colors, which had darkened with the years since the New
Deal, in the middle of a slow pan around the rotunda, happened to
pick up in her viewfinder this compact figure in a beige double-
knit, striding toward the staircase. (200)
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Certainly the faded murals in the above passage signify the declining influence of
the principles of social justice and progressivism on the development of post
WWn American politics, however, there is also an important and compelling
sense in which Frenesi's interest in the murals, her struggle to recapture the
political potency of the symbols on film, despite their darkening colors, acts as a
reminder of the unachieved promise of a variety of American political traditions.
Vineland's political themes of justice and progress are not just representative of
the eclipse of liberal and social progressive ideals in contemporary America, but
are also suggestive of the possibilities kept alive by the memory of the political, by
the belief that such fundamental principles still operate, even if only tacitly, as an
element of the American political consciousness.
Pynchon's explicit reference to the New Deal as a watershed historical and
political moment in the shaping of postwar American liberal democracy, and its
shifting attitudes towards justice and progress, is broadened and developed in
Vineland, by his account of the history of three generations of the Becker family
and their experience of the profound changes in the nature and conception of state
power introduced "in the years since the New Deal." Vineland pays particular
attention to the decline of the labor movement, the demoralization of the New Left
and the counter-cultural revolution, and the ascension of Reaganism and
ideological "neo-conservatism," three crucial episodes, in both the history of
postwar America and in the story of the Becker family, which point to a new
consolidation and expansion of power whose emergence is a direct challenge to
traditional conceptions of democracy and citizenship.
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Pynchon's concern regarding the evolution of the New Deal conception of
liberalism, and the profound implications that it had for the expansion of state
power in postwar America, is an important political and ideological signpost in his
work. We can see distinct indications of this in his novel The Crying ofLot 49,
published in 1966, in which Oedipa Mass, chasing after the legacy of Pierce
Inverarity, is soon overwhelmed by the complexity and scope of the shadow that
Inverarity has cast over the social and political landscape of her beloved America.
Many critics identify Inverarity as a rather conspicuous example of the
prototypical capitalist run amuck, and allegorize his pervasive presence in the
novel as a thinly veiled expression of Pynchon's discontent with the dangerous
hegemony that liberal capitalist values seem to wield in all aspects of
contemporary American life. From an ideological perspective Jerry A. Varsava
argues that Inverarity's presence in the novel exemplifies the values of
libertarianism, in particular economic libertarianism, an ideology that raises
unfettered capitalism and the pursuit of individual interest to the status of moral
absolutes. Discussing Inverarity's ubiquity in the novel Varsava writes:
The vestiges of this rogue entrepreneur are apparent everywhere
that Oedipa looks—in the multiplying conspiracies, in the tangled
web of his commercial enterprises, in the urban sprawl of Southern
California, and, most notably, in the rigid economic stratification
that defines American society. All of these conditions can
ultimately be traced back to Inverarity's (and unnamed others)
successful pursuit of the ideals of economic libertarianism. (70)
It is, of course, more than legitimate to read Inverarity as the incarnation of the
destructive nature of greed and economic inequality in American society, but to
lay the blame for all of the social, political, and economic concerns that Varsava
lists solely at the feet of an ideology, however objectionable, whose ideals had
148
more or less been relegated to the political margins during the period in question—
a period which historians Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle argue was dominated by
"New Deal [...] ideas, public policies, and political alliances," seems
unsatisfactory when dealing with a writer as politically astute as Pynchon seems to
be (ix).
Certainly the kind of unfettered capitalism that is the economic system of
choice for libertarians was much in evidence in America in the early part of the
twentieth century. Highly unregulated and unresponsive to progressive social
ideas, the capitalist elite in America, those whom Roosevelt in his inaugural
speech referred to as "the rulers of the exchange of mankind's goods," pursued the
production of capital and the accumulation of individual wealth largely
unrestrained by regulatory institutions or interventionist state policies. That is, of
course, until the onset of the high unemployment and social distress of the Great
Depression.
The flurry of policies and governmental initiatives which President
Franklin Roosevelt's administration designed to attend to the many immediate
social and economic problems associated with the Depression, which collectively
came to be known as the "New Deal," promised not just relief from the pressing
crisis of the greatest economic collapse in American history, but also sought to
frame reforms to provide the federal government with a larger, and it was hoped
stabilizing, influence on America's economic and social development. The notion
that the state had a significant role to play in the way that capitalism functions in
America had its origins in the progressive reform movements of the early
twentieth century which recognized the social and political dangers of large
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corporations having too much power and influence over the lives of individuals
and over the American economy as a whole. The New Deal promised to
institutionalize this progressive spirit by recognizing that capitalism in America
often needed to be saved from itself, and that a duly elected democratic
government, concerned with the plight of the individual citizen and prepared to
enact significant social and economic reforms, was the instrument best suited for
the job. This fundamentally anti-libertarian project became the basis for modern
American liberalism.
That "New Deal liberalism" was certainly not consistent with the strong
belief in "laissez-faire" capitalism that is associated with the libertarian elements
of American liberalism, and yet was supported with enthusiasm by many liberals
of the period, is a strong indication of just how out of favor libertarian ideals had
become. As Brian J. Cook argues, Roosevelt's redefinition of liberalism was in
fact a shifting of liberal ideology away from its traditional emphasis on economic
liberty towards an emphasis on pragmatic reform, a shift that significantly changed
the liberal understanding of the role of government in American life.
Roosevelt had to label his program distinctively and banish to the
political wilderness any opponents who might claim the same label.
FDR achieved this by adopting the title "liberal" and forcing his
opponents to accept the designation "conservative." [...] This was
an especially meaningful achievement, for the American creed was
fundamentally liberal. According to John Dewey, the creed
consisted of two strains of liberalism—laissez-faire and
humanitarian—with the former dominant and latter associated with
personal and voluntary effort. FDR successfully raised the political
status of humanitarian liberalism and redefined it in connection
with government activism, generating a still-increasing sharp
competition between the two streams of liberal thought—now in
the guise of liberalism and conservatism. (Cook 106)
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While Cook implies that the term "liberal," as it was applied by Roosevelt to the
amalgam of initiatives, policies and ideas that constituted the New Deal, reflected
Roosevelt's keen political sense more than his ideological sympathies, the fact
remains that New Deal liberalism, with its emphasis on the expansion of state
intervention in social and economic matters central to American life, was the
dominant force in America's political culture well into the postwar era.
If it is the case then, as The Crying ofLot 49 clearly and repeatedly
suggests, that Inverarity's story is the story of contemporary America, then it could
be argued that the social and economic conditions that Oedipa discovers in his
wake are more the result of the shortcomings and incongruities associated with the
development of contemporary American liberalism than the success of Inverarity's
libertarian ideals. The story of Pierce Inverarity appears to be that of just another
successful American capitalist, however, his legacy is given form and meaning,
not by Inverarity the man, but by Oedipa, by her obsessive drive to reconcile the
America she thought she inherited, with the poverty, disenfranchisement, and
paranoia she confronts on her journey. Determined to make whatever sense she
can of the "scatter of business interests that had survived Inverarity," Oedipa
begins to sense that while the great edifice of America's liberal order seems to be
in a state of deterioration, another order, its ideals less determinate and its nature
less conspicuous than liberalism's, an order which is somehow tied to Inverarity,
is tightening its grip on all elements of American life.
In this regard the textual evidence that Varsava provides to justify his
characterization of Inverarity as "a paragon of libertarian heroicism" points
constructively in an ideological direction—though I would like to argue that the
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orientation in question is more usefully described as corporatist rather than
libertarian (71). Varsava writes:
Yoyodyne Inc., a large defense contractor—suggestive of
Pynchon's onetime employer, Boeing—comes into view and with it
the specter of the "military-industrial complex" President
Eisenhower warned America about in 1961, just before leaving
office. (Indeed, Eisenhower realized that the military-industrial
complex posed a threat to American liberty and justice
unprecedented in the nation's history.) A major shareholder in
Yoyodyne, Inverarity, after the fashion of the robber baron, secretly
arranged the special tax break that brought the company to this
location in the first place. Inverarity's machinations give new
meaning to Adam Smith's notion of the 'invisible hand.' (In a
perverse, libertarian reading of civitas, Inverarity sees his self-
interested scheming as the proper office of a 'founding father'
[26].) (71)
What emboldens a self-interested capitalist like Inverarity to legitimize himself as
a "founding father" is a political environment in which the collaboration between
the state and the interests of capital encourages the development of quasi-
governmental structures and dangerously influential private interests groups. Such
a political environment is made manifest in the novel, as Varsava rightly indicates,
by the imposing presence of Yoyodyne Inc. and the "military industrial complex"
that it suggests. Inverarity's statesmanlike status is indicative of the emerging
corporatist reality of postwar America's political development, a reality that
historian Alan Brinkley describes in this passage from Liberalism and its
Discontents:
In the postwar era there emerged [...] what became, in a sense, a
second government: a national security state, powerful, entrenched,
constantly expanding, and largely invulnerable to political attacks;
a state that forged intimate partnerships with the corporate world,
constantly blurring the distinctions between public and private; and
a state that produced some of the very things—strengthened private
monopolies and expanded state power to sustain them—that the
liberal vision was supposed to prevent. (93)
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Certainly Inverarity's actions in The Crying ofLot 49 are in his own interest, but
behind each of his "machinations" is a corporatist-style relationship to a state
structure or expanded governmental function that plays an instrumental role in his
success.
"What is it that they know that the powerless do not? What terrible
structure behind the appearance of diversity and enterprise?" (Pynchon, Gravity's
Rainbow\65). These questions from Gravity's Rainbow take aim at exactly the
same kinds of issues that Oedipa's pursuit of Inverarity's legacy in The Crying of
Lot 49 inevitably compel her to consider. In fact, it could be argued that the
political consciousness raised by these questions, a consciousness that is skeptical,
suspicious of unseen connections, and wary of any organization or power structure
that appears simple is, at least for Oedipa, Inverarity's most important legacy.
And while the overall effect of Pynchon's interrogation of postwar power in The
Crying ofLot 49 and Gravity's Rainbow seems to point, as many critics have
argued, towards the politicization of a very broad and diffuse sense of paranoia,
there also emerges, in these two novels, a more specific and substantial ideological
critique that reaches beyond the esoteric logic of a world replete with shadowy
conspiracies and secret plots, to call attention to specific shifts in ideology that
have greatly shaped political, institutional, and social developments in postwar
America.''
5 Of course the great question of Lot 49 always remains—is Oedipa's determination to "create
constellations" from the apparent disorder of Inverarity's affairs the result of paranoia, or of a
fortuitous unearthing of a perversely complicated intrigue—the shadowy Tristero conspiracy.
Critics often call attention to the fact that this question—"Either Oedipa in the orbiting ectasy of a
true paranoia, or a real Tristero"—remains unanswered and unresolved by the novel's conclusion
(182). What is not given consideration often enough, however, is that both conditions—secrecy
and paranoia—are not necessarily mutually exclusive as solutions to Oedipa's dilemma, but may,
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Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Stalinist Russia, argued many postwar
liberal intellectuals, illustrated the dangers of mass politics, of people having too
great an influence over the political destiny of their nation. The desire for
rationalization amongst many postwar liberals, for the application of instrumental
and corporate methods to all spheres of American life, reflected the growing fear
and distrust of the people and their susceptibility to demagoguery that was a vital
influence on the direction of liberal social and political criticism after the war. It is
particularly apparent in that strain of postwar liberalism, exemplified in the work
of figures like Seymour Martin Lipset6, and H.L. Mencken (who famously
described democracy as the rule of the "booboisie,") that argued that one of the
things which the experience of WWII had made clear is that a more rational and
scientific approach to managing society than is offered by democratic self-
government is necessary.
It was widely believed in those days that behind the War—all the
death, savagery, and destruction—lay the Fiihrer-principle. But if
personalities could be replaced by abstractions of power, if
techniques developed by the corporations could be brought to bear,
might not nations live rationally? One of the dearest Postwar
hopes: that there should be no room for a terrible disease like
charisma... that its rationalization should proceed while we had the
time and resources... (Pynchon, Gravity's Rainbow 81)
This kind of satirical attack, in Gravity's Rainbow, on the ideological tendency in
postwar America to "favor a powerful program over a powerful leader," is easily
recognizable as the kind of critique of the technocratic vision generally associated
with postwar political theorists like C. Wright Mills, Jacques Ellul, and Herbert
rather, be intimately linked symptoms of the dilemma itself, measures of a larger political and
social system that seems able to employ both to its distinct advantage.
6 See particularly: Political Man: The Sociological Bases ofPolitics (1960)
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Marcuse7 (81). These theorists, suspicious of the growing pragmatic, anti-
ideological, and elitist tendencies of liberal thinking in postwar America, began to
call attention to the widening gap between the traditional ideals of American
liberalism and what Mills called the "realities of modern social structure that might
serve as the means for their realization" (Mills 189).
Mill's and Ellul's thoughts regarding the dehumanizing and subversive
effects of the instrumentalization of politics in America was greatly influenced by
the theories ofMax Weber, and as critics such as Joseph W. Slade and Edward
Mendelson have pointed out, there is an unmistakably Weberian element to
Pynchon's work, which Pynchon underscores by not only utilizing some of
Weber's key concepts and terms (eg. rationalization and charisma), but by also
alluding to him by name in Gravity's Rainbow. Weber feared for the very survival
of liberal values in the modern world of ever larger organizations, ever expanding
state apparatuses, and an ever more complex economic and political life
confronting the individual. He argued that since rationalization, or the burgeoning
of scientific, technological, and administrative procedures and techniques, is an
inescapable and distinctive part of living in a modern industrial society, the power
accrued by the experts and managers which run the bureaucracies that are an
inevitable consequence of rationalization, can only be countervailed by the
emergence of strong democratic leadership. These individuals, leaders whose
authority is legitimated by what Weber termed "charismatic rule," or "the
authority of the exceptional, personal 'gift ofgrace,' [...] the entirely personal
devotion to, and personal trust in, revelations, heroism, or other qualities of
7 See particularly: Mill's Power Elite, Ellul's Technological Society, and Marcuse's One
Dimensional Man.
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leadership in an individual" provide the best hope, according to Weber, for
maintaining some sense of accountability and individual connection to the
functioning of the modern state (Weber, "Vocation" 312).
Modern politics, or the politics of "the disenchanted world" for Weber, is
too complex to be managed or fully understood by the mass of citizens in a
democracy, and thus political participation and democratic citizenship are best
understood, not as the basis for self-government or individual development, but
rather as an indispensable mechanism for establishing and legitimizing competent
political leaders, or dismissing the ineffective from their positions. As Weber
envisioned it, in the bureaucratic state order "the only choice lies between a
leadership democracy with a 'machine' and democracy without a leader, which
means rule by the 'professional politician' who has no vocation, the type of man
who lacks those inner, charismatic qualities which make a leader" (351).
Democracy, for Weber, is a means of maintaining something of the political in the
functioning of the bureaucratic state, preserving some of the liberal freedom for
individual choice and action within the rationalized world, even if only for an elite
few.
It seems obvious that many of Pynchon's satirical targets in Gravity's
Rainbow, the unchecked growth in bureaucracy, the technocratic emphasis on
expertise, technology, and secrecy, the systemic integration of government and the
economy, the growing emphasis on organization and management over
individualism, and the general sense of anxiety and discontent that surrounds the
increasing influence and scope of technology, science, and administration in the
postwar world, has much in common with both the tragic assessment of modernity
156
and progress expressed in the work of Weber, and the critique of postwar America
liberal democracy as elitist and corporatist offered by Mills and Marcuse. Of
course, it could be argued that along with his discomfort with the growing
correlativity of the state, the economy, the media, and the military, Pynchon's
work also often shares these theorists' penchant, particularly prevalent in Marcuse,
to exaggerate the extent of that interrelation, often implying the presence of a
totalizing system that is more the product of a powerful imagination than of
reasonable political critique.
However, Pynchon, as far as he might go in raising the specter of totalizing
tendencies in American society, never abandons political critique for a principled,
but hopeless, radical skepticism or relativism as he is sometimes accused of doing,
nor does his work ever relinquish its commitment to the ideal of individual liberty
despite its often pessimistic assessment of the opportunities to realize or express
individuality in the modern rationalized world. Pynchon's work, particularly
Vineland, as we shall see, takes seriously the possibility of democratic renewal
despite his often powerful indictment of contemporary politics, and affirms a
belief in the resiliency and promise of American liberalism in the face of its
demoralization and declining influence. As Edward Mendelson has written about
Gravity's Rainbow, "the moral center of the book is the difficult but required task
of recognizing the secular connectedness of the present scientific and political
world—and the even more difficult requirement to act freely on the basis of that
recognition" (Mendelson 145). Pynchon's suspicion that emergent forms of power
in postwar America have extended beyond the management, much less the control,
of traditional democratic political institutions, accounts for much of the
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exaggerated tone of his political satire, but it is Pynchon's moral commitment to
the ideals of individualism and democracy that guides his attempt, in Vineland, to
reaffirm the potency of political memory, and thus reclaim conceptions of justice
and progress which have, so often in American history, been the inspiration for
movements committed to social and political reform.
The world that Pynchon's fiction depicts is a world in which liberal
democratic values and institutions are, not just endangered and vulnerable, but
rapidly being rendered anachronistic. Vineland, in particular, calls attention to the
many ways that conceptions of democracy, justice, and progress in America have
been depolitized by the evolution of the form and nature of state power in postwar
America, by what political theorist Sheldon Wolin has called the "emergence of
the megastate" (Wolin, "Essays" 183). The term "megastate", as Wolin defines it,
"is intended to capture not only the expansion of power made possible by science
and technology but also the pervasiveness of power encouraged by the new mix of
public and private elements" (183). Wolin traces the theoretical argument for
expanded state power in American politics back to Alexander Hamilton and his
principle of the unlimited power of a sovereign people, but clearly identifies the
complicated legacies of the New Deal and the economic mobilization during
World War II as the fountainheads of this new form of the state8.
8 For a detailed and convincing exploration of the many theoretical debates and contemporary
political developments which provide an historical grounding for Vineland's thematic interest in
the evolution of state power in postwar America, ranging from "the federalist issues regarding the
separation of powers, the proper role of the various branches of government, and the intent of the
Constitution's framers to guarantee individual freedoms," to Roosevelt's internment of Japanese-
Americans during WWII, Truman's "national security state" doctrine, and Reagan's "war" on
drugs, see David Thoreen's "The President's Emergency War Powers and the Erosion of Civil
Liberties in Pynchon's Vineland" (Thoreen 764).
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ForWolin, the New Deal "was less a social than a political revolution" that
brought about a dramatic shift in both the definition, and practice, of liberalism in
America (22). "New Deal liberalism" with its expanded conception of state
power, combined with "the experience of near-total mobilization duringWW n,
including the mobilization of science, universities, and private industry,"
legitimated the unprecedented convergence of public and private administration
which has transformed American government, and the enmeshing of the interests
of the state and of the methodology of the corporation as a means of ensuring both
security and the expansion of material comfort, which has come to largely define
contemporary politics in America (183). In Vineland, Pynchon explores the
evolution of the postwar political situation in America via his narrative of three
generations of the Becker family, providing a dramatic portrayal of the expanding
power of the "megastate" and its impact on both the individual lives of particular
family members, as well as on the progressive ideals and liberal politics which are
so much a part of the American, and the Becker family, tradition.
The point of convergence at which Becker family history, as it is related to
us in Vineland, meets the story of contemporary American liberalism's gradual
repudiation of the kinds of populist and progressive commitments to economic
equality, political reform, and social justice that defined liberal hopes in America
for more than half a century, is the postwar fate of the American labor movement.
The American trade union movement in the immediate pre-war era, as Pynchon
depicts it through the stories told to Frenesi by her mother Sasha, was a vibrant,
active and growing movement. Profoundly angered by her father's crippling at the
hands of Croker "Bud" Scantling, a member of an anti-union organization called
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the "Employers' Association," Sasha leaves home and settles in a "rip-roaring
union town, still riding the waves of euphoria from the General Strike of '34" and
proceeds to involve herself in the local labor struggles (Pynchon, Vineland 77).
Growing up, Frenesi heard stories of those prewar times, the strike
at the Stockton cannery, strikes over Ventura sugar beets, Venice
lettuce, San Joaquin cotton... of the anticonscription movement in
Berkely... Somewhere Sasha also found time to work for Tom
Mooney's release, fight the infamous antipicket ordinance,
Proposition One, and campaign for Culbert Olsen in '38. (77)
Then WW II came along and, as Sasha recounts to Frenesi, for herself and for the
labor movement,
[t]he war changed everything. The deal was, no strikes for the
duration. Fot of us thought it was some last desperate capitalist
maneuver, a way to get the Nation mobilized under a Feader, no
different than Hitler or Stalin. But at the same time, so many of us
really loved FDR. (77)
American labor did indeed enter into economic arrangements with business and
government in the interests of mobilization and wartime production. FDR had set
the stage for such co-operation by passing legislation such as the National Fabor
Relations Act, which guaranteed collective bargaining rights for workers, and by
creating the National Fabor Relations Board, which was given the authority to
police unfair labor practices.
When the need to mobilize for war arose, Roosevelt sought to greatly
strengthen this New Deal tripartite partnership between government, capital, and
labor in order to provide economic stability and promote the increased production
necessary to accomplish the massive task of preparing for war. The theory was
that both business and labor would subordinate their own interests under the
direction of the government in order to serve the larger interests of the public
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good. However, as the activist state of the New Deal evolved into a warfare state,
it was the interests of capital that dominated much of the agenda and policies of
the War Industries Board, the bureaucratic entity which oversaw the bulk of
America's mobilization effort, largely because the agency was staffed "almost
entirely from the private sector, relying on lawyers, businessmen, and financiers
(many of them drawn directly from the industries they were then called upon to
regulate)" (Brinkley 83).
Labor was never able to achieve anything like equal standing in this
wartime partnership, while capital, able to dominate and manipulate the central
mobilization agencies, reaped enormous profits and solidified their influence over
the regulatory mechanisms and bureaucracy of the New Deal state. Thus Hub
Gates, Sasha's husband and Frenesi's father, returning from fighting the war,
confronts a vastly different political situation in America, a situation in which the
wartime arrangements between government and capital provided the framework
for a postwar state and a brand of liberal politics that was explicitly antiunion.
Participating in one of the wave of postwar strikes, Hub is confronted with
this new political reality for progressivism and for labor:
The stmggle between the IATSE [International Alliance of
Theatrical Stage Employees], a creature of organized crime in
collusion with the studio, and Herb Sorell's Conference of Studio
Unions, unapologetically liberal, progressive, New Deal, socialist,
and thus, in the toxic political situation, "Communist," had been
going on all through the war but now broke into the open in a series
of violent strike actions against the studios. All the newspapers
pretended it was an organizing dispute between two unions. In fact
it was the dark recrudescence of that hard-cased antiunion tradition
which brought the movie business to California in the first place,
where it had gone on to enjoy till only recently its free ride on the
backs of cheap labor. The minute this was threatened, in came the
studio-created scab locals of IATSE and their soldiers, often in
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battalion strength. And the outcome was foredoomed, because of
the blacklist. In one of American misoneism's most notable hours,
a complex system of accusation, judgement, and disposition,
administered by figures like Roy Brewer of LATSE and Ronald
Reagan of the Screen Actors Guild, controlled the working lives of
everyone in the industry who'd ever taken a step leftward of
registering to vote as a Democrat. (Pynchon, Vineland 289-90)
The clear contrast between the co-opted and fragmented situation of organized
labor in postwar America reflected in the above passage, and Frenesi's Wobbly
grandfather Jess Traverse's pre-war "dream of One Big Union" (76) is an
indication of just how much the political landscape had shifted in America
following the war. In particular, it is evidence of Pynchon's keen awareness of the
crippling effect that McCarthyism, and the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act—a
piece of legislation which confirmed that the kind of political influence enjoyed by
business interests during the war, vis-a-vis the wartime economic partnership with
the state, would continue to dominate public life in the postwar period—had on the
labor movement in America. Historian Nelson Lichtenstein describes the impact
and importance of the Taft-Hartley Act when he argues that:
Passage of the Taft-Hartley Act over President Truman's veto
provided a milestone not only for the actual legal restrictions the
new law imposed on the trade unions, but as a symbol of the
shifting relationship between the unions and the state during the
late 1940s. The law sought to curb the practice of interunion
solidarity, eliminate the radical cadre who still held influence
within trade union ranks, and contain the labor movement to
roughly its existing geographic and demographic terrain. [...]
Union leaders correctly recognized that the act represented the
definitive end of the brief era in which the state served as an arena
in which the trade unions could bargain for the kind of tripartite
accommodation with industry that had been so characteristic of the
New Deal years. (133-34)
Stripped of its most powerful organizational tools by Taft-Hartley, and
ideologically neutered by the chilling effect of the cold war on American domestic
162
politics, labor began to abandon its progressive political agenda as unions shifted
their focus towards solidifying their institutional positions and seeking higher
wages for their members. More or less abdicating the reformist and socially
democratic ideals that defined it in the prewar period, American organized labor
had been reduced from an active and expanding progressive force on the American
political scene before the war, to the status of a mere special-interest group
lobbying for the attention of the "broker-state" after it. Pynchon abstracts the story
of the postwar liberal repudiation of the progressive struggle against corporate
capitalism with Hub Gates's summarization of his own short personal story: "I let
the world slip away, made my shameful peace, joined the LA, retired soon's I
could, sold off my only real fortune—my precious anger—for a lot of got-damn
shadows" (Pynchon 1990 291).
The kind of progressive and social democratic politics which animated
labor-liberalism in the prewar period, but had been driven to the margins of the
American political scene by that period, which followed the war, characterized by
ideological conservatism, Keynesian economics, the anti-communist excesses of
McCarthyism, and the demoralization of liberalism, reappeared with a vengeance
on the national political scene in the 1960's with the civil rights movement, the
emergence of the New Left, and the explosion of political radicalism on the
campuses of America's universities. Certainly, Pynchon's sympathy with the
democratic and progressive impulses and ideals of the sixties "revolution" can be
strongly felt in Vineland. It is, however, a novel that squarely confronts the failure
of those impulses, the corruption of the democratic ideals of what came to be
known as the "New Left" by both radical and conservative forces within America,
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and the waning commitment of a generation caught up in the wave of
consumerism, prosperity, and the promise of personal freedom, that appeared to
offer a more immediate road to self-fulfillment than political activism seemed to—
a development allegorized in Vineland primarily by the co-option of Frenesi Gates
at the hands of Brock Vond.
Brock Vond's obsession with conformity and order is certainly depicted as
out of control and destructive in Vineland, but to describe Vond's maniacal and
authoritarian behavior as representative of something like the "the conservative
communitarian values that dominate American domestic and foreign policy from
the late sixties through to the early nineties," not only distorts a very complex and
wide body of communitarian thought, but ascribes to Vond political motivations
that Pynchon goes out of his way to discount (Varsava 79).9 Vond is, strictly
speaking, no ideologue, nor does he necessarily, at core, act out of political
principle, but rather, as Pynchon makes clear, he is, fundamentally, little more than
a lackey, a keen and over-zealous errand boy with his nose pressed up against the
window of the halls of real power. Just what motivates "Mad Dog Vond" is no
mystery in Vineland, or at least it is a question that Pynchon seems to deal with
rather directly.
He'd caught a fatal glimpse of that level where everybody knew
everybody else, where however political fortunes below might
bloom and die, the same people, the Real Ones, remained year in
and year out, keeping what was desirable flowing their way.
Prosecutor Vond wanted a life there, only slowly coming to
understand that for someone of his background there would be no
route to this but self-abasement, fawning, gofering, scrambling for
9
Cyrus K. Patell also sees Brock Vond as representative of a "coercive, majoritarian, and bad"
strain of communitarianism. but also recognizes a "voluntary, pluralist, and good" form of
communitarianism represented in the figure of Zoyd Wheeler (173). What is at stake in the rivalry
between Vond and Zoyd, for Patell, is a battle between these two forms of communitarianism.
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tips and offering other such hints of his eagerness to be brevetted on
life's battlefield to a rank higher than he would ever, by the terms
of his enlistment, have deserved. Though his defects of character
were many, none was quite as annoying as this naked itch to be a
gentleman, kept inflamed by a stubborn denial of what everybody
else knew—that no matter how much money he made, how many
political offices or course credits from charm school might come
his way, no one of those among whom he wished to belong would
ever regard him as other than a thug whose services had been hired.
(276)
Vond is such a disturbing character, not because he is the manifestation of "the
evil power-death-tech-government-official-reality politics of our age," but because
he represents a classic, though perverted, story of American aspiration, a
"provincial whiz kid" yearning to be a gentleman (Porush 38). Brock Vond is a
kind of Jay Gatsby of the technocratic age, a Machiavellian figure whose
frustrated desire to be amongst the powerful elite leads him to embrace, rather than
resist, the power system that torments him, rejects him, and inevitably leads to his
undoing. That Brock Vond, devotee of Lombrosonian "misoneism10," soldier of
the political backlash and instrument of control, should ultimately be betrayed by
the source of his own power—state bureaucracy—indicates just how problematic,
for Pynchon, politics has become in the age of the megastate.
Complicating the political dynamics raised by the fate of Brock Vond in
the novel, is the disturbing ease with which Vond is able to convince Frenesi, a
member of a family steeped in the history of the progressive struggles of the
American left, to participate in his plan to destroy "The People's Republic of Rock
and Roll," perhaps the central representative of 60's revolutionary ideals and spirit
10 What really got his [Vond's] attention was the Lombrosian [criminologist Cesare Lombroso
(1836-1909)] concept of 'misoneism.' Radicals, militants, revolutionaries, however they styled
themselves, all sinned against this deep organic human principle, which Lombroso had named after
the Greek for "hatred of anything new.' (Pynchon, Vineland 272-273)
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in the novel. Some critics, including Joseph Tabbi, have suggested that Brock
Vond was able to turn Frenesi "mainly through the force of his sex" (Tabbi 96).
However, Frenesi herself, at the very moment when Brock makes his pitch for her
to betray her friends and her ideals and help him bring about the dismantling of
PR3, suggests a different reason, a motive that has very little, if not nothing at all,
to do with Brock himself—
She understood as clearly as she could allow herself to what Brock
wanted to do, understood at last, dismally, that she might even do
it—not for him, unhappy fucker, but because she had lost too much
control, time was running all around her, these were rapids, and as
far ahead as she could see it looked like Brock's stretch of river,
another stage, like sex, children, surgery, further into adulthood
perilous and real, into the secret that life is soldiering. (Pynchon,
Vineland 216)
Frenesi is not captivated by Brock's sexual prowess, at least not enough to betray
her friends, but her desire for control, for order, for the stability that Brock
represents, compels her to accept his perverse conception of duty, and fulfill her
role in the larger system, as just another log making its way—and here Pynchon
extends the water motif of the above passage—"down the river to the sawmill, to
get sawed into lumber, to be built into more America" (216).
In Vineland, Pynchon draws attention to this weakness, not just in Frenesi
Gates, but also in the sixties revolutionary movement as a whole. The generation
which marched against the war in Vietnam, protested inequality and injustice in all
its forms, that rediscovered and fought for all manner of progressive and liberal
social causes was, finally, unable to resist the temptations that economic prosperity
and consumerism offered, eventually acquiescing to the conceptions of justice and
progress which the new era of political economy demanded. In the end, Pynchon
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seems to judge the revolutionary spirit of the sixties and early seventies as hopeful
and full of noble intentions, but too immature and self-indulgent to do little more
than moderate the growing postwar trend in America to fashion its politics around
the apolitical imperatives of economic rationality—mainly stability, prosperity,
and the centralization of power.
In fact, Pynchon goes so far as to suggest that the sixties revolution may
just have been a particular variation of that deeply felt desire for security and
continuity that eventually propelled Reagan and the neo-conservatives to power in
the eighties:
Brock Vond's genius was to have seen in the activities of the sixties
left not threats to order but unacknowledged desires for it. While
the Tube was proclaiming youth revolutions against parents of all
kinds and most viewers were accepting this story, Brock saw the
deep—if he'd allowed himself to feel it, the sometimes touching—
need to stay children forever, safe inside some extended national
Family. (269)
The discontent and alienation that Vond detects as the driving force of so much of
the politics of the New Left is a sign of social crisis, an indication of the break
down of civil society. Vond recognizes in a generation of young Americans
looking to the public sphere for a sense of belonging and security that used to be
derived from private associations—from family, neighborhoods, and friends—a
personal and political vulnerability, an opportunity to redefine the boundaries of
state power.
References to family and community ties are plentiful in Vineland, one
would guess in response to the rhetoric about "family values" typically offered by
neo-conservatives. "We know already how much all you Reaganite folks care
about the family unit, just from how much you're always fuckin' around with it,"
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is Zoyd Wheeler's response to government agent Hector Zuniga's conversational
inquiry concerning his daughter's welfare (30-31). It is a response that highlights
the divide between the 'traditional values" celebrated by Reagan and his disciples,
and the growing disciplinary functions of state apparatuses, especially the agencies
of law enforcement, under Reagan's presidency. This, combined with
developments in surveillance technologies11, further serves to compromise the
distinction between the public and private realms, a distinction fundamental to
traditional liberal conceptions, both of the level of autonomy available in civil
society, and of the limits of state power.
Like Vond, Reagan traded on the desire for order, continuity, and security,
but defined that desire in terms consistent with a conception of progress rooted in
unlimited economic growth and the enhancement, rather than the dismantling, of
state coercive power. Reaganism promotes a vision of America it claims is
conservative but, as Pynchon portrays it, its policies represent less a commitment
to "traditional values" than the promotion of those forces that pose the greatest
threat to America's democratic tradition of civil society—the interests of business.
For Pynchon, Reagan's real vision was of America as a "pacified territory,"
Reclaimed by the enemy for a timeless, defectively imagined future
of zero-tolerance drug free Americans all pulling their weight and
all locked in to the official economy, inoffensive music, endless
family specials on the Tube, church all week long, and, on special
days, for extra-good behavior, maybe a cookie. (221-222)
Under Reagan, as Vineland makes clear, the idea of progress as the reflection of
the hope for social justice and equality that gave rise to most of the significant
"
During a rant Flash, Frenesi's husband and fellow government informer, argues that
"Everybody's a squealer. We're in th'Info Revolution here. Anytime you use a credit card you're
tellin" the Man more than you meant to. Don't matter if it's big or small, he can use it all" (74).
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reform movements in American history, has been all but transformed from a
political into an economic notion. Progress, in the Reagan years, is made
synonymous with the forces of modernization, with technology, economic growth,
managerialism, and the growing interconnection between the public and private
sectors, between state and corporate administration. Where once the Left in
America was committed to progress as the promise of political democracy, the
forces of the Right now embrace it as the promise of limitless economic
expansion. Pynchon spends most of Vineland lamenting this transformation, but
in the final chapter he offers a response to it, a response rooted in the principle
that, to borrow a comment made by Christopher Lasch, "Hope does not demand a
belief in progress. It demands a belief injustice" (Lasch 80).
Emerson in Vineland Pynchon and the "Principle of Compensation"
"Justice?—You get justice in the next world, in this world you have the
law" (Gaddis 13). This sentence, which William Gaddis' uses to begin his 1994
novel A Frolic ofHis Own, a biting satire of contemporary America's litigation-
mad society, sets up a distinction between justice and the law that brings to mind
what Emerson, in his essay "Compensation," calls "the doctrine of the Last
Judgment" (Essays 57). Recalling a church sermon he recently attended, Emerson
relates the conception of justice offered by the preacher:
He assumed that judgment is not executed in this world; that the
wicked are successful; that the good are miserable; and then urged
from reason and from Scripture a compensation to be made to both
parties in the next life. No offence appeared to be taken by the
congregation at this doctrine. As far as I could observe, when the
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meeting broke up, they separated without remark on the sermon.
(57)
Gaddis' novel portrays a society in which the expectation of justice is no longer an
aspect of the law, where the law has become an instrument of vindication, of
resentment, of greed, of power, and even of self-definition, but it would appear, no
longer an expression of any faith in the realization of justice. That, according to
the lawyers in Gaddis's novel, and to Emerson's preacher, will have to wait for the
next world.
There is, for Emerson, a "fallacy" inherent in this kind of preaching and in
the conception of justice that it propounds, which lies in "the immense concession
that the bad are successful; that justice is not done now" (58). The preacher, as
Emerson sees it, perverts the notion of justice by defining just compensation in
terms more consistent with delayed material gratification than any principle of
retribution (58). "The ones showing up in court demanding justice," one of
Gaddis' characters tells us, "all they've got their eye on's that million dollar price
tag" (13). In the age of political economy, the limits of justice are defined, not by
hope and faith, but by economic reality, by what Emerson calls the "base estimate
of the market of what constitutes a manly success" (Essays 58). If the hope for
justice is reducible to little more than the belief that the success enjoyed by
unprincipled people in this world will be visited on the principled in the next; then
the law, unconstrained by any theology of deferred gratification, is free to define
just compensation in purely practical and economic terms.
Gaddis portrays legal processes in contemporary America as compromised,
co-opted, and often ridiculous: "Only justice! As a farce yes, play it as farce
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because that's what it is isn't it!" (Gaddis 485). Pynchon seems largely to concur
with this view, and indeed, in Vineland, the law is presented as a caricature of
justice, a burlesque of bureaucracy, corruption and political power played out in
the courtrooms, jail cells, and government offices across America. Certainly
Brock Yond's police state tactics and the basic disregard for civil and
constitutional rights, which justice officers at all levels of government display in
Vineland, are suggestive enough of Pynchon's cynicism concerning the state of the
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justice system in America . Nevertheless, the vision of justice with which
Pynchon concludes his novel is one that reaffirms, not just the possibility of
retributive justice, but also its inescapability. It is a vision that suggests that while
the state may undeniably be the central instrument of justice in the contemporary
world, a much older conception of justice, as a principle of everyday life that
exists outside of the state's laws and authority, however corrupt and authoritarian,
is also at work.
This vision of an inexorable justice is invoked by Pynchon via Jess
Traverse and his yearly recitation of a passage from Emerson at the annual
Traverse-Becker family reunion:
It was the heart of this gathering meant to honor the bond between
Eula Becker and Jess Traverse, that lay beneath, defined, and made
sense of them all, distributed from Marin to Seattle, Coos Bay to
downtown Butte, choker setters and choppers, dynamiters of fish,
shingle weavers and street-corner spellbinders, old and beaten at,
young and brand-new, they all kept an eye on the head of the table,
where Jess and Eula sat together, each year smaller and more
12 In his article, "The State Law Enforcement Apparatus as America: Authority, Arbitrariness, and
the 'Force of Law' in Vineland," Richard E. Burket looks at Vineland's portrayal of the legal
system, and particularly at Pynchon's critique of the notion of the law as a "neutral, disinterested
regulatory process," calling attention to the various ways that Pynchon dramatizes "the role that
force, power, and interpretation play in the operation of the legal system" by focusing on the often
arbitrary and politically and economically interested nature of the enforcement of the law and the
application of "legally sanctioned" force in postwar America (729-730).
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transparent, waiting for Jess's annual reading of a passage from
Emerson he'd found and memorized years ago, quoted in a
jailhouse copy of The Varieties ofReligious Experience, by
William James. Frail as the fog of Vineland, in his carrying, pure
voice, Jess reminded them, "'Secret retributions are always
restoring the level, when disturbed, of the divine justice. It is
impossible to tilt the beam. All the tyrants and proprietors and
monopolists of the world in vain set their shoulders to heave the
bar. Settles forever the ponderous equator to its line, and man and
mote, state and sun, must range to it, or be pulverized by the
recoil.'" (369)
There is an inclination amongst many critics to interpret Pynchon's appeal to this
rather vivid moral doctrine as largely ironic, as a tongue-in-cheek reference to a
theological or Utopian vision whose function, if anything, is only to emphasize the
glaring lack of real social justice in America that his novel highlights. For Barbara
Pittman, Jess's recitation is little more than an empty distraction, the observance of
a ritual whose substance is so out of context and so irrelevant to the lives and
experiences of the Traverse-Becker clan that "in all these years, apparently, no one
has considered it necessary or advantageous to find the primary source" (Pittman
47). Jerry Varsava finds irony in the disjunction between what he sees as the
implications of the passage as "an apology for political quietism," and Jess
Traverse's dedicated political activism throughout his life. For Varsava, in Jess
Traverse's mouth at least, "these words promote not complacency but the
application of a neo-Emersonian optimism to the active pursuit of liberal ideals"
(92).
For those who, unlike the Traverse-Beckers, feel it important to trace the
passage through William James' The Varieties ofReligious Experience back to its
original source in Emerson's essay "The Sovereignty of Ethics," the moral
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sentiment of the quotation, as well as Jess Traverse's attraction to it, are issues
made more, rather than less, relevant to a full understanding of the novel.
Pittman's puzzlement over just what imbues Jess's recitation with such power, and
why the Traverse-Beckers "meet every year just to hear old Jess read someone
else's quotation from Emerson," is perhaps best addressed byWilliam James
himself when he praises the sentences from Emerson which he is about to quote as
being "as fine as anything in literature" (Pittman 47; James 33). It is as much the
eloquence of the expression of faith, as its exemplification of the "Emersonian
religion," that compels James to call attention to the passage, and it seems
reasonable that what James calls "the inner experiences that underlie such
expressions of faith as this and impel the writer to their utterance," whether the
utterance being quoted is from a primary or secondary source, would command the
attention of the Traverse-Becker clan as firmly as it does James's (33).
Pittman's implied point, however, concerning the incongruence of the
circumstances in which the passage appears in the novel, and the context in which
Jess Traverse is said to have come across it in The Varieties ofReligious
Experience, takes us more directly to the heart of the matter. James quotes the
passage in order to both broaden the definition of religious experience he intends
to discuss, and to prepare the way for his assigning Emerson to what he calls the
"once-born" type of religious consciousness, a category James uses to designate a
sensibility "with no element of morbid compunction or crisis," a kind of
temperament "organically weighted on the side of cheer and fatally forbidden to
linger, as those of opposite temperament linger, over the darker aspects of the
universe" (82-83). The passage is exemplary, for James, of Emerson's
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unacquaintedness with morbid thoughts and his lack of awareness of evil, of the
practical limitations of his optimism and the fragility of his position when
confronted with real adversity. Considering the life that Jess Traverse has led, his
personal and political confrontations with injustice, suffering, and hardship—after
all we are told that he comes across the passage while in jail—his unshaken faith
in Emerson's vision of "divine justice" and "secret retributions" appears too
excessively sanguine and submissive, too much an expression of naive belief, to be
anything other than ironic.
If, however, we read Emerson's, and thereby Jess Traverse's, declaration
of faith in the "principle of compensation," as critics such as Christopher Lasch,
Stanley Cavell, and David M. Robinson suggest, not as a symptom of political
quietism, optimism, or a quasi-pathological cheerfulness13, but rather as a kind of
moral pragmatism, then what Prairie at one point calls "this belief they [her
parents] always had in some higher justice" offers to take us in a different, less
ironic, direction (Pynchon, Vineland 366). Lasch argues that it is "justice and
hope, not optimism," that Emerson preached, and it is in this spirit that Jess
Traverse's yearly recitation should be understood.
Rather than being a negation of human action, Emerson's doctrine that
"every secret is told, every crime is punished, every virtue rewarded, every wrong
redressed, in silence and certainty," affirms the moral act in the face of necessity
(Emerson 62). Fate, as Emerson conceives it, is experienced as the limitation
imposed on human freedom by nature, as the inescapable measure of human action
13 "In some individuals optimism may become quasi-pathological. The capacity for even a
transient sadness or a momentary humility seems cut off from them as by a kind of congenital
anaesthesia" (James 83).
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by the demands of virtue. It is a doctrine that Lasch outlines elegantly in his book
The True and Only Heaven when he writes:
Real insight lies in the knowledge that nature will prevail in the
long run. Submission, not defiance, is the way of true virtue; but
Emerson's idea of submission carries no hint of weakness or
passivity. 'Loving resignation' has nothing in common with
cowardice or timidity or with the complaint that we are helpless,
blameless victims of circumstance. [...] Rightly understood, it is a
'fatal courage,' an 'energy of will,' an 'ecstatic,' 'heroic'
affirmation of life that transforms necessity into freedom precisely
by acknowledging its fitness and beauty as well as its
inescapability. Submission implies a willingness to accept fate not
only as limitation but as justice. (Lasch 264)
This acceptance of the necessity of limits, which Emerson himself calls "a doctrine
of unspeakable comfort," is not reducible to a facile optimism, determinism, or
fatalism, but rather functions, for Emerson, as a repository of moral courage and
energy which can be harnessed, as David M. Robinson puts it, "to transform a
condition of limit into a springboard of power" (5).
But does this vision of justice, with its colors of Calvinist theology, offer
any political insight, or is Varsava right to argue that it is simply a harmless
optimism that Pynchon, tongue firmly in his cheek, grafts onto the liberal political
ideals that Jess Traverse represents? Irving Howe, himself a staunch leftist, strikes
a decidedly skeptical note when, discussing the interpretation of Emersonian
compensation offered by Harold Bloom in his 1984 article "Mr. America" in The
New York Review, he writes:
Emerson's notion of "compensation" has been defended by Harold
Bloom, who cites a sentence from the older Emerson saying it
means "nothing is got for nothing." Yes; but more characteristic is
this remark of the early Emerson: 'There is always some levelling
circumstance that puts down the overbearing, the strong, the rich,
the fortunate, substantially on the same ground with others.'
Perhaps death does that; but short of death what could Emerson
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have meant? As one who has spent a good part of his life looking
for the 'levelling circumstance' of which Emerson speaks, I can
only report that thus far it has steadily eluded me. (Howe 14)
It is impossible, for Howe, to reconcile Emerson's notion of the "leveling" or
"vindictive" circumstance with the unequal distribution of wealth and social
injustice that he sees and experiences all around him. Bloom's synopsis of the
principle of compensation in the maxim "nothing is got for nothing," or as
Emerson also puts it "in Nature nothing can be given, all things are sold," offers
for Howe, very little moral or philosophical guidance, and even less comfort, in
the presence of the pain and imparity of human experience (Emerson 65). For
Christopher Lasch, however, what Emerson's principle of compensation is tapping
into is what he calls "the producer ideology of Anglo-American populism," a kind
of combination of middle-class political morality and the "expression of the folk
wisdom that condemns every attempt to get something for nothing" (265; 270).
That there is a price to pay for everything is a rather pragmatic moral
sentiment that, according to Lasch, Emerson transposes from the ideology and
political economy of populism. American Populism, preoccupied with the
corrupting influence of commerce on politics, with the condemnation of the abuse
of, not the desire for, wealth and power, and with the immorality of "unearned
income," embraced a sense ofmorality drawn from the wisdom gained through the
daily experience of economic exchange. Often fusing Jeffersonian liberalism,
Protestant ethics, and Jacksonian producerism, Populism struggled to oppose the
powerful ideological and economic forces of progress and limitless material
expansion by defining its struggle of "the people" against "the interests" as moral,
as well as political. The values of commerce, understood by the populists as
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commensurate with the responsibilities of citizenship and the principle of
individual freedom, provide a powerful language that Emerson utilizes to express
what Lasch calls his "theology of producerism."
Always pay; for, first or last, you must pay your entire debt.
Persons and events may stand for a time between you and justice,
but it is only a postponement. You must pay at last your own debt.
If you are wise, you will dread a prosperity which only loads you
with more. Benefit is the end of nature. But for every benefit
which you receive, a tax is levied. (Emerson 68)
In this regard it is significant, for our understanding of the political perspective of
both Vineland and Emerson, that prominent amongst Emerson's list of those who
"in vain set their shoulders to heave the bar," are "proprietors and monopolists."
Neither Emerson, nor certainly Pynchon via Jess Traverse, denies the
reality of injustice. In fact, what the principle of compensation provides is a vision
of nature, of fate, and of virtue with which to face injustice. Howe himself, while
certainly skeptical about the validity of Emerson's notion of a "levelling
circumstance," nevertheless admits spending a good part of his life looking and
hoping for it. Jess Traverse, by evoking Emerson each year, reaffirms his belief
that injustice is not the inevitable way of things, that justice is a present and vital
force in the world. For Emerson there is, in our daily experience, enough evidence
of his "perfectionist" understanding of justice, to hearten us, to keep us from
despair, and, if necessary, in Stanley Cavell's terms, to provide "Hope Against
Hope."
Howe argues that the notion of compensation was Emerson's personal
bulwark against his own skepticism and private disillusionment, which as Howe
tells it, were largely the consequence of his social conscience and political
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engagement.14 Deeply troubled by the continued presence of slavery, and
outraged by events such as the enactment of the Fugitive Slave Law, Emerson,
while never abandoning his skepticism regarding political and social reform, was
"forced by conscience," and by "the moral urgency which the struggle over
slavery took on," to become more active in the anti-slavery movement (Howe 76-
77). It is this yielding to his public obligations, the frustrating and discouraging
experience of active involvement in the struggle against the social, political, and
institutional injustices of his day, that Howe believes pushed Emerson's idealism
to near-exhaustion. It was the political realm, according to Howe, that put
Emerson face-to-face with "the spiritual tokens of nihilism that lurks at the bottom
of everything, not to be explored" (79).
There is something of this spiritual exhaustion in the air at the Traverse-
Becker reunion, as various generations of the family come together to give voice
to their well-earned and well-worn political cynicism:
And other grandfolks could be heard arguing the perennial question
of whether the United States still lingered in a prefascist twilight, or
whether that darkness had fallen long stupefied years ago. [...] One
by one, as other voices joined in, the names began—some shouted,
some accompanied by spit, the old reliable names good for hours of
contention, stomach distress, and insomnia—Hitler, Roosevelt,
Kennedy, Nixon, Hoover, Mafia, CIA, Reagan, Kissinger, that
collection of names and their tragic interweaving that stood not
constellated above in any nightwide remoteness of light, but below,
diminished to the last unfaceable American secret, to be pressed,
each time deeper, again and again beneath the meanest of random
soles, one blackly fermenting leaf of the forest floor that nobody
wanted to turn over, because of all that lived, virulent, waiting, just
beneath. (Pynchon Vineland 371-372)
14 In his essay "Irving Howe: The Left in the Reagan Era," Leo Marx argues that Howe's rather
sympathetic depiction of Emerson as a disillusioned idealist "expresses the pathos of the American
left in the Reagan age. It brings to mind Howe's account of his own enervating service to the idea
of socialism," and is indicative of "his loss of confidence in the future of the left in America"
(347).
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Such a pessimistic understanding of history and politics might appear to exist
rather uncomfortably beside Emerson's principle of compensation, but in
Emerson's will to believe that justice will prevail, maintained in the face of the
experience of injustice, and without denying the tragic elements of history, Lasch,
Cavell, Howe, and it would seem Pynchon, recognize the essentially practical
capacity to assert a moral vision of hope in a climate of skepticism and despair.
For Lasch, Emerson's determination to "assert the goodness of life in the face of
its limits," offers a template with which "to recover a more vigorous form of hope"
which "in the troubled times to come," Lasch tells us, we will need "even more
than we needed it in the past" (530). Stanley Cavell points out that "when
Emerson teaches that actions we take to define our lives [...] should be taken in
hope and on such claim to authority as only we alone, in our uncertainty, can bring
to it, he is teaching what Kant called practical wisdom" (Cavell 138). And Howe,
while wary of what he perceives as the sentimental and nostalgic elements of
Emerson's politics, nevertheless finds in Emerson's voice, confident and ever
counseling against despondency, a call to be resilient in one's aspirations, to
respond to the tragedy of circumstance with the patience of hope. But "Patience?
After all these bitter years?" Howe quarrels rhetorically. In answer to which, as if
in conversation, he imagines Emerson calling our attention to the final lines of his
essay "Experience": "Darkened with the knowledge of loss, he [Emerson] speaks
again: 'Never mind the ridicule, never mind the defeat; up again, old heart!—it
seems to say—there is victory yet for all justice'" (Howe 89).
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Pynchon enacts something akin to what Cavell calls the "conversation of
justice" in Vineland, a dialogue that inhabits the gap between the present condition
of justice in society and an ideal of perfect justice, which according to Cavell,
functions as an essential internal criticism of democracy15. This conversation,
which, in the novel, finds its arena in the conceptual space of the Traverse-Becker
reunion, a territory demarcated by Pynchon between the Emersonian perfectionism
of Jess Traverse, and the despondency of the American left in the Reagan era,
reveals both the many fronts on which American democracy has failed to bring
about a just society, as well as the continuity and resiliency of the hope sustained
by the founding link between democratic aspiration and the possibility of justice,
though specific events push that hope to the brink of exhaustion. The critics that
find only irony or a parody of facile optimism in Jess Traverse's Emersonian
vision of justice consider his evocation of the principle of compensation to be
rather wistful and sanguine, but against the powerful portrayal of debased justice
that pervades most of the novel, an instance of almost farcical credulity. Having
taken pains to paint so vivid a picture of injustice in America, surely Pynchon
cannot be participating in a "conversation of justice" which takes seriously such a
Utopian vision. Thus, having rejected the possibility of a Pollyanna Pynchon, such
critics leave, as the only plausible modes with which to account for the
Emersonian evocation in Vineland, the skeptical withdrawal of irony or the mock
apologetics of parody.
However, it is exactly these two responses to the debasement of justice—
withdrawal and apology—that a democratic "conversation of justice" rejects.
15 For a view of Jess Traverse's Emersonianism as less perfectionism and more "transcendental
dogmatism" see David Dickson's The Utterance ofAmerica (164).
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Varsava is certainly correct to point out that, "Pynchon parodies facile optimism in
the conclusion to Vineland when Prairie, an innocent in distress, is rescued from
the dastardly clutches of Brock Vond," though he reveals only part of its
significance when he offers this incident as proof of Pynchon's assertion in the
novel that "justice is not inevitable" (Varsava 93). The debased kind of perfect
justice that Pynchon parodies is as much an indication of the usefulness and
necessity of a perfectionism vigorous enough to be compatible with democracy, as
it is a rejection of the facile kind of perfectionism which Varsava identifies with
"Hollywood's happy-ending syndrome" (93).
False perfectionism, as Cavell points out, invites a cynical response that in
turn, unless one is willing to abandon democratic aspiration to cynical resignation,
must be countered by hope. Cavell argues that "the mission of Perfectionism
generally, in a world of false (and false calls for) democracy, is the discovery of
the possibility of democracy, which to exist has recurrently to be (re)discovered"
(Cavell 16-17). Emersonian Perfectionism, because it invites us to not only look
for, but expect, justice in this world, to assert, without cynicism, the moral
imperative of justice in a world which appears to be dominated by the inevitable
compromises and failures of democracy, is, for Cavell, a perfectionism which
should be understood "not only to be compatible with democracy, but its prize"
(28). As a democrat, Emerson understands the virtue of political and social
criticism, whether based on cynicism or perfectionism, to be an affirmation of
democratic faith, an acknowledgment of the possibility of democracy intrinsic in
the choice to continue to participate in a conversation of justice that "only makes
sense on the assumption of democracy as our life and our aspiration" (Cavell 138).
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As a liberal, Emerson yields to the urgency of the struggle for social
reform, to the moral necessity of engaging the political realm, with a hopefulness
rooted in his faith in justice and progress, but without denying the skepticism
demanded by the experience of injustice, and the respect for the limits placed on
progress by what he referred to as Nature. David M. Robinson argues that, "the
spirit of 'Compensation,' [...] was crucial to Emerson, for it allowed him to take a
tragic view of history while he maintained at the same time his belief in inevitable
progress" (35). Judith Shklar locates the limits of Emerson's skepticism in the
moral sentiments of liberal democracy—"The public religion of Emerson's
America was the faith in progress, real moral and political advance. Democracy
depended on it. Emerson could not dismiss that faith" (Redeeming 60). Whether
one argues that Emerson's commitment to liberalism constituted the moral
boundary of his skepticism a la Howe and Shklar, or that his skepticism
concerning progress constituted the limit of his liberal commitment a la Robinson
and Lasch, it is clear that Emerson's liberalism, particularly his pragmatic
determination to preach resolution rather than resignation as the virtuous response
to the experience of the limitations of human endeavor, had recourse to a belief in
an ideal of justice vigorous enough to contend with the disappointment and defeat
that defines such a large part of human experience.
Thus, justice, for Emerson, is not only something which one hopes for, or
expects, or believes in, but it also something which one works for, earns, and for
which one pays a price. Whatever amplitude of insight and hope that the principle
of compensation might offer is earned and affirmed as part of the experience and
struggle of everyday life. As if to reinforce exactly this point, Jess Traverse
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concludes his reading from Emerson by offering an example of the principle of
compensation from his own experience—
'And if you don't believe Ralph Waldo Emerson [...] ask Crocker
'Bud' Scantling,' the head of the Lumber Association whose life of
impunity for arranging to drop the tree on Jess had ended abruptly
down on 101 not far from here when he'd driven his week-old
BMW into an oncoming chip truck at a combined speed of about
150. (Pynchon Vineland 369)
Jess Traverse, as a lifelong laborer, and servant of the struggle for social justice,
recognizes in Emerson's principle of compensation a moral doctrine that affirms
his conviction in the promise of American liberal democracy. It lends meaning to
the hardship and adversity, to the sacrifices and effort, experienced first hand in
the novel by Jess Traverse, which has been the price paid in the past, and which
will certainly be the cost in the future, for the advancement of justice. Jess
Traverse, and perhaps Pynchon himself, draws hope and comfort from Emerson's
passage, not because Emerson preaches a facile optimism or convenient quietism
in the face of difficult and disheartening circumstances, but because he challenges
those circumstances with his conviction, by affirming his faith in what is an
uncompromising and demanding conception of justice. David M. Robinson
cautions us that it is important not to underestimate "the extent to which he
[Emerson] had come to address political reform, daily experience, work, and
community as the keys to his moral vision" (7). While it would certainly be
overreaching to argue that Pynchon has taken on board, in toto, this Emersonian
moral vision, one should not underestimate the extent to which Pynchon, for
moral, political, and pragmatic reasons, feels compelled to consider it, to respond
to his own disillusionment and pessimism by taking seriously the hope for justice,
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and the belief in democratic progress, which has, to a large extent, characterized
the tradition of reform movements in American politics.
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CHAPTER FOUR
"The Real American Crazy Shit": Democratic Individuality in Philip
Roth's "American Trilogy"
Is it naive to continue to take seriously, in an age of identity politics,
culture wars, and post-Enlightenment skepticism, the promise of self-invention,
self-creation, and self-discovery offered by the heroic conception of America
formulated in the Declaration of Independence and promoted throughout
American history by figures such as Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln and
Martin Luther King, Jr.? Is it dangerous? Philip Roth's "American trilogy,"
consisting ofAmerican Pastoral (1997), 1Married a Communist (1998), and The
Human Stain (2000) raises and revisits many issues, both literary and political,
which necessarily cluster around the ongoing and distinctly American dialogue of
individuality, particularly as it continues to shape America and the American sense
of identity as the twentieth century gives way to the twenty-first. The stage setting
for Roth's fictional project encompasses some of the most pivotal events of
postwar American political history, including the anti-communist excesses of the
McCarthy era, the politically and culturally tumultuous period defined by the
Vietnam War, and the recent impeachment crisis surrounding President Bill
Clinton and his affair with White House intern Monica Lewinsky. Throughout,
Roth charts the fate of the idea of the individual in postwar America, dramatizing
the impact that the contingencies of history and provisionalities of politics have
had on the extraordinary lives of his three protagonists—Swede Levov (.American
Pastoral), Ira Ringold (IMarried a Communist), and Coleman Silk (The Human
Stain)—and thereby gauging the cultural, political, and literary vitality of that
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most archetypal of American figures—the individual undertaking the
quintessential^ American task of inventing him-or herself.
The political and social realities of American life have always been in
conflict with the mythic elements of American individualism, imposing limits, as
politics inevitably does, on the freedom of the individual, and constraining the
invention of the self within the circumscriptions of the social world.
Individualism, as an idea and as an ideology, lies at the heart of American liberal
thought, which, if we are to believe influential consensus scholars such as Louis
Hartz and Richard Hofstatder, places it at the center of American political tradition
and culture.' Indeed, individualism as a political ideal is, in contemporary Anglo-
American political theory, most often affiliated with liberalism, and particularly
with those notions of individual autonomy, "laissez-faire" economics, distrust of
the state, and opposition to all forms of collectivism, that constitute, in a general
sense, the broad inclinations of liberal thinking and values. That is to say,
particularly as the term has been bandied about in the continuing theoretical debate
between liberals and communitarians, individualism, though saddled with a wide
range of interpretations and meanings, has largely been remodeled as "liberal
individualism," the ideological association between the two traditions a well-
entrenched, though certainly still contentious, part of contemporary mainstream
political discussion.2
There are benefits to reading Roth's trilogy with either of these two
frameworks in mind. Calling attention to those aspects of his fiction that affirm
1 See particularly Louis Hartz's The Liberal Tradition in America, and Richard Hofstadter's The
American Political Tradition.
2 For a detailed discussion of this theoretical development and its implications see Colin Bird's The
Myth ofLiberal Individualism.
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America's shared attachment to its traditional liberal democratic beliefs, whatever
the particular antagonisms of specific political issues or cultural conflicts, as well
as to those elements which put that consensus under scrutiny and critique the
liberal commitment to basic ideals of equality and individual freedom, would give
us a sense of how Roth's fiction negotiates the difficult territory of the American
liberal tradition and its pertinence to postwar political and social dilemmas in
America. While, attempting to determine the extent to which Roth's fiction
indicates a certain sympathy with, or even determinate political commitment to,
the ideological or philosophical underpinnings of liberal theory and its rather
complicated relationship to individualism as a political ideal, would help
demarcate the theoretical boundaries of Roth's fiction and focus our attention on
how they might be said to participate in the ongoing discussion concerning the
often conflicting demands of the principles of social justice and individual
freedom amongst liberal thinkers in America. Roth's sympathies are
undoubtedly liberal, and either approach would provide a ground on which to
engage the political dynamics of Roth's narrative exploration of self-invention and
American identity, and thus, to some extent, both are useful for our present
purposes.
However, it is the way that the unraveling of history and politics has of
pulling at the seams that bind the idea of a common America with the notion of
American individualism, which seems most compelling to Roth in his trilogy. The
depth of the political, social, and personal conflict—certainly as central to the
American tradition as consensus—between the meaning of America embodied in
its mythology, founding principles, and democratic promise, and the reality of the
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experience of America as it continues to unfold, is the overarching subject of the
trilogy. Roth's characters inherit, as part of the American legacy, not just a
tradition of liberal consensus, and a belief in the potential of individual aspiration,
but also the unresolved ambivalences, difficulties, and tensions, particularly those
related to inequality, of American liberal democracy. The central protagonist in
each of the novels of the trilogy interprets this American legacy in his own
fashion, an act that puts each in conflict with the ascendant political, institutional,
and cultural forces of his day. Conflict, between the individual determination to
invent the self, and thus interpret the meaning of what it is to be American, and the
inescapable historical encumbrances of family, race, ideology, and the various
limitations of human nature, is what drives the fictional scenarios that Roth,
through his narrator Nathan Zuckerman, offers as part of the larger story of the
development of postwar American liberal democracy.
Alongside Roth's thematic concern with the impact of postwar political
developments on the vitality of the fundamental dialogue concerning American
individualism and identity, is a narrative undercurrent that runs throughout the
trilogy, which registers the postwar desiccation of the left in America. By tracing
the declension of postwar intellectual and political radicalism through the anti-
communist hysteria of the cold war period, the "revolutionary" politics of the
Vietnam era, and the onset of cultural politics exemplified by political correctness
and the "culture wars," Roth charts the diminishing spirit of the progressive,
reformist, and populist ambitions of the left in America. Roth's trilogy tracks the
retreat of the American left in the face of the forces of history, marking, if not the
end of progressive politics in America, at least the exhaustion of what Todd Gitlin
188
describes as, "that core belief shared by Americanism and by the historic ideals of
the Left: a belief in progress through the unfolding of a humanity present—at least
potentially—in every human being" (Gitlin 85). We will, as this chapter develops,
come to describe the historical and political encroachment on "that core belief' in
terms borrowed largely from the political theorist George Kateb and his notion of
"democratic individualism."
American political thinkers who have expressed a deep concern regarding
the decline of liberalism in contemporary America, such as Robert Hughes,
Russell Jacoby, and Todd Gitlin, have frequently reminded their readers that it has
most often fallen to the left in America to provide the engine for progress and
reform, largely through its willingness to imagine the possibility of an alternative
future, its propensity to understand selves and society in a manner that challenges
o
prevailing conventions and institutions. They also make the point that reform
politics in America has functioned most effectively when it expressed its
commitment to change in terms consistent with the highest principles of America's
liberal democratic consensus, offering its vision of the future as an advancement of
liberty or equality. As Russell Jacoby argues, "the vitality of liberalism rests on its
left flank, which operates as its goad and critic. As the left surrenders a vision,
liberalism loses its bearings; it turns flaccid and uncertain" (8). This political
situation in America, a state of affairs in which, again to borrow Jacoby's
characterization, "radicals have lost their bite and liberals their backbone," makes
it difficult for either liberal individuality or democratic commonality to flourish, a
point that Roth's trilogy seems determined to dramatize (xii).
3 See particularly, Robert Hughes' Culture of Complaint, Russell Jacoby's The End of Utopia, and
Todd Gitlin's The Twilight of Common Dreams.
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The "American trilogy" does not promote anything like a new vision of the
future for America, nor does it propose a particular program for the resurgence or
renewal of the American left. In that sense, Roth's work is not political, it makes
no real effort to argue, convince, or direct its readers towards a specific political
objective. What it does assert is an individualist sensibility, an affirmation of the
formidable resources of individuals in the face of those forces—historical, social,
and political—that make claims on the individual potential for self-creation and
seek to direct the aspirations of individuals towards particular identities, ideas, and
community obligations. Roth sketches episodes of extraordinary individualism
that amplify the ever present tension between self and society, creating
opportunities to consider the manner in which the self, in America, is perennially
ensnared in the conflict between the claims of self and social determination. The
political manifestation of this antagonism, the struggle between the politics of
individuality and the politics of community, when contained within the framework
of the American liberal democratic consensus, often yields provisional settlements
and compromises which lead to real progress, but, as Roth's work highlights, it
also too often yields periods of intense conflict, extraordinarily divisive politics,
and, perhaps the central object of his satirical gaze, what Roth calls "the ecstasy of
sanctimony" (Roth The Human Stain 2). Meditations on the fate of the American
self during these periods, on the tragedy of individualism during times of what one
character in American Pastoral refers to as "the real American crazy shit," are
what occupy Roth in the pages of his trilogy (Roth American Pastoral 277).
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Roth and the Party of Irony: Adamism and individualism in American
Pastoral
Presented with a novel entitled American Pastoral, containing chapter
headings with names like "Paradise Remembered," "The Fall," and "Paradise
Lost," Roth compels his readers to revisit what R.W.B. Lewis called "the matter of
Adam." Lewis's study, The American Adam, explores the notion of a mythic
American identity concentrated around the emergence, in a variety of nineteenth
century American literature, of a powerful image of the new world's representative
man as an innocent, liberated, totally individual figure. Lewis describes this figure
as:
An individual emancipated from history, happily bereft of ancestry,
untouched and undefiled by the usual inheritances of family and
race; an individual standing alone, self-reliant and self-propelling,
ready to confront whatever awaited him with the aid of his own
unique and inherent resources. (Lewis 5)
As Lewis follows the disputations and developments surrounding this image of the
"American as Adam" through the writings of, amongst others, Walt Whitman,
Nathaniel Hawthorne, Herman Melville, and Henry James, he argues for an
approach to American culture and identity as a debate, or at best a dialogue,
amongst historians, essayists, critics, philosophers, as well as novelists and poets,
which, during the second quarter of the nineteenth century according to Lewis,
was dominated by a contentious effort to define the American character with
reference to themes such as: "innocence, novelty, experience, sin, time, evil, hope,
the present, memory, the past, [and] tradition" (2).
Critics of Lewis have argued that The American Adam fails to adequately
engage with the central political concerns of the historical period in question,
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ignoring issues such as slavery and economic uncertainty in favor of a purely
textual approach. In the words of Russel Reising, "For all the political
implications of his terminology, Lewis distances his themes and the writers he
studies from engagement with issues beyond their private thematics in so far as
they relate to "the matter of Adam" (116). In defense of Lewis, John Whalen-
Bridge points out that, the epilogue to Lewis's book, entitled "Adam in the Age of
Containment," "is an explicit consideration of the relationship between American
literary mythology and political culture," arguing that while Lewis's seminal work
has fostered some ahistorical tendencies within postwar American literary
criticism, "there is also a political strain within [the] Adamic tradition" (Whalen-
Bridge 107). Lewis's The American Adam may not suggest a specific political
context for the cultural dialogue it examines, nor does it critique negative or
renunciatory attitudes towards social engagement within the literature that is its
focus, however, Lewis's study does assert a conviction about the Adamic myth as
a vital resource within American culture, as a "symbol of a possible individual
condition," which writers return to in difficult times to create characters which
"proffer their private dignity and their very amount of being as worthy to compare
with the dignity and being of the public world" (Lewis 129).
Lewis's Adamic figure constitutes an historic and mythic dream, an ideal
vision of life that stands against the forces of history, but certainly not outside of
them. The new Adam may no longer be, if it ever was, a politically persuasive
idea, however this certainly does not mean that it is an apolitical or politically
unimportant one. Leo Marx makes this point, more or less, when, in The Machine
and the Garden, he calls attention to contemporary liberal historians such as
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Richard Hofstadter and Marvin Meyers, whose work, he argues, demonstrates the
"impediment to clarity of thought and, from their point of view, to social
progress," that results when pastoral or Edenic myths are employed in the service
of political ideology (7). This is, of course, recognizable as the general argument
against pastoralism, the notion that when the pastoral sensibility appears attached
to a political vision, one is firmly in the territory of reactionary ideology, false
consciousness, and the "romantic perversion of thought and feeling" (Marx
Garden 10).
Pastoralism, as the argument goes, is fed by nostalgia, and thus, inevitably
taints politics with escapism, sentimentality, and an irrational resistance to change
and progress. It panders to the emotional need to venerate the past, to escape from
the difficulties and complexities of the present by evoking a time when the world
was a simpler and safer place. The image of the American Adam, the mythic
notion of the innocent individual poised at the beginning of a new history,
provides the pastoral vision with its perfect inhabitant, just as it provides the
conservative ideologue with the perfect citizen for his idealized version of the
American past4. As Lewis himself observes "the dangers, both to life and to
letters, of the Adamic ideal were acknowledged at once and have been repeated
endlessly" (9). However, for Lewis, this tells only part of the story.
4
Leo Marx points out that the "discerning, politically liberal historians of American thought," that
he uses as examples of critics of the presence of this kind of idealization of the American past in
political discourse rarely invoke the word "pastoral." Instead, as he lists them, "they refer to the
hold of "'rural values' upon the national consciousness ([Richard] Hofstadter), or to the 'agrarian
myth' (Hofstadter), or to the 'Old Republican idyll' ([Marvin] Myers), or to the 'myth of the
garden' ([Henry Nash] Smith])" (Marx, Machine 7). However they refer to them, according to
Marx, they all agree that the tendency to mythologize the past, in the service of political ideology,
"[helps] to mask the real problems of an industrial civilization" (7).
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The Adamic vision, argues Lewis, also lends American culture and politics
an "original sense of tragedy," in its relation to tradition, an approach to history
that includes a sense of loss as a vital component of its understanding of the
relationship between the experience of the past and the circumstances of the
present. It is a vision that has consistently provided "occasions for reflection and
invention," a chance to consider the moral significance and pragmatic impact of
developments in culture, politics, and society, as well as to affirm the possibility of
new developments and ideas for the future. For Lewis, the dream of the Adamic
individual functions less as an aspiration then as an inspiration within American
culture, a figure which always has the potential to "pose anew, in the classic way
of illumination as it did in the American nineteenth century, the picture of what
might be against the knowledge of what is" (10).
Adamism contains within it an expression of enduring democratic
cheerfulness, a willingness to return, again and again, to a vision of innocence and
freedom both in recognition of, and in response to, the often-tragic circumstances
that engulf such innocence. Lewis refers to those with this sensibility, which he
also characterizes as "tragic optimism," as belonging to "the party of Irony," a
group which "consisted of those men who wanted both to undermine and to bolster
the image of the American as a new Adam" (193). Undermine, Lewis explains, in
order to reassert the importance of tradition and community to the life of the
individual, and bolster in order to cultivate a sense of the vastness of individual
possibility. Lewis may emphasize the creative stimulus to writers that the tensions
between these two imperatives provide, however, he also clearly exhibits some
sensitivity to the moral and political implications of his subject.
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Lewis's purview obviously extends beyond the purely aesthetic when he
sees fit to criticize the "hopelessness" and "chilling skepticism" of cold war
America, a period which he characterizes as "the age of containment." There is,
he argues, something of a mordant skepticism coloring the contemporary picture
of America, an agonizing disillusionment pervading much of literature, and what
he calls "public conduct," that seems embarrassed by the innocence and simple
self-reliance that the Adamic figure represents. The image of the American Adam,
for Lewis, is perhaps best understood as a kind of test, useful for sounding the
depths of that sense of hopefulness and possibility that has always been an
important element of American democracy, a metaphor which consistently
provides the American writer with "a sensitive instrument" by which to gauge "the
moral weather of the life he [or she] was imitating" (153). What does the innocent
and self-directed individual experience when he enters the actual world, openly
facing the various dangers and demands of history and society? This question,
which lies at the heart of American Adamic mythology, will always have political
implications, particularly for those who view individualism as the vital center of
the American story.
Roth's novel, American Pastoral, self-consciously locates itself within that
strain of the American literary tradition which Lewis associates with Adamism,
presenting us with a hero, Seymour "Swede" Levov, that both embraces and
expresses the American promise of self-creation, a figure preoccupied with the
Adamic business of "forming yourself as an ideal person [...] who frees himself of
the pre-America insecurities and the old, constraining obsessions so as to live
unapologetically as an equal among equals" (Roth American Pastoral 85). Roth's
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Adamic narrative, his story "of the Swede's great fall," also makes clear the
unavoidably political nature of American identity, focusing on the tumultuous
historical events of the sixties and its impact on the direction and nature of the
"debate," cultural and political, concerning the meaning of the American
character, and the possibilities offered by the American experience (88). Roth's
novel marks the extent of the changes in the American attitude towards idealism
and nationalism since the end ofWW n, raising important questions regarding
what has been gained and what has been lost, and the implications for the
individual and for American individualism when the seams of an American
identity, and the idea of a common America, seem to give way.
Roth offers an indication of the scope of his project in what the novel's
narrator Nathan Zuckerman characterizes as "the speech I didn't give at my forty-
fifth high school reunion, a speech to myself masked as a speech to them" (44).
This speech, which Zuckerman began to compose after he had attended his
reunion, functions as a kind of internal monologue, an extended rumination in
which Zuckerman attempts to make sense of a night of "hugging, kissing,
kibitzing, laughing, hovering over" his childhood classmates who graduated with
him from Weequahic High, New Jersey, forty-five years previous. (45).
Zuckerman emerges from his reunion with a seemingly urgent need "to
comprehend the union underlying the reunion," to express the sense of a common
experience that united his childhood community, a common experience that
Zuckerman wants to argue, can, in some respects, be said to have been shared by a
whole generation of Americans (44).
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For Zuckerman, this common experience is strongly associated with the
end of World War II, and the general feeling he discerned amongst Americans that
their nation stood poised at a new beginning. There was, as Zuckerman puts it, a
more-or-less common sense after the war that, with "the clock of history reset and
a whole people's aims limited no longer by the past," the sins and burdens of
history had, in some sense, been redeemed by victory in the war, inspiring the
growing determination within individuals and communities of all kinds to seize the
opportunity, promised by the postwar period, for "Americans [...] to start over
again, en masse, everyone in it together" (40-41). Anxiety, hardship, racism,
inequality, and mistrust still formed a pervasive and persistent undercurrent of the
American experience, but it was now countered by a strong belief in a better
future. As Zuckerman recalls, "there was a big belief in life" illuminating his
predominantly Jewish neighborhood. Weequahic, New Jersey, like much of the
rest of the country, was caught up in the energy and sense of promise that followed
the end of the war, an optimism, as we are told, that inspired a community, and
indeed a whole nation, to believe in a better future for themselves and their
families. As Zuckerman, summing up the industrious and hopeful spirit of the
period, succinctly puts it, "a better existence was going to be ours. The goal was
to have goals, the aim to have aims" (41).
It was not this ebullience, however, that gave birth to the mythic figure of
"Swede" Levov, star athlete and ail-American kid. Indeed, as Zuckerman
explains, the idolization of "the Swede" answered the yearnings of a much darker
and more solemn time, providing succor for a community in desperate need of a
distraction from the uncertainty and horror associated with World War II.
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The elevation of Swede Levov into the household Apollo of the
Weequahic Jews can best be explained, I think, by the war against
the Germans and the Japanese and the fears that it fostered. With
the Swede indomitable on the playing field, the meaningless surface
of life provided a bizarre, delusionary kind of sustenance, the happy
release into a Swedian innocence, for those who lived in dread of
never seeing their sons or their brothers or their husbands again.
(4)
For those in his neighborhood, Swede Levov represented an "unconscious oneness
with America," an epitome of achievement, confidence, and style that seemed
effortlessly to transcend the contradictions and anxieties of the American Jewish
experience. "The contradiction in Jews who want to fit in and want to stand out,
who insist they are different and insist they are no different, resolved itself in the
triumphant spectacle of this Swede," a spectacle in which patriotism, communal
aspiration, and heroic individuality seemed to converge (20).
The Swede was a living symbol, a neighborhood figure whose exploits
transcended the confines of ethnic identity and neighborhood expectation,
representing for the inhabitants of Weequahic, a broadening sense of individual
possibility in America, as well as a broader notion of their own identity. The
simple, natural, guileless style of the Swede, typified according to Zuckerman by
"the Jewishness that he wore so lightly," communicated a distinctively American
way of being, that of the genuine democratic individual (20). The Swede's athletic
talent and glorious achievements provided a much needed distraction from the
horrors of war, however, embodied in the way he achieved them was "something
grander even than his talent for sports", what Zuckerman describes as "the talent
for 'being himself,' the capacity to be this strange engulfing force and yet to have
a voice and a smile unsullied by even a flicker of superiority" (19).
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For the Swede, the ordinary rules of being Jewish in America did not seem
to apply, the combination of his extraordinary physical prowess and his
"unsurpassable style," personified the powerful American theme of the liberation
of the individual from the inhibitions of social constraint and the limits of stifling
social convention. Manifest "in the marvelous body of the Swede" was the
promise and meaning of American democracy, a display of extraordinary
innocence, strength, and freedom which the inhabitants of Weequahic "embraced
as a symbol of hope" during the difficult and fearful reality of the war years (20;
5). In the words of critic Andrew Furman, "the assimilationist immigrant dreams
of Newark's Jews culminate in the heroic figure of the Swede. His distinctively
American brand of sprezatura goes a long way toward convincing Zuckerman and
his cohorts that they just might transcend the status of "jittering little Jews of the
Diaspora," as Shuki Elchanan predicts in The Counterlife" (Furman 36).
The Swede's presence as the embodiment of American individuality, his
mythic figuration as the Adamic individual and symbolic manifestation of the
collective American dream, is interwoven into Zuckerman's understanding of his
childhood, an integral part of both his own formative experiences, and the
formative experience of his community, generation, and nation as he understands
them. The hope and promise that the Swede represented to Zuckerman's
neighborhood during World War II was, to some extent, affirmed and internalized
during the remarkable energy of the postwar years, at least in Zuckerman's
recollection. There was, for Zuckerman, something powerful that united him and
his classmates,
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[a]nd united us not merely in where we came from but in where we
were going and how we would get there. We had new means and
new ends, new allegiances and new aims, new innards—a new
ease, somewhat less agitation in facing down the exclusions the
goyim still wished to preserve. (44)
The promise of freedom and opportunity that appeared to so easily attach itself to
the figure of Swede Levov seemed, for Zuckerman, for a particular historical
moment in postwar America, to have been realized, trumping the uncertainties and
hesitations which were so much a part of the worldview of the generation,
particularly of those who had lived through the Depression, preceding
Zuckerman's own. For Zuckerman, the Swede was the "boy we were all going to
follow into America, our point man into the next immersion" (89). He embodied,
not the realization of the American dream, but its vividness, its commonness, its
democratic promise. To again borrow Andrew Furman's terms, Levov's example
convinces Zuckerman "that the idyllic American pastoral life is no longer off
limits to the Jew in America" (Furman 36).
However Zuckerman, Roth's fictional narrator, tell us that he decides to
write about the Swede, not to celebrate the mythic qualities of his heroic
achievements or affirm the simple allegorical meaning of his life, but rather as a
way to approach the sheer inescapability and contingency of history. Some critics
have suggested that Zuckerman's fictionalized account of the Swede's life is an
attempt "to recover [...] the true subjectivity of Levov," to get beyond the simple
surface of his childhood hero to "discover a substratum" of subjectivity which
would serve to demystify, not only the mythic narrative of the Swede, but the
mythic notion of an ideal American self (Millard 24, Roth Pastoral 38). Indeed
Zuckerman conceives of his narrative as "a realistic chronicle" concerned with
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portraying Swede Levov's life "not [...] as a god or demigod in whose triumphs
one could exult as a boy but his life as another assailable man" (89). It is not
Swede Levov the hero that Zuckerman puts up on his stage, but rather it is Swede
Levov the tragic figure, the victim of history, the fallen idol whose story he tells;
for Zuckerman the tale of Swede Levov typifies "the tragedy of the man not set up
for tragedy—that is every man's tragedy" (86).
Zuckerman turns to the myth of the American Adam, to the figure of the
innocent hero suffering the tragic consequences of a collision with history, as the
narrative framework for his story of the Swede, not because it provides insight into
some deeper recesses of the Swede's subjectivity, but rather because it effectively
dramatizes the radical disruption in the sense of American identity and common
aspiration that the turbulent period of the 1960s visited on America. Zuckerman
begins to conceive of the scope and structure of his tale while dancing at his
reunion:
So then... I am out there on the floor with Joy, and I am thinking of
the Swede and of what happened to his country in a mere twenty-
five years, between the triumphant days at wartime Weequahic
High and the explosion of his daughter's bomb in 1968, of that
mysterious, troubling, extraordinary historical transition. I am
thinking of the sixties and of the disorder occasioned by the
Vietnam War. [...] I am thinking of the Swede's great fall. (88)
The Swede's tragedy in many ways mirrors the American tragedy that was
Vietnam, his desperation and suffering reflecting the violence done to the
consciousness of the whole nation. Many writers have called attention to this
notion of Vietnam as a wedge driven into the psyche of America, unraveling the
idea of a common identity, and exposing the vulnerability and illusory nature of
those ideals that provided the binding agent for the American dream. Vietnam let
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loose what Roth refers to as "the indigenous American berserk," an era of social
and political division, violence, and fragmentation, a period that political theorist
Francis Fukuyama refers to as "The Great Disruption," that stormed away at the
conception of America as a melting pot, as the land of opportunity and democracy,
full of immigrants aspiring to be middle-class individualists.
Zuckerman's image of an ideal American identity, embodied in the figure
of the Swede, was forged in the unifying days of the war effort. Echoing the
image of integration and common purpose proffered by Hollywood and the
obligatory multiethnic and socially diverse platoons of its World War II movies,
Zuckerman imaginatively reconstructs the Swede's days as a marine, providing a
detailed account, in first person, of the quintessentially American quality of the
eighteen year old Swede's coming of age, of his experience amongst the "Irish
guys, Italian guys, Slovaks, Poles, tough little bastards from Pennsylvania, kids
who'd run away from fathers who worked in the mines and beat them with buckles
and with fists," that he "lived with and ate with and slept alongside" (212). This,
for the Swede, illustrated the larger meaning of America, a nation certainly not
free from prejudice and discrimination—"Nobody gave us any Jew boy shit. A
little back in boot camp, but that was it"—but one with an impulse towards the
fusing of diversity with common aspiration (213).
The Swede's Americanism, his embodiment of and identification with
the American ideal, connects him, in Zuckerman's imagination, to other American
mythic figures such as the hero from John R. Tunis's The Kid from Tomkinsville,
the archetypal American pioneer Johnny Appleseed, and perhaps most
significantly, the slain Arthurian figure of President John F. Kennedy (7, 420, 83).
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As Kenneth Millard points out, these are examples of "a number ofmyths
American Pastoral employs to characterize an ideal of American selfhood and
nationhood," an ideal that provides an indispensable context for the Swede's
understanding of himself and his life (245).
Why, he lived in America the way he lived in his own skin. All the
pleasures of his younger years were American pleasures, all that
success and happiness had been American [...]. The loneliness he
would feel as a man without all his American feelings. The longing
he would feel if he had to live in another country. Yes, everything
that gave meaning to his accomplishments had been American.
Everything he loved was here. (Roth Pastoral 213)
Some critics point to this intertwining of the Swede's sense of himself with the
ideals of America, his identification with the mythic narratives of the American
pastoral, as an indication of a lack of individuality, a subjectivity wholly
constructed by national dreams and illusions. As Millard argues, "Levov's
conflation with myth is so complete that a sense of his individuality is erased;" it is
a viewpoint that Zuckerman himself overtly considers in the novel (24).
Meeting with the Swede over dinner, Zuckerman ponders the possibility
that the apparently simple nature of the Swede's subjectivity, his seeming lack of
artifice, ambivalence, and irrationality, was the truth of the man, that his interest in
the Swede was a misplaced attempt to impose a depth of meaning onto his
childhood idol that had no basis in reality.
Why bestow on him all this thinking? Why the appetite to know
this guy? [...] Why clutch at him? What's the matter with you?
There's nothing here but what you're looking at. He's all about
being looked at. He always was. He is not faking all this virginity.
You're craving depths that don't exist. This guy is the embodiment
of nothing. (Roth Pastoral 39)
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Of course, Zuckerman's attempt to tell the story of the Swede is the direct result of
his realization that such thinking is spectacularly wrong, that the significance of
the Swede's individuality, his subjectivity, is its ideal Americanness, the example
it offers of an individual who believes himself fashioned of democratic values,
liberal freedom, and American opportunity. Significantly, the Swede looks for the
evidence of the flourishing of these ideals, not within the American state,
American culture, American history, or American society, but within the
American individual, within himself.
What, for Zuckerman, the Swede finally embodies is not the American
dream, the myth of America as the Promised Land, or even the yearning for the
American pastoral, but rather that which all of those narratives seek to express: the
human aspiration towards self-realization, the desire for a time and place to act as
an individual, to register one's individual uniqueness and potential. The Swede
embodies the notion that the liberal ideals of America—democracy, tolerance,
liberty, and respect for the dignity of the individual—can cultivate an awareness of
the vastness of individual possibility, what political theorist George Kateb calls "a
sense of one's inner ocean," that can awaken a new sense of life in every
individual. He represents that element of the American dialogue, epitomized by
the work of figures such as Emerson, Whitman, and Thoreau, that elicits profound
hope and meaning from American individualism's claim to newness and
innocence. To borrow one of Emerson's pairs of terms that R.W.B. Lewis also
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adopts to help identify the many voices involved in the American dialogue, the
Swede is recognizable as being firmly in the camp of the "party of Hope."5
What is at stake in the narrative of the Swede is whether or not, in the face
of the crisis over the Vietnam war, the failure of the vocabulary with which he
imagines himself—"liberal," "middle-class," "tolerant," "decency," "unashamed,"
"producer,"—renders his conception of an American identity, centered around
democratic individualism, a bogus ideal. His daughter's bombing of a local
general store, as the Swede recognizes, is an act, not just of radical protest against
the Vietnam War, but also of radical rejection—rejection of American ideals, of
American identity, and, perhaps most incomprehensibly for the Swede, of her
American father.
For her, being an American was loathing America, but loving
America was something he could not let go of [...]. How could she
'hate' this country when she had no conception of this country?
How could a child of his be so blind as to revile the 'rotten system'
that had given her own family every opportunity to succeed? [...]
There wasn't much difference, and she knew it, between hating
America and hating them. He loved the America she hated and
blamed for everything that was imperfect in life and wanted
violently to overturn, he loved the 'bourgeois values' she hated and
ridiculed and wanted to subvert. (213)
For the Swede's daughter, and for the more radical and militant elements of the
New Left and antiwar movements of the sixties, there was no redemption or
reawakening from history available to the individual. America was diseased by its
racist and imperialist past, the origins of the American dream were tainted by
5
According to Lewis, "Historians after Emerson have either gone along with his dichotomies and
have talked about the "dualism" of American culture; or they have selected one of Emerson's two
parties as constituting the American tradition, rejecting the other as a bleak foreign hangover or as
immature native foolishness. But if we attend to the realities of American intellectual history, we
must distinguish in it at least three voices (sometimes more). American culture has traditionally
consisted of the productive and lively interplay of all three (7)."
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slavery, expansionism, and inequality, and the Vietnam War was yet another
manifestation of the curse of this original sin. The hopeful liberalism that the
Swede so effortlessly embraces, the prospect of achieving a better life through
hard work and individual aspiration which he claims as his right as an American,
provides no bulwark against Merry's anti-Americanism, against Merry's angry and
passionate alienation from her father's nation and all that it represents to him.
Anthony Hutchison sees Roth's characterization of the New Left's "anti-
Americanism" as "a by-product of the author's attempt to retrieve the idea of a
collectivist majoritarian liberalism that the political radicalism of the 1960's
rejected" (31). Roth, it seems, carries the standard of the communitarian cause.
Indeed, there is a suggestion in American Pastoral, that perhaps the New Left's
demands for a seemingly unlimited right of personal freedom, its complete
rejection of the middle-class way of life—of its values, sense of decorum, and
belief in the idea of America—-lurched too far beyond any reasonable definition of
the American liberal consensus not to have had a detrimental impact on reform
politics in America. The Swede's father, self-described "lifetime Democrat" and
New Deal liberal, expresses the sense of threat to the middle-class that
accompanied the inflamed political and social atmosphere of the period, decrying,
in a manner now commonly associated with conservatives and communitarians,
the growing sense of social disorder and moral decline in America since the end of
the war.
We grew up in an era when it was a different place, when the
feeling for community, home, family, parents, work ... well, it was
different. The changes are beyond conception. I sometimes think
that more has changed since 1945 than in all the years of history
there have ever been. I don't know what to make of the end of so
206
many things. The lack of feeling for individuals that a person sees
in that movie6. The lack of feeling for places like what is going on
in Newark7—how does this happen? You don't have to revere your
family, you don't have to revere your country, you don't have to
revere where you live, but you have to know you have them, you
have to know that you are part of them. (Roth Pastoral 364-365)
What Mr. Levov laments is not so much a lost American idealism, or the rejection
of a communitarian politics, but rather the loss of respect for any limits, the
elevation of transgression as the basis for progressive politics and culture, giving
rise to a doctrine of individualism that seems to have absolutely no regard for the
values which define his way of life, for his sense of decency, responsibility,
patriotism, and respect for hard work. It is incomprehensible to him that those
values, which so often in the past have provided the platform from which to
critique and challenge the reigning authorities and institutions of power in
America, have become objects of such contempt and revulsion, especially on the
part of the new "revolutionary" left.
If Roth can be said to be attempting to recover anything it is that element
of civility, responsibility, and belief in a common purpose that once furnished
middle-class culture in America with its moral realism, its understanding of the
indispensability of foundations, respect for community, and self-discipline, to the
flourishing of individualism. "What is the limit?" is Lou Levov's response to the
politics of the New Left, to its equation of liberation with the complete rejection of
authority and unhindered celebration of transgression (364). It is a response that
does not challenge the centrality of individualism to American liberalism in order
to rediscover a majoritarian or communitarian conception of the American liberal
6 Mr. Levov is engaged in a dinner party discussion of the pornographic film Deepthroat.
7
Largely a reference to the exodus of business and people following the 1967 Newark race riots.
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tradition, rather it objects to a doctrine of individualism that defines itself as
merely freedom of choice or radical personal liberation. For political theorists
such as Christopher Lasch, historians like John Patrick Diggins, and contemporary
Emersonian thinkers like George Kateb and Stanley Cavell, such a conception of
individualism stands in opposition to a more robust tradition of American
liberalism on the grounds that it produces an impoverished, atomistic, and
deracinated understanding of the American self, a self mired in cynicism and
disillusionment and severed from those liberal principles—like a sense of
vocation, an understanding of the value of work, and a respect for individual
integrity—that seek to further its aspirations and affirm its dignity. What Lou
Levov finds impossible to understand about the individualism of the New Left and
sixties counterculture is just how it expects to achieve a virtuous nation, or
community, or set of political institutions, without a virtuous individualism.
That Lou Levov's appeal for decency, concern for individual dignity, and
respect for family sounds like conservatism now, only emphasizes the extent of the
success of the New Left's attack on consensus liberalism. For Roth, the polarizing
effect of New Left radicalism on those coalitions which embraced the need for
social reform, seems to have isolated liberalism from what is most valuable about
the middle-class sensibility and its potential contribution to progressive politics—
namely its commitment to the idea of a common America. Central to Lou Levov's
middle-class liberal sensibility, for Roth, is its understanding that individualism, as
an ideal, must be encouraged and cultivated, but in practice should always be
subject to those limitations and compromises which experience, conscience, and a
sense of responsibility necessitate. Lou Levov's mini-jeremiad, like all jeremiads,
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tells a story of decline, demarcating a more virtuous past from a less virtuous
present. In many ways it signals a major transition in the story of the middle-class
in America, a story that once told of its faith in liberal progress, of a conception of
the march toward a common American destiny fueled by a shared aspiration for
greater freedom, more democracy, and expanding rights. Zuckerman speaks of
"the anticipated American future that was simply to have unrolled out of the solid
American past, out of each generation getting smarter [...] out of each new
generation's breaking away from the parochialism a little further, out of the desire
to go the limit in America with your rights" (85). This is the story that the more
radical elements of the New Left rejected, finding precious little progress or
promise in the middle-class faith in a common America and its central ideal of
liberal individualism. Confronted with a reformist left driven by the condemnation
and rejection of their values and ideals, the middle-class, like Lou Levov, is left to
look to the past rather than the future, and ultimately, increasingly to the emerging
voices of conservatism rather than the progressive left, for any recognition of its
o
vision of the American pastoral.
There is, in American Pastoral, an effort on Roth's part to reestablish
contact with the vision of America offered by middle-class reform liberalism
before, as Todd Gitlin puts it, "the idea of a common America, if there was to be
one at all, was ceded, by default, to the Right" (73). However, this is done, not in
s Andrew Delblanco expresses this line of thought quite elegantly when he writes that, "discrete
stories of particular groups within American society tend no longer to be regarded as tributaries
that come together in a collective national history of expanding rights. As the cultural critic Bill
Readings wrote, we "no longer tell a story of liberation as the passage from the margins to the
center." It is impossible to date the death of this story with any precision; but if we look
somewhere around the moment when the reformist dream that Lyndon Johnson called the Great
Society became a casualty of the Vietnam war. we will not, I think, be too far off the mark"
(Delblanco 94).
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the name of some communitarian or coliectivist doctrine, but rather as one method
of gauging the extent of what has been lost of that sense of possibility, appeal to
newness, and liberal democratic faith that once inspired and energized liberal
politics in America. Zuckerman's identification of the Swede with President John
F. Kennedy is itself an invocation of a more hopeful and inspiring public life
which, for Roth, appears lost to present day American politics, a reminder that the
story of contemporary American liberalism fits very neatly into the tragic pattern
of a vigorous idealism that could not survive the trials of a harsh reality9.
The gulf which the sixties and Vietnam opened up between the political
left and those Americans who are interested in social reform but aspire towards a
middle-class life or hold middle-class values, has left liberalism in America in
crisis, seemingly no longer able to inspire a vision of the future liable to bridge
that gap. The Swede's particular pastoral imagination is rooted in an image of
America as a place where the possibilities of the individual can be developed and
explored because of a common commitment to creating those social and political
conditions that encourage the flourishing of the self, a place where individual self-
realization is necessarily interwoven with the embracing of American democratic
ideals. When confronted with its antithesis, an image of America as a place where
individualism is distorted and manipulated rather than encouraged by "the
American way of life," and where liberal values constitute the greatest hindrance
to democratic reform rather than its most compelling motive, the Swede's innocent
9 It is interesting to note how often historians utilize the terms and tropes of tragedy to describe the
period of American history spanning the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. A very good
resent example is M.J. Heale's The Sixties in America: History, Politics, and Protest, in which he
entitles one of his chapters concerning this period "The United States in the World: From Hubris
to Humiliation," and writes that "the attempt of the Kennedy administration to revitalize the
American sense of mission now seemed to have been tempting fate" (69). This is a period that
consistently seems to engage the literary sensibilities of its commentators.
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affirmation of American idealism appears, not only naive and unconvincing, but at
least partly culpable for the intensity of "the fury, the violence, and the desperation
of the counterpastoral" reaction of the sixties (Roth Pastoral 86).
The issue which lies at the heart ofAmerican Pastoral is not the illusory
nature of the Swede's innocence for, as R.W.B. Lewis tells us, Adamic figures in
America are always and inevitably undone by their experience, but rather what
role, if any at all, does the Swede's innocence play in his own tragedy. Is the
Swede's affirmation of the redemptive myth of America as a place to express
himself as an individual, free from the encumbrances of history and undefiled by
the sins of the past, in the face of the suffering, oppression, and injustice that
drives his own daughter to murder as an act of political protest, an indefensible
transgression in itself? His daughter, and the radical anti-American movement
whose worldview she embraces, condemns the Swede's ideal of American
individualism as little more than indifference posing as innocence, and thus
morally culpable in a world fraught with such oppression and injustice.
Considering America's history of slavery and racism, the many atrocities of the
twentieth-century, and the tragic circumstances of the Vietnam war, any claim of
innocence is, from such a perspective, not only indefensible, but evidence of a
decadent ideology which is tantamount to complicity. While the Swede's brother
Jerry, a successful and much divorced doctor, contends that such claims of
innocence are nothing more than a self-serving illusion, an unsustainable
American fantasy that inevitably comes with a price—"And you thought all that
facade was going to come without cost," Jerry upbraids the Swede, "Genteel and
innocent. But that costs, too, Seymour" (280).
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Roth is certainly uncompromising in his dramatization of the tragedy of
innocence in America, the ultimate and inevitable betrayal of the Swede's idealism
by the "American berserk." However, just as dramatic as the Swede's lost
innocence is the sense Roth communicates in the novel of Zuckerman's need to
come to grips with the Swede's tragedy, his struggle to provide some narrative or
mythic framework with which to tell his hero's story. As the Adamic figure
within the mythic structure of Zuckerman's narrative, we expect the Swede not to
be prepared for his coming fall from grace; however, it is the extent to which
Zuckerman seems to share in that unpreparedness that closes the distance between
what the Swede embodies, his mythic figuration, and the role he plays in
Zuckerman's consciousness. Zuckerman tells us that despite a lifetime's
experience that has taught him that "no one gets through unmarked by brooding,
grief, confusion, and loss," he "was still convinced that for the Swede it had to
have been pain-free all the way" (20). In fact, we are told, one of the most
significant reasons, aside from his lingering adolescent hero-worship, that
Zuckerman decides to answer the Swede's initial request for a meeting is his
inability to imagine what could have "ever threatened to destabilize the Swede's
trajectory" (20).
If the Swede's innocence makes him complicit in his own tragedy, then
Zuckerman's innocence, his unpreparedness for the news of the Swede's fall, is
undoubtedly implicated as well. In fact to Zuckerman, as both a writer and as a
man, it is the recognition of the dramatic impact of this circumstance that is the
most compelling element of the Swede's story.
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He'd invoked in me, when I was a boy—as he did in hundreds of
other boys—the strongest fantasy I had of being someone else. But
to wish oneself into another's glory, as boy or as man, is an
impossibility, untenable on psychological grounds if you are not a
writer, and on aesthetic grounds if you are. To embrace your hero
in his destruction, however—to let your hero's life occur within
you when everything is trying to diminish him, to imagine yourself
into his bad luck, to implicate yourself not in his mindless
ascendancy, when he is the fixed point of your adulation, but in the
bewilderment of his tragic fall—well, that's worth thinking about.
(88)
Zuckerman celebrates the aesthetic and mythic meaning of the Swede's fall as a
kind of self-chastisement, a cautionary tale warning of the consequences of
retaining innocent attitudes in a corrupted and corrupting world, of the
childishness of "assuming that because he was once upon a time this mythic
character the Swede he had no limits" (72). Giving the Swede's story a tragic
structure, telling it as an Adamic narrative, dramatizes the notion of individual
limits by reaffirming the "utterly ordinary humanness" of an extraordinary
individual, exposing once again the vulnerability and provisionality of the promise
of freedom born of innocence.
However, if via Zuckerman, Roth affirms the ordinariness of the Swede's
tragic fall, he also affirms the extraordinary value of the qualities and attributes
that make his fall inevitable. The Swede's American pastoral, his personal
identification with the ideals of American democracy and individualism, evokes
that innocent aspect of American culture and imagination that, as Lewis describes
it in The American Adam, is ultimately as illusory as it is valuable. The literary
value of innocence is well evidenced by the sense of tragedy with which Roth
imbues the Swede's story. Ironically, this capacity for innocence, an innocence
which, in the American literary tradition, inherently contains the basis of tragedy,
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functions as a resource of hope for American democratic culture, a tradition that
constantly needs to imagine sources of individual inspiration, cheerfulness, and a
sense of possibility for the future, especially during times when such
encouragements are scarce in American public and political life. In terms of
politics, it makes possible a doctrine of individualism that binds the realization of
individual liberty to the ideals and aspirations of the American democratic
tradition, providing occasions and opportunities to express the conviction that
individuality can be a source of connectedness, that in America, to use the words
of George Kateb, "individuality's meaning is not fully disclosed until it is
indissociably connected to democracy" (Kateb Inner Ocean 78). This imaginative
resource, the capacity to reaffirm the proposition that individuals might, in good
faith, embrace the ideals of America innocently, in full knowledge that inevitably
the experience of America will defeat, and sometimes even destroy that innocence,
is essential to what Kateb calls "the doctrine of democratic individuality."
Roth's revisiting of the myth of the American Adam, in American
Pastoral, is very much in the spirit of what R.W.B Lewis described as "the party
of Irony." His expression of sympathy for the Swede, for his optimism, his
innocence, and his idealism is matched only by the vividness with which he
dramatizes his assailability, the frailty of those qualities with which the hopeful
individual confronts the contingencies and disruptions of history. The collision, in
American Pastoral, of Roth's sympathy for innocence and his recognition of
experience, embodied in the figure of the Swede, underscores Roth's awareness of
the vital role played in American culture and political thought, of what Lewis calls
"a tragic optimism," or what Kateb refers to as "a more experienced innocence."
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It is a temperament capable of affirming the promise of the future, while retaining
a keen consciousness of the burdens of the past, of bringing a sense of irony and
moderation to the dialogue of American identity that too often seems polarized
between the party of Hope and the party of Memory. Roth's novel attempts to
respond to the diminishment of this third voice in the American dialogue which, in
recent times, has struggled to eloquently articulate a perspective willing to affirm
the possibility of individual freedom while also acknowledging the inevitable
limitations imposed by the demands of community, or to cultivate a sense of a
common future as a way, not to absolve, but rather to overcome, the inequalities
and injustices of the past.
Roth's novel highlights the abatement of a liberal temperament towards
consensus, the difficult but vital work of searching for common dreams and
aspirations on which to build a nation, as a central feature of the American left,
and more generally from the sense of American identity, since the "great
disruption" of the sixties. Certainly the kind of postwar idealism and patriotic
spirit which shaped the individual and communal aspirations of the Swede, as
Zuckerman makes clear, lost its innocence in the sixties, particularly as the New
Left helped to reveal, along with the civil rights and feminist movements, the
extent and depth of America's problems concerning inequality and race.
However, to close off the ongoing dialogue concerning the envisioning of the
American future from the hopeful potential of American idealism and the unifying
potential of American nationalism, to simply dismiss the Swede's American
pastoral as an innocent dream or an unrealizable Utopian vision, stifles the possible
contribution of both the liberal aspiration for greater individual freedom, as well as
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the democratic aspiration for greater social unity, to that dialogue. Roth's attempt
to articulate the value of American idealism through revisiting the tragic moments
of its diminishment and rejection in postwar America dramatizes a liberal
sensibility that seems increasingly marginal to the political and cultural discourse
of contemporary America.
"All the brutish American stuff": McCarthy and the Betrayal of Lincolnian
Individualism in I Married a Communist
"Our age yields no great and perfect persons. We want men
and women who shall renovate life and our social state, but we see
that most natures are insolvent, cannot satisfy their own wants,
have an ambition out of all proportion to their practical force and do
lean and beg day and night continually."
—Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Self-Reliance"
If there is an historical figure that represents that idealistic strand of
American liberal democracy that promotes both individual self-construction and
democratic equality it is Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln's conviction that the political
ideals of individual liberty and egalitarianism as set down in the Declaration of
Independence should and could direct and shape American life as the political and
moral foundations of the nation, offers a vision of American exceptionalism that
takes seriously both the tragedy of the historical failure to achieve and live up to
those ideals, and the possibility of redemption to be found in working and aspiring
towards creating the conditions in which they might be realized. The appeal of
Lincoln for liberals lies not just in his advocacy of the intimate association
between individual self-determination and the principle of equality that was a
central element of his politics and rhetoric, but in the example of his life—
"Abraham Lincoln," as Daniel Walker Howe succinctly puts it, "preached what he
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practiced" (141). This "deeply felt dedication to the intellectual and moral growth
of the individual, and to the development of a political order that would support
such growth," reserves for Lincoln, in the mind of many historians of American
liberalism, a role in American history unlike any other. For those who see Lincoln
as both the embodiment and the spokesman of the political and moral foundation
of American liberalism, Lincoln assumes the role of teacher. "In Abraham
Lincoln," John Patrick Diggins contends, "liberal democracy found its educator"
(Diggins xix). It is in something like this role that Philip Roth casts Lincoln in I
Married a Communist.
IMarried a Communist is essentially framed as an American
Bildungsroman, the story of Nathan Zuckerman's adolescence, growing up in
Newark, New Jersey during the darkest days of cold war anti-communism, and his
initiation into the political and moral complexities of postwar America. The
influences that shape young Nathan, and direct his idea of America and being
American, are myriad and often contradictory. Nathan finds himself caught
between the idealistic and mythic America he finds portrayed in the books of
Howard Fast and John R. Tunis, embodied in the language of the radio plays of
Norman Corwin, and represented in the historical figure of Thomas Paine, and the
more ambiguous and much less heroic reality of cold war-era politics in America
epitomized by the campaign of defeated Presidential candidate Henry Wallace,
darkened by the excesses and betrayals which defined the McCarthy era, and made
personal and substantive, for Zuckerman, in the fate of the novel's central figure,
Ira Ringold.
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The first time Nathan encounters Ira Ringold, also known to the world by
his stage name Iron Rinn, Ira is dressed up as Abraham Lincoln, standing on stage
during a school assembly and delivering Lincoln's Gettysburg Address and the
Second Inaugural in front of Nathan and his schoolmates. It is an act Ira had
perfected while traveling around Chicago for the Congress of Industrial
Organizations, performing Lincoln at their conventions and picnics. Ira is the
brother of Nathan's high school English teacher Murray Ringold, an articulate man
of wide-ranging and vigorous intelligence, but it is to the glamorous, idealistic,
and rough edged Iron Rinn that young Nathan is drawn—to what the mature
Zuckerman describes as "the trinity of Iras, all three of them—the patriot martyr of
the podium Abraham Lincoln, the natural, hardy American of the airwaves Iron
Rinn, and the redeemed roughneck from Newark's First Ward Ira Ringold"
(Communist 23). In Ira, Nathan believes he has found the personification of the
romantic and heroic conception of American democracy that animated the books
and radio plays on which his imagination fed, and also a figuration of manhood as
experienced, passionate, and defiantly independent toward which he aspired.
Ultimately, of course, what Ira ends up embodying for Nathan are the
contradictions and abatements which experience imposes on the lyrical and heroic
conceptions of American democracy and of manhood that kindled his youthful
idealism. Into the heady mix of Corwin's "high demotic poetry" confirming "the
reality of the myth of the national character," and the Tom Paine-inspired
reverence for the defiant individual burning with populist conviction, Ira
introduces what Nathan, at one point, refers to as "firsthand evidence of all the
brutish American stuff' that was not to be found in the books or on the radio
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programs that, up until his meeting Ira, had been his window on the larger world
(39; 38; 49). Ira exposes Nathan's "native-son" enthusiasm and nascent political
sensibility to the gloom of hypocrisy, opportunism, dogmatism, and personal
animosity that is as much a feature of the American political landscape as
democratic idealism and the exercise of liberal freedom—a gloom, as Roth's novel
emphasizes, which was especially prevalent during what came to be known as the
McCarthy era.
IMarried a Communist, however, is not a novel that revisits that infamous
period of American history in order to issue a passionate condemnation of the
figures and events central to its anti-communist witch-hunts as Robert Coover
does in The Public Burning, or to undertake an explanation/ apology for the New
Left politics of the 1960s which arose in reaction to the virulent anti-communism
of the 1950s as E.L Doctorow does in The Book ofDaniel10, rather Roth's novel
calls attention to the lingering smell of the tawdriness and sensationalism of
McCarthy-style politics in the melange of sanctimoniousness and prurience that
Roth detects in the tabloid world of scandal and spectacle which characterizes so
much of contemporary American public life. A sense of the very real impact that
McCarthy had on public and private life in America—as one historian of the
period puts it, "directly or indirectly he shattered countless lives and seemed to
inflict a mood of fear and suspicion on American life as a whole"—is by no means
missing from IMarried a Communist, but in his depiction of Ira Ringold's fall
from celebrity grace, Nathan Zuckerman's disenchantment with both his personal
10 In Political Fiction and the American Self, John Whalen-Bridge points to Doctorow's novel as a
consummate example of an "indisputable political book" commenting that, "from beginning to end,
Doctorow's Book ofDaniel measures out as much justification as possible for the excesses of the
New Left" (Whalen-Bridge 4).
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hero Ira and with the heroic America which had fueled his youthful patriotism, and
Murray Ringold's Shakespeare-infused insights into the nature of power, Roth
displays a greater interest in dramatizing how American politics is intimately
entangled in "the thousand and one dualities that twist its nature into the human
knot" than in the grim details of the House Un-American Activities Committee or
the Rosenburg case (Rogin 2; Communist 280). What underlies the political tone
of the novel is not shock, outrage, or even bafflement at the theatre of human
cruelty, frailty, and simple-mindedness that gripped American life during the
McCarthy years, but rather Roth's mix of fascination and disheartenment at what
Murray Ringold refers to as "the postwar triumph of gossip as the unifying credo
of the world's oldest democratic republic" (284).
Considering the saliency of the novel's characterization of "McCarthyism
as the first postwar flowering of the American unthinking that is now
everywhere," it is tempting to ascribe the Lincolnian presence in the novel,
particularly considering its manifestation in the rather unlikely guise of radio actor
and committed communist Ira Ringold, solely to a satirical flourish on Roth's part,
designed to emphasize the disjunction between the ideals espoused by Lincoln in
his Gettysburg Address, and the reality of the postwar American experience (284).
Indeed, Roth provides us with a description of a contemporary event, a significant
postwar funeral oration, which stands in juxtaposition to Lincoln's famous address
delivered at the dedication of a cemetery for those killed in the battle of
Gettysburg and which, with Roth's characteristic black humor, trenchantly
illustrates the discordance between Lincoln's appeal to the memory of the
Revolution and the principles of the Declaration of Independence as the
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indispensable wellspring of the meaning of American democracy, and the kind of
abuse of memory and self-serving patriotic cant designed to "induce catalepsy in
the multitude" that Roth discerns in the now standard rhetoric and pageantry
marshaled to mark the occasion of Richard Nixon's passing (278).
Roth, via Murray Ringold, evokes the staging of that particular piece of
political theatre in order to vividly exhibit the transition of Ira Ringold's personal
drama from tragedy to banal entertainment to farce. The diminishment of Ira's
role in the sordid story of McCarthyism to that of forgotten bit-player culminates,
for Murray, in then President Clinton's "exalting [arch-anti-communist and
disgraced ex-President] Nixon for his 'remarkable journey'," [...] and then
Governor of California Pete Wilson "assuring everyone that when most people
think of Richard Nixon, they think of his 'towering intellect'," and most grating of
all for such a careful student of Shakespeare as Murray Ringold, Henry
Kissinger's inappropriate evocation of Hamlet's tribute to his murdered father—
"He was a man, take him for all and all, I shall not see his like again"—in
remembrance of "that glaringly impure soul" (278-280). The loudest echoes of
McCarthy's season of personal hypocrisy, political ambition, and national
paranoia—the era, as Murray puts it, of "the accessible transgression, the
permissible transgression" that allowed "you [to] retain your purity at the same
time as you are patriotically betraying"—now resound, for Roth, not necessarily in
the outcome of ideological battles present or past, but in the kind of abuse of
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language and democratic bad faith that transforms Richard Nixon into a "great
patriot" by declaring him one on television11.
Betrayal, both personal and political, is one of the central themes of 7
Married a Communist, indeed of the trilogy as a whole, and in his depiction of the
form of modern politics pioneered by McCarthy and Nixon, a politics that dresses
its ambition and lust for power in the public clothes of piety for the sake of the
television audience and utilizes personal ruin as its most effective tactic, Roth
marks the extent of the betrayal in postwar America of those Lincolnian ideals
expressed in the Gettysburg Address and the Second Inaugural. The Lincolnian
veneration for the work of American democracy, famously represented in that
"long, chugging locomotive of a sentence" from the Second Inaugural that is
recited in front of Nathan's school with such a flourish by Ira, and later carefully
diagramed and analyzed for Nathan's class by Murray, in which Lincoln exhorts
Americans to "strive on to finish the work we are in," to labour to live up to the
political and moral commitments set down in the Declaration of Independence,
seems, for Roth, an ever diminishing concern of "the connoisseurs of deal making
and deal breaking, masters of the most shameless ways of undoing an opponent,
those for whom moral concerns must always come last," which seem to set the
tone of contemporary American public life (28; 278).
It is somewhat peculiar that this betrayal of Lincolnian ideals is personified
in the novel by the unmaking of Ira Ringold, a doctrinaire communist with a
11 "Great patriot" is a phrase used by Senator Dole's during his remarks at Nixon's funeral: "Today
our grief is shared by millions of people the world over. But it is also mingled with intense pride in
a great patriot who never gave up and never gave in." A complete transcription of the eulogies
given at President Nixon's funeral can be found at the Nixon Library website:
<http://www.nixonfuneral.org/Research_Center/Nixons/RichardNixonFuneral.shtml>.
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murdererous past, however there is a distinctly Lincolnian element to Ira's story, a
persistent striving that, in his brother's judgment at least, stands out as the defining
feature of his life. In the work of self re-invention, of re-creating himself as Iron
Rinn, celebrity and revolutionary, lie the seeds of both Ira's redemption and the
cause of his downfall. Lincoln, who was a passionate advocate for the redemptive
power of individual liberty, located the individual capacity for self-definition at the
heart of the ideals set out in the Declaration of Independence and therefore central
to the American conception of political freedom. Murray describes Ira as
essentially "a man perpetually hungering after his life," a man whose "passion was
to be someone he didn't know how to be" (319). Ira's struggle to construct a life
in which he would be both recognized and redeemed as an individual can hardly
be described as heroic—in Ira's case the Lincolnian character is more a role to be
played than an example to be followed—however in "the enormous wrongness" of
Ira's efforts, Roth portrays the double-edged nature of the individual capacity for
self-definition, the ultimate exercise of American political freedom as Lincoln
conceived it.
The individual striving after his or her life, and the propensity for bad
judgment, confusion, and error which that exercise often reveals, is a perpetual
source of social, personal, and political tension in America. At the heart of Ira's
story is what John Patrick Diggins, following Kenneth Burke, calls the "tragic
ambiguity" which perpetually surrounds the pursuit of individual self-
determination in America, an ambivalence made manifest in the many
encumbrances and limitations placed on individual liberty by the demands of
social and communal imperatives. As Roth makes clear, what makes Ira
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particularly vulnerable to the historical forces conspiring against him, to the
various "traps" set for him by his era, is his perpetual hunger to construct an
identity that fits—an undertaking rooted in the belief, which he shares with
Lincoln, that the fate of the self, in America, should be a matter of choice and
effort rather than custom or inheritance.
Indeed as Diggins points out, Lincoln's own ambitions often faced a
"tragic ambiguity," as "he tried to pursue the conflicting political values of liberty
and democracy, the self-determination of the individual, and the social
determinants of society" (Hallowed 284). Lincoln advocated that America's best
hope for achieving the future promised by the ideals set forth in the Declaration of
Independence, and its only hope for redeeming the past and present failure to live
up to those ideals, was to continue to embrace the often contradictory task of
pursuing individual liberty while remaining firmly committed to equality as the
moral "proposition" to which America was dedicated, even at times when that task
seems unrealizable. In both his actions and his words, Lincoln recognized that,
while too often yielding periods of conflict and divisiveness with tragic
consequences, the tension between the principle of equality and the pursuit of
individuality which lay at the heart of liberal democratic faith is an indispensable
source of health and vitality for American democracy; while Ira finds only a
source of weakness and regret in his worldly ambitions and appetite for
experience, his individual aspirations for wealth, status, and recognition coming to
represent nothing so much as his own betrayal of the ideology in which he so
fervently believes.
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This glaring contradiction in Ira between his individual aspirations and his
allegiance to the Communist party—for Murray the indisputable root of everything
that "enraged," "confused" and eventually "ruined" his brother—is what makes
him particularly susceptible to what Murray refers to as "the iron pole of
righteousness," that blunt instrument utilized by ideologues and zealots (of both
the McCarthyite and Communist persuasions) whose morality and politics appear
untroubled and untainted by the complexity and duality of human experience, by
that obstinate human tendency towards inconsistency, error, and impurity which,
in the final novel of Roth's trilogy, is epigrammatized by the phrase "the human
stain." From Ira's impersonation of Lincoln as part of his political theatre, to the
gaunt, exhausted look that Murray describes as "Lincoln's mask of sorrow" which
increasingly dominates Ira's appearance as the weight of his own inadequacies and
the personal and political betrayals of his era take their toll, the ironic motif, in I
Married a Communist, of Ira Ringold's resemblance to Lincoln underlines the
ambiguities and dualities of the human entanglements and individual motives that
Roth constantly points to as the inescapable historical concomitant to the
American democratic ideal (Communist 283). It also serves to underscore one of
Roth's central political observations in the novel—that when it comes to grappling
with the complexities and contradictions at work in both the high aspirations and
the sordid realities of the American experience, "purity is a lie" and the
simplifying certainties of self-righteousness a dangerous individual and communal
infatuation (318).
Passing Dangers: Self-Construction and Sanctimony in The Human Stain
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"For all their traditional antagonisms and obvious
differences, the so-called black and so-called white people of the
United States resemble nobody else in the world so much as they
resemble each other."
—Albert Murray, The Omni-Americans
"Many things are possible in America, but the singleness of
identity is not one of them."
—Leon Wieseltier, "Against Identity"
In The Human Stain, the final novel of his "American trilogy," Roth turns
his attention towards a more contemporary period of postwar American history
and finds the winds of sanctimony, what Nathan Zuckerman, returning yet again as
narrator, refers to as "America's oldest communal passion," once again sweeping
through the newspaper headlines, the ivory towers of academe, and the halls of
power in America (Stain 2). Set in the summer of 1998, the events of the novel
take place concurrently with the impeachment crisis which followed the public
discovery of President Bill Clinton's affair with White House intern Monica
Lewinsky, and are centered on the remarkable story of Coleman Silk, an African
American who lives most of his life "passing" as white and Jewish, and is forced
into retiring from his position as a Classics professor at a small New England
liberal arts college after he is spuriously accused of racism.12 Offered as a
response to the censorious and prosecutorial zeal which he depicts as a kind of
madness driving the often extravagant rhetoric and moralizing coming from both
sides of the so-called culture war in the 1990's, Roth once again looks to
dramatize the irony and ambiguity of individualism in America, in this case
unfolding the tale of Coleman Silk's partly heroic and partly tragic "struggle for
12 For a detailed exploration of the historical and cultural phenomena of "passing," in America, see
Gayle Wald's Crossing the Line: Racial Passing in Twentieth-Century U.S. Literature and Culture.
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singularity," his determination to move beyond the boundaries dictated by what
Coleman regards as the tyranny of custom, propriety, and inheritance.
The force of Coleman's resolve to escape the delimitations imposed on him
by his birth, particularly to free himself from the predicament of being black in
America, are largely forged by his experiences in Washington D.C., where
Coleman moves in the early 1940's to enroll at Howard University, an all-black
college. Refused service and called a racist epithet at a Woolworth's in downtown
Washington, Coleman is exposed to the kind of blatant racism and malevolent
prejudice that "his father had been condemned to accept," and from which,
growing up in East Orange, New Jersey his father had shielded him (106). He
also found himself unsatisfied with the communal identity that, for Coleman,
seemed an adjunct of life at Howard University, recoiling from what he perceived
as the "overbearing solidity" and insistent ethics of being a "Howard Negro"
(108).
Coleman rejects both the bigotry imposed by the "they of Woolworth's"
and the coercive morality and obligations imposed by the "we of Howard," seeing
both as obstructions impeding his desire to be "[f|ree to go ahead and be
stupendous," to pursue his largest aims and achieve his greatest potential (108-
109). Committing himself instead to "the raw I with all its agility," to becoming
"[fjree to enact the boundless self-defining drama of the pronouns we, they, and I,"
Coleman quits college to undertake his first act of conscious self-definition—lying
about his age to join the navy (108-109). Indeed, it is while filling out his
enlistment forms that it first occurs to Coleman that, with his green eyes and light
complexion, he "could play his skin however he wanted, color himself just as he
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chose" (109). It is this revelation, one that sets Coleman's heart "banging away
like the heart of someone on the brink of committing his first great crime," which
sets the stage for his momentous decision in 1953—having come out of the
service, enrolled at NYU, and met and proposed marriage to a white Jewish girl
without telling her he was black—to sever himself from his past, his ancestry, and
his family, and to live the rest of his life "passing" as a white Jewish man (109).
What Nathan Zuckerman's efforts in the novel, to unravel the many secrets
and layers of concealment surrounding Coleman's remarkable life, clearly
demonstrate is that, in America, race is a matter more complex, persistent, and
1 3
inescapable than either Zuckerman, or Coleman Silk himself, envisaged . In the
end, Coleman is undone, not by what his father called America's "Negrophobia,"
or by the exposure of what his brother Walter believes to be his betrayal of his
family and his race, rather Coleman is blindsided by what his sister Ernestine
describes as the "buffoonery" of the censorious university authorities who, in their
prosecutorial fervor, absurdly accuse Coleman of being a racist for using the word
13 It is interesting to note that, while discussing with Zuckerman her dissatisfaction with the politics
underlying Black History Month in America, Coleman's sister Ernestine, a retired teacher from
whom Zuckerman learns the truth of Coleman's background, gently chastises Zuckerman for not
knowing the story of Dr. Charles Drew, the black scientist who, as she explains, "discovered how
to prevent blood from clotting so it could be banked. Then he was injured in an automobile
accident, and the hospital that was nearest would not take colored, and he died by bleeding to
death" (Roth Stain 333). Arthur M. Schlesinger, in his book The Disuniting ofAmerica, also
alludes to this version of Dr. Drew's story, particularly as it is taught to American students through
its inclusion in The Baseline Essay on Science and Technology, an officially sanctioned
educational tool which contains the biographies of black American scientists. "It is a hell of a
story," Schlesinger writes, "the inventor of blood plasma storage dead because racist whites denied
him his own invention. Only it is not true. According to the biographical entry for Drew written
by the eminent black scholar Rayford Logan of Howard for the Dictionary ofAmerican Negro
Biography, 'Conflicting versions to the contrary, Drew received prompt medical attention'"
(Schlesinger Disuniting 80). There is little doubt that Roth included the allusion in his novel fully
aware of Schlesinger's reference to it in his book, and by having the apocryphal story asserted as
historical fact by a black school teacher who Zuckerman describes as possessing an "unswerving
allegiance to a canon of time-honored rules," is almost certainly designed to highlight the depth
and complexity of the history and mythology surrounding the issue of race in America (Roth Stain,
333).
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"spook" in reference to two chronically absent students whom he had never seen,
who happened to be black. This kind of disproportionate reaction, encouraged by
the growing preoccupation, amongst many on the elite academic Left, with
purifying the language of their antagonists and driven by the polarizing and
aggressive rhetoric which fuels the politics on both sides of the culture war, is a
symptom, for Roth, of a kind of cynicism which Stanley Crouch characterizes as
the "flight from the engagement that comes of understanding the elemental
shortcomings of human existence as well as the founding fathers did" (Crouch 10).
For Roth and Crouch, such cynicism, particularly as it manifested itself in the
moral and political landscape of the 1990's with the enforcement of campus
speech codes, the growing chorus of lamentations about the decline of traditional
virtues and community values, and the self-righteous and grandstanding calls to
"excise the erection from the executive branch," will always be at odds with the
American aspiration towards an heroic individuality because it fundamentally fails
"to address the tragic optimism at the center of the metaphor that is the
Constitution" (Roth, Stain 2; Crouch 10).
There is little doubt that for both Roth and Crouch, issues of race and
ethnicity are unavoidable when examining or discussing the unfolding story and
meaning of the American experience, but to oversimplify or sentimentalize the
nature of identity in America, to brush aside the complexity, variety, and
slipperiness of individual identities and interests in order to elevate the principle of
group difference or the proprieties of tradition to the level of political and moral
orthodoxy, promotes an impoverished and limited conception of individuality that
fails to appreciate what Crouch calls the "mysteries of human appetite" and what
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Roth describes in the novel as "every perplexity pumping the human imagination"
(Crouch xiv; Roth, Stain 333). As Ross Posnock points out, "Coleman's decision
to pass as a Jew is presented by Roth as a practical solution to his quest for self-
invention rather than as ratifying a cultural/ racial identity politics," and what is
undone by the furor over the "spooks" incident is not the secret of his
impersonation—in fact, as Zuckerman informs us, Coleman is buried as a Jew—
but rather his "singularly subtle life" as a created self, his nearly lifelong project of
self-control and discipline designed to escape the limitations and impositions of
race and ethnicity on his fate (Posnock 95; Roth, Stain 335).
The motives and politics underlying Coleman's undertaking are, ultimately
for Zuckerman, left as uncertain as everything else about Coleman's life. In his
eulogy delivered at Coleman's funeral, Herb Keble, a fellow professor at Athena
College, characterizes Coleman as an "American individualist," who, like
"Hawthorne, Melville, and Thoreau [...] refused to leave unexamined the
orthodoxies of the customary and of the established truth" (311). Roth, however,
is careful to undercut such mythologizing, as wary of the simplifications and
romanticizations of "rugged individualism" as of the reductions and
sentimentalizations of identity politics. Zuckerman is left wondering whether
Coleman's decision provided him with a kind of adventure, "traveling through life
incognito," or was he "merely being another American and, in the great frontier
tradition, accepting the democratic invitation to throw over your origins if to do so
contributes to the pursuit of happiness?" (Roth, Stain 335). Whether the motives
behind Coleman's decision were based on pettiness or principles or a bit of both is
a question left open by the novel, but what Roth's novel does definitively embrace
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is the energy and tenacious independence of Coleman's drive towards
transformation and self-creation. In Coleman's obstinate determination "[t]o
become a new being," Roth seeks to unsentimentally stage what Zuckerman's
declares to be "[t]he drama that underlies America's story, the high drama that is
upping and leaving—and the energy and cruelty that rapturous drive demands"
(342).
As critic Sanford Pinsker points out, the reality of America is such that
there are certain to be costs as well as gains involved in striving to "mov[e]
beyond parochial boundaries" imposed by society, particularly when it relates to
what Pinsker describes as "jumping the ethnic fence," and in The Human Stain,
Roth portrays both the liberating possibilities and the tragic consequences of
Coleman's oppositional conception of individualism (475). Roth dramatizes the
personal and emotional toll of Coleman's assertion of his individual freedom, or
what, in the novel, Coleman calls the "payments exacted" for "this license he'd
taken, this freedom he'd sounded, the choices he had dared to make" —the
alienation from his family, the lying to his wife and children, the need to maintain
constant vigilance and control in all aspects of his life, and, perhaps most enraging
for Coleman, the frustration of not being able to use the truth of his identity to
defend himself against the specious allegations of racism levied against him, the
battle over which, as Coleman sees it, drove his wife to suffer a fatal stroke (Roth
Stain, 136).
In many ways Roth formulates Coleman Silk's story to serve as a
cautionary tale regarding the inherent danger of deceiving oneself concerning the
sovereignty of the individual will, of underestimating, willfully or idealistically,
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the role played by race, ethnicity, and other social forces, in determining and
defining the historical circumstances which shape the fate of the individual in
America. Coleman is undoubtedly guilty of such overreaching, and he is left ill
prepared for the "tyrannical" forces of propriety when they emerge to demand
appropriateness, define the acceptable, and "enact the astringent rituals of purity"
or what Stanley Crouch refers to as the "flagellation rituals" that often "pretend
[...] to have something to do with the blue steel facts of unfairness in our country
and in the history of the world" (Roth Stain, 2; Crouch 34). Inevitably, the long
and tragic history of race in America casts too complex and inescapable a shadow
for even the skilled boxer and "greatest of the great pioneers of the I" Coleman
"Silky" Silk to duck forever, just as, for Roth, the optimism and singularity of the
life lived by Dean Silk should have proven too complex and extraordinary, too
marked by the desires, perplexities, and impurities of being human, the "stain that
precedes disobedience, that encompasses disobedience and perplexes all
explanation and understanding," to be so utterly derailed by the utterance of one
word (Roth Stain, 108; 242).
The central irony on which Roth ruminates in The Human Stain, just as he
does in American Pastoral and IMarried a Communist, is that while the tension
between the aspirations of the individual and what Zuckerman calls the "we that is
inescapable: the present moment, the common lot, the current mood, the mind of
one's country, the stranglehold of history that is one's own time" is a recurring
source of divisiveness, antagonism and discord in American life, it is exactly this
conflict between the demands of self and those of society, the perpetual struggle of
the individual, whether alone or in groups, to free itself from the limitations and
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constraints imposed by society, which often accounts for the progress America has
made towards the realization of the ideals that cluster around the liberal
democratic conception of America expressed in its founding documents.
Undoubtedly Roth affirms his protagonists' drive towards self-creation and their
desire to fulfill their individual possibilities, the individualist sensibility that is, in
various ways, represented in the stories of "Swede" Levov, Ira "Iron Rinn"
Ringold, and Coleman "Silky" Silk, but in each case his affirmation is
significantly tempered by a sense of the great distance which still exists between
the promise of American democratic ideals and the often tragic and destructive
ways that the historical forces of inequality, incivility, and injustice continue to
leave their indelible mark on both the individual American stories he tells in his




The American novelist, like every American, finds him or herself in the
middle of an on-going and continuous democratic dialogue. In the past, novelists
in America have played a significant role in engaging, shaping, and sometimes
directing that dialogue, often powerfully articulating the central issues and themes
that were at stake in the political debates and discussions of the day. As was
mentioned in the introduction, it is Ralph Ellison's contention that it has been and
remains an important function of the American novel to take up the challenge of
bringing the fundamental principles on which that dialogue is based into its
aesthetic and literary arena, as part of the important work of constantly revisiting
the liberal democratic conception of America, both as a means of doing justice to
the complexity and diversity of the American experience, and as a means of
calling America to account regarding the liberal democratic debts, promised by the
ideals on which the nation was founded, which remain unpaid. This can, of
course, be perceived as a limited and limiting political vision for the American
novel, but for the four novelists whose work provides the focus of this study, it
continues to provide a framework from which to both express their discontent
concerning the present state of American liberal democracy, and to affirm its
ideals and principles.
The underlying force that continually drives and animates political
discussion and debate in America is the fundamental tension that exists in a liberal
democracy between the principle of liberal individualism and the demands of
democratic equality. This dynamic and often contradictory relationship between
liberty and democracy provides the terms and framework on which the political
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and social struggles over the legitimacy and authority of democratic practices and
institutions in America are waged, and also, as I have argued, grounds many of the
thematic concerns which are explored in the novels discussed above. The four
central liberal democratic themes which frame this study—citizenship, legitimacy,
justice, and individualism—provide points of departure from which the concerns,
perspectives, and issues that one confronts in the particular novels under
consideration, can be explored, and the nature of the imaginative and literary
resources each novelist brings to the on-going dialogue and debate regarding the
state and nature of American liberal democracy, can be better understood.
It is also important to note how these central themes intersect and overlap
in and amongst the work of these four novelists. Norman Mailer's concern
regarding the crisis of citizenship that he perceives as directly associated with the
ascension of apolitical and corporatist forces in postwar America, leads him to
presciently consider, in The Naked and the Dead, the challenge which a
technocratic and democratically illegitimate form of politics poses to the health
and vitality of the American liberal democratic imagination, which as he conceives
of it, thrives on the energizing conflict between conservatism and liberalism that
technocorporatism seeks to exorcise from the political arena. In search of a
vitalizing and dynamic notion of political participation with which to respond to
the stagnant vision of politics advanced by technocorporatism, Mailer looks, in
The Armies of the Night, to affirm the existential aspects of American democracy,
that link between political freedom and existential action which, for Mailer,
constitutes the "revolutionary" idea of American democratic citizenship.
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Mailer's concern regarding the manner in which state power, in postwar
America, increasingly functions beyond the legitimating boundaries of democratic
political practices and processes is one that he shares with Thomas Pynchon, who
throughout his work, but particularly in Vineland, calls attention to the
intensification and expansion of state power in the postwar era, a development
which, for Pynchon, directly contradicts the political and moral commitment to
individualism and democracy which he holds as central to the idea of America.
Mailer also shares an interest, which he explores most extensively in Harlot's
Ghost, in the erosion of faith in democratic legitimacy and political agency, with
Don DeLillo, who in Libra, dramatizes the extent to which the postwar obsession
with secrecy and bureaucracy, particularly prevalent during the cold war, has
elevated the influence which paranoia, anxiety, and suspiciousness exert on the
American political imagination.
In Underworld, DeLillo delves deep into the cynicism, skepticism, and
anxiety which tightened its grip on American life throughout the cold war,
exploring both the broad influence on the American psyche, and the almost
mystical significance assumed by the most banal details, of life under the threat of
nuclear destruction. Underworld depicts the American imagination as haunted by
the twin apocalyptic forces of weapons and waste, and which, finally emerging out
from under the dark cloud of the Bomb, finds itself confronted by the disorienting
and overwhelming forces of globalization which appears to function well beyond
the control of any political entity or process, democratically legitimate or not.
Thomas Pynchon too casts his critical eye on the economic and technological
conception of progress that seems to be the driving force of contemporary
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American history, and like DeLillo, he looks to counter that seemingly implacable
force by marking, in his fiction, the cost, both personal and political, of defining
progress purely in economic terms. Similar to the sense of nostalgia for a mode of
public experience and sense of common solidarity which DeLillo evokes with his
baseball motif in Underworld, Pynchon also looks back to the recent American
past, in Vineland, in order to recover a more hopeful and vital sense of possibility
than seems to be currently available to the contemporary political left in America.
In Vineland, Pynchon dramatizes the fading influence of a conception of
progress rooted in the advancement of social justice which populist and
progressive movements in America have contributed to the larger story of
American democracy. Dispirited by the co-option and fragmentation of organized
labour afterWW II, the corruption of the liberal democratic ideals of the New Left
by the temptations of radicalism and consumerism, and the ascension of neo-
conservatism during the Reagan years, the forces of progressivism and liberalism
in contemporary America, are increasingly, for Pynchon, being rendered
anachronistic. Philip Roth, like Pynchon, writes with a strong sense of lament in
American Pastoral for the spirit of democratic hopefulness and individual
possibility that inspired visions of a common American future in the years
immediately following WW II. Such hope, for Roth, must always be tempered by
an awareness of the experience of injustice, inequality, and intolerance in
American life, but to completely reject the vision of a common America rooted in
a shared aspiration for individual freedom, as the more radical elements of the
New Left did during the Vietnam era, is, for Roth, to indulge a kind of cynical
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individualism that has had a disastrous impact on the fate of liberalism in
contemporary America.
Indeed, it is the way that the contingencies of history and the
provisionalities of politics conspire to pull at the seams that bind the democratic
idea of a common America with liberalism's aspiration for individual freedom that
is the overarching theme of Roth's "American trilogy." Dramatizing three
episodes in postwar American history when the tension between self-creation and
social determination strained the framework of the liberal democratic consensus,
yielding periods of intense conflict and divisive politics, Roth revisits the dangers
that always threaten the individualist sensibility in America. In The Annies of the
Night, Norman Mailer also recognizes that the political sphere is a dangerous place
for the individual, but like Roth, Mailer acknowledges that, with all its attendant
dangers, the struggle to free the self from the limitations and constraints of custom,
inheritance, and restrictive social imperatives, often inspired by the myth of
American individualism, is a primary means by which the movement towards
liberal democratic ideals in America is realized.
I have also sought to demonstrate how the perspectives which these four
novelists offer on these central liberal democratic themes relate to the key ideas
and criticisms of some of postwar America's most important and original thinkers
on the subject: political philosophers such as Sheldon Wolin and George Kateb,
historians such as John Patrick Diggins and Alan Brinkley, and social
commentators such as Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. and Christopher Lasch. Also of
vital importance are the imaginative and literary resources that these novelists
bring to bear as they explore their political themes, and a specific concern of this
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study has been to call attention to how Roth's and Pynchon's engagement with the
pastoral tradition in American literature, and DeLillo's and Mailer's utilization of
Gothic conventions, helps to shape and influence the manner in which each author
addresses political ideas and issues in their work.
Indeed it is at those points, at which the novelist's literary and imaginative
preoccupations and concerns overlap with the perspectives and conceptual
approaches associated with the study of American liberal democracy by specific
political thinkers and historians, that the role of the novelist in the on-going debate
surrounding liberal democracy in America appears most compelling. Thus, when
Norman Mailer's self-declared "left-conservatism," his concern for the "idea of
the revolutionary" which he argues lies at the center of the American democratic
tradition, compels him to reaffirm the existential elements of democratic
citizenship in America, he produces a novel, The Armies of the Night, which
effectively dramatizes the understanding of the kind of liberalism peculiar to
America put forward by historians John Patrick Diggins and Samuel Huntington, a
form of politics which works on the principle that conflict is the child of
consensus. And Don DeLillo, whose utilization of Gothic conventions to convey
the haunting of the postwar American imagination by the secretive and
democratically illegitimate exercise of power—by the state in Libra and by the
forces of globalization in Underworld—captures the dominant tones of paranoia
and cynicism in American culture, that worry thinkers like Richard Rorty who are
concerned that in the face of globalization and rampant consumerism, the sense of
political agency vital to the spirit of American democracy is being subsumed by a
"spirit of detached spectatorship" (Rorty, Achieving, 11).
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Simply characterizing Thomas Pynchon's work as an example of a
contemporary jeremiad, as some critics have done, has the reductive effect of
narrowing his rather sophisticated and often pragmatic critique of democratic
institutions and the state of liberalism in postwar America to the status of a
straightforward idealistic moral utopianism. In Vineland particularly, Pynchon's
political perspective is much more complex and subtle than the conventions of the
jeremiad would allow, though he does self-consciously evoke the American
literary tradition of pastoralism as an element of his self-confessed Ludditism.
Vineland does contain a devastating satire on the expansion and intensification of
state and corporate power in America, a phenomenon that Sheldon Wolin refers to
as the "megastate," and certainly takes a hard look at the consequences of the
failure of the sixties revolution and the New Left, particularly as it aided the
ascension of neo-conservatism and Reaganism in the 1980's. However, Pynchon
also takes seriously the sense of political hope and possibility which gave rise to
American reform movements, flawed as they surely were, such as progressivism,
populism, and the sixties counterculture, and recognizes that the basis of that sense
of possibility must be recaptured if the left in America is to rekindle the political
potency necessary to reverse the declining influence of the principles of social
justice on American political life and counter the ascendant forces of neo-
conservatism in America. Like Christopher Lasch and Stanley Cavell, Pynchon
looks to the moral pragmatism of Ralph Waldo Emerson for a source of this
necessary resiliency and unearths Emerson's principle of compensation, a vision
of justice that asserts its practical capacity to keep faith with the moral sentiments
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of liberal democratic progress even when confronted with the forces of injustice
and inequality on the march as Pynchon portrays them in Reagan-era America.
Philip Roth also engages the American literary tradition of pastoralism in
his "American trilogy," however his interests lie in the image it offers of the
American Adam, the archetypal figure of the self-reliant and innocent American
individual confronting the dangers and demands of history and society. Roth
revisits the myth of the American Adam as a means of both affirming the promise
of self-creation and individual possibility which the Adamic figure represents, and
of dramatizing the ever-present conflict between the aspirations of individualism
and the demands of history, society, and politics in America, a conflict which, as
Roth's trilogy demonstrates, too often yields periods of divisiveness and
intolerance with tragic consequences for both the individual and the nation. In this
way Roth calls attention to what George Kateb has termed "the doctrine of
democratic individuality," or the notion that one can know the meaning of
individuality in America only when it is indissociably connected to the aspirations
of democracy. In the individualist sensibilities of his protagonists, and his
portrayal of their tragic fates, Roth considers the irony and ambiguity of this
doctrine, finding within its scope both the seeds of progress towards a common
American future and the source of further divisiveness and conflict as the
encumbrances and limitations imposed by history continue to weigh on American
life in the present.
As represented by the vigorous and trenchant critiques of postwar America
that Mailer, Pynchon, DeLillo, and Roth include as a central element of their
fiction, there remains a significant gap between the liberal democratic ideals that
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America professes and their social, political, and cultural realization. However,
from Mailer's personal excavations of the existential ground of democratic
citizenship in The Armies of the Night and Pynchon's inability, in Vineland, to
look towards the American future without the lens of a half-pragmatic, half-
Emersonian hope for a renewed sense of social justice, to the persistent yearning
for redemption and renewal of DeLillo's characters in Underworld and the "tragic
optimism" which lay at the heart of the stories of three extraordinary individuals
and their collisions with postwar American history which make up Roth's
"American trilogy," these writers demonstrate a persistent faith in liberal
democratic principles and an abiding concern for the state of democratic morale
and the vitality of the liberal imagination in America. By focusing on specific
novels, particularly those which offer a broad historical perspective on the postwar
period, I have sought to examine the various ways that these writers have struggled
in their fiction to articulate a response to those aspects of postwar American life
and politics which they recognize as unjust, illegitimate, and divisive, but also to
appeal to the promise of America's founding principles which continue to provide
a vital source of hope and possibility for American democracy.
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